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Preface
We are very pleased that Springer was ready to publish a revised version 13 years
after the release of the first edition of this book. The following items have been
changed:
– The way we dealt with the problem of transversality in the first edition never
really got us satisfied. We now believe that we have found a way to deal with this
issue much more convincingly than before.
– The same applies to sections where we discuss companies that can go bankrupt.
We have incorporated new findings where they seemed important to us.
– We have extended the problems and included the sample solutions in the text; a
separately available Solution Manual no longer appeared up to date to us.
– The book is now open access. Such a feature did not exist a decade ago, and
we are extremely pleased that Springer makes possible this form of publication
today.
– Last but not least, we would like to draw the reader’s attention to the fact that the
title of the book has changed—seemingly only slightly. For us authors, however,
this is an important matter. We have found that the words “Discounted Cash
Flow” are too reminiscent of the literature aimed at practitioners whose job is
to find simple ad hoc solutions to the many problems of company valuation.
We are academics and see our mission in finding logically stringent answers to
complicated questions. This is sometimes quite far away from what practitioners
have to cope with. Unlike practitioners, we cannot accept “sticking tax rates
to capital costs in any arbitrary way” or ignore the probabilistic basis of risk
and uncertainty. Rather, we want to concentrate on the scientific foundations of
calculation under uncertainty and focus on the stochastic questions of valuation.
Unfortunately, it then follows that we will inevitably have to ignore some
practically important details in our analysis. But then, the title should not fake
what the book does not deliver. Therefore, from now on, the book is called
“Stochastic Discounted Cash Flow.”
v
vi Preface
Undoubtedly, empirical questions of company valuation are currently in vogue.
However, we sincerely hope that there will be a return to analytical questions in the
not too distant future.
Berlin, Germany Lutz Kruschwitz
November 2019 Andreas Löffler
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1Introduction: A Stochastic Approachto Discounted Cash Flow
A new scientific truth does not best gain acceptance by
convincing and instructing its opponents, but much more so in
that its opponents gradually die out and the upcoming
generation is entrusted with the truth from the beginning.
Max Planck, Autobiography
The valuation of firms is an exciting topic. It is interesting for economists engaged in
either practice or theory, particularly for those in finance. Amongst practitioners, it
is investment bankers and public accountants, who are regularly confronted with
the question of how a firm is to be valued. The discussion about shareholder
value (starting with Rappaport) indicated that one cannot tell from the numbers
of traditional accounting alone whether the managers of a firm were primarily
successful or did poorly. Instead, the change in the value of the firm is used in
order to try and determine exactly this. That suffices for the practitioner’s interest.
The reasons why academics involve themselves with questions of valuation of firms
are different.
If you look more closely at how finance theoreticians use to determine the
value of a firm, you quickly realize that firms are not seen by them primarily
as institutions that acquire production factors and manufacture either products or
services. The actual side of economic activities is not looked at in any more detail.
Instead, the income which the financiers, the owners in particular, can attain is
the question of interest. The ways in which firms contribute to fulfilling consumer
needs are of secondary importance. What is decisive is the amount of payments
and its distribution among the owners and creditors. The income a company can
earn determines its value. In the end, a firm is nothing more than a risky asset, or a
portfolio of assets. The valuation of firms deals with nothing else than the question
as to what economic value future earnings have today. It can be principally summed
up as: the more the better, the earlier the more desirable, and the more certain the
more valuable.
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The literature on valuation of firms recommends logical, quantitative methods,
which deal with establishing today’s value of future free cash flows. In this respect,
the valuation of a firm is identical with the calculation of the discounted cash flow,
which is often only given by its abbreviation, DCF. There are, however, different
coexistent versions that seem to compete against each other. Entity approach and
equity approach are thus differentiated. Acronyms are often used, such as APV
(adjusted present value) or WACC (weighted average cost of capital), whereby these
two concepts are classified under the entity approach.
We see it as very important to systematically clarify the way in which these
different variations of the DCF concept are related. Why are there several procedures
and not just one? Do they all lead to the same result? If not, what are the economic
differences? If so, for what purpose are different methods needed? And further: do
the known procedures suffice? Or are there situations where none of the concepts
developed up to now delivers the correct value of the firm? If so, how is the
appropriate valuation formula to be found? These questions are not just interesting
for theoreticians; even the practitioner who is confronted with the task of marketing
his or her results has to deal with them.
When the valuation of risky assets is discussed by theoreticians, there are certain
standards that get in the way of directly carrying over the results onto the problems
of practical valuation of firms. Theory-based economists usually concentrate on
specific details of their object of examination and leave out everything else which
they consider to be less important at the moment. There have been models in
which—for purposes of simplification—it is supposed that the firm to be valued
will survive for exactly 1 year. Or you find models in which it is required for
convenience’s sake that the firm goes on forever. But in return for that, it yields
cash flows which remain the same and it does not have to pay taxes. In yet other
models, it is assumed that although a very simple tax is brought to bear on the
business level, the shareholders are, however, spared any taxation. It is supposed
in further models that the price of an asset follows a stochastic process, which the
evaluator can describe very accurately and over which he or she is methodically
(mathematically) in total control. Such simplifications and specializations are part
and parcel of theoretical work. They are not only usual but extremely advantageous.
They are, however, not always appropriate for means of practical valuation of firms.
And this is the reason why considerable efforts must be made to move in the
direction away from the fundamental theoretical understanding, which derives from
assumptions demanding a great deal of simplification. Instead, a move should be
made towards valuation equations that are either not based on such a great deal of
simplification or else based in part on far-reaching simplifications.
The article by Modigliani and Miller represents, for instance, an important basis
for traditional DCF theory. Two things are characteristic for this contribution: first,
a very simple corporate income tax is depicted; second, the leverage ratio of the
firm is measured in market values. If you now have to value a German firm, for
example, the results from Modigliani and Miller cannot simply be applied. Instead,
you have to carry out appropriate adjustments. First, the German system of business
taxation is somewhat more complicated. And second, it could be that the managers
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of the firm have decided in favor of a financing policy in which the leverage ratio
is measured on balance sheet basis. The question must then be asked, “how are the
formulas to be changed?” The theoretical literature so far offers no clear path to
follow.
If the theory does not provide an answer, practitioners are left with no other
choice than to ad hoc adjust the valuation equations according to their judgement
so that they do justice to the present situation as far as they are convinced. For the
practitioner, the theory can only be a guideline to go by anyway. They are used to
taking matters into their own hands in order to make the theory at all useable.
The theoreticians are not under the same time constraints as the practitioners.
They are obligated to the truth, not their mandates. This is the reason it is not allowed
for them to simply change valuation equations ad hoc, which were developed under
the specific circumstances of a model, if the original conditions no longer prevail.
They must instead abide by the rules, which make it possible to check to see if
its assertions are correct. As a first step, the new conditions are to be described in
an orderly way. On this basis and that of further contradiction-free assumptions,
the theoretician must try to derive the valuation equation relevant for this case
with the help of logical and mathematical operations. It is only in observing these
conventions that they have the right to recommend a specific valuation equation
as appropriate. And it is only in observing these rules that a third party has the
possibility to check whether a valuation procedure in fact deserves the predicate
“suitable.” We are convinced that whoever does otherwise risks being accused of
having no scientific ground to stand on.
We will attempt in this book to stick to the line of thought just described. We will
thus not ad hoc draw up valuation equations, but rather call to mind the theoretical
groundwork upon which these were gotten. We see no other serious alternative in
this matter. Readers who take the trouble to follow along with us will indeed be
rewarded with a lot of discoveries, which are at once formally precise and also
economically interesting.
In closing, we want to get a little more concrete regarding the “long way round”
that we have propagated and impart what we regard as particularly characteristic of
our methodology. More than anything else there are four points, which differentiate
our depiction of the DCF concept from that of the literature up until now:
No arbitrage Certain paradigms dominate finance theory today. These include,
for instance, expected utility, the concept of perfect markets, the postulate that
the markets are free of arbitrage, and the equilibrium concept, just to name
a few. No reality-grounded theoretician would maintain that any of these are
empirically representative. We are well aware that managers and investors do not
always behave rationally. This presents the basis for an interesting development,
which is today referred to as behavioral finance. The investors’ assumption of
homogenous expectations is characteristic of perfect markets. It is clear to us
that in reality the market participants are working with asymmetric information.
Principal–agent models, which take exactly that into consideration, have made a
lot of headway in finance theory in the last 40 years.
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But as far as the development of valuation equations is concerned, finance
theoreticians have only been successful when they have strictly followed the
guidelines of the neoclassical paradigm. And this paradigm is based without ifs,
ands, or buts on the assumption that there is no free lunch in the market. Although
we are in reality observing arbitrageurs, theoreticians have never attempted to
make these arbitrage opportunities the object of independent theories. On the
contrary, the principle of no free lunch represents the indispensable cornerstone
of the neoclassical paradigm. That is why all valuation equations in this book
are based on this condition. We are sure that this principle has not always been
consequently paid attention to by other authors regarding the issue of valuation
of firms and we will make that pointedly clear at the appropriate spot.
Cost of capital Cost of capital is definitely one of the key concepts in finance.
Surprisingly, there is no definition of this term to be found in the literature that
is precise enough that it can be used with logical operations to get valuation
equations in particular in a multiperiod context. Since we regard cost of capital as
a central term, we have chosen to begin our considerations with its clarification.
But then, several statements that are considered in the literature to be obviously
true have to be proven by us.
Data given As far as we can perceive, the information that the evaluator has on
the firm to be valued plays no systematic role within the DCF literature. But it
is in fact exactly this that can decide how the evaluator is to calculate. That is
why we will always very precisely describe what information is supposed to be
available when we develop a valuation equation.
Uncertainty of Cash Flows We have found that when evaluating a company, many
practitioners attach little or no importance to the stochastic structure of future
cash flows. Practitioners are much more likely to limit themselves to estimating
the expectations of cash flows. If we were to fully understand the significance
of this, then valuation concepts explicitly based on the stochastic structure of
payment patterns are ruled out.
We are thus concentrating on models, where the expectation of the cash flows is
of central interest and extraneous information about the distribution of cash flows
is left out. That will play an important role in our analysis.
The first version of our book has been published some 10 years ago. Since then
we have worked continuously on the subject and added new insights to the second
edition. We removed mistakes and typos, added a new chapter on transversality and
were able to enrich our findings on default. New literature was also included. Some
of our ideas have since then found its way into textbooks (see, among others, Fan
and Yo (2017, p. 346 ff.)), although we still think that a systematic and concise
approach as we prefer it is still missing.
In the first edition of the book we marked all random variables with a tilde,
i.e., ˜X. Today, such a notation clearly looks old-fashioned, typographically complex,
and in the modern literature the use of the tilde is discouraged. Notwithstanding
this fact, we decided to mark random variables with a tilde and this mainly for
Reference 5
didactic reasons. Otherwise, it would require some time for the inexperienced reader
to notice that an equation like
E[X · Y ] = X · E[Y ]
needs several assumptions for being correct.
We have provided extensive supplementary material for those who want to use
this book for teaching. You find slides and additional material on our website
http://www.wacc.info/.
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2Basic Elements: Cash Flow, Tax, Expectation,Cost of Capital, Value
2.1 Fundamental Terms
Valuation is being talked about everywhere. Finance experts, CPAs, investment
bankers, and business consultants are discussing the advantages and disadvantages
of discounted cash flow (DCF) methods since years. This book takes part in the
discussion, and intends to make a theoretical contribution to it.
Those who get involved with the DCF approach will inevitably run into a number
of reoccurring terms. It is typically said that the valuation of a firm involves the
discounting
– of its future payment surpluses
– after consideration of taxes
– using the appropriate cost of capital.
Three things must obviously be clarified: firstly, it must be understood what payment
surpluses are; secondly, a proper understanding of the taxes taken into consideration
is needed; and thirdly, information about the cost of capital is required.
The payment surpluses, which are to be discounted, are also called cash flows.
Nowhere in the literature this term is clearly defined. So one can be certain that
no two economists speaking about cash flows will have one and the same thing in
mind. The reader of this book might expect that we will go into elaborate detail on
how cash flows are determined. We will disappoint these hopes. Essentially, we will
be limiting ourselves to working out the difference between gross cash flows and
free cash flows.
It is relatively clear what one means when speaking of taxes while doing a
business valuation. The lawmakers leave no doubt as to which payments are due
to him. Furthermore, it is known to all those involved in business valuation that
taxes on profit are to be taken into particular consideration. Finally, every evaluator
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knows that there are such taxes on the corporate as well as on the private level of
business. In Germany, for instance, one must think about corporate and trade tax on
the business level, and about income tax on the level of the financiers. This book is
not, however, intended for readers who are interested in the details of a particular
national tax system. Therefore, we do not plan to individually present the British,
German, or US tax systems. On the contrary, we will base our considerations on
a stylized tax system. Some readers may have different expectations regarding this
point as well.
As a rule it remains rather unclear in business valuation what is meant by cost of
capital. Even those who consult the relevant literature will not find, in our opinion,
any precise definition of the term. This brings us head-on with the question as to
what cost of capital is.
Every theory of business valuation is based on a model. Such a model possesses
characteristics which we will describe here. In the following sections, we will deal
with cash flows, taxes, and cost of capital in some more detail.
2.1.1 Cash Flows
To make use of a DCF approach, the evaluator must estimate the company’s future
cash flows. This leads to two clearly separate problems. The first question asks what
it actually is that must be estimated (“What are cash flows?”), and the other concerns
their amount (“How are future cash flows being estimated?”). The first question is a
matter of definition, whereas the second involves a prognosis. We are concentrating
on the first issue.
Gross Cash Flow By gross cash flows we understand the payment surpluses,
which are generated through regular business operations. They can either be paid
to the financiers, or kept within the company, and so be realized as investments.
When referring to the financiers, we are speaking about the shareholders on the one
hand, and the debt holders on the other. The payments to the financiers involve either
interest repayments or debt service, or dividends and capital reductions. In the case
that taxes have not yet been deducted from the gross cash flow, we are speaking
about gross cash flow before taxes, see Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 From EBIT to
gross and free cash flow
Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT)
+ Accruals
= Gross cash flow before taxes
− Corporate income taxes
− Investment expenses
= Free cash flow
− Interest and debt service
− Dividend and capital reduction
= Zero
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Those who need to determine the gross cash flow for an already past accounting
year of an existing business normally fall back upon the firm’s annual financial
statements. They study balance sheets, income statements and, most likely, cash
flow statements as well. The way in which one needs to deal with these individually
depends heavily upon which legal provisions were used to draw up the annual
reports, and on how the existing law structures in place were used by the managers
of the firm. It makes a big difference if we are looking at a German corporation,
which submits a financial statement according to the total cost format, and in doing
so follows the IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards), or if it concerns
a US American company, which concludes according to the cost of sales format
and pays heed to the US-GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles). No
uniform procedure can be described for calculating the gross cash flow of the past
business year for both firms. Thus, we may justify why we will not elaborate here
on the determination of gross cash flows.
Free Cash Flow Companies must continually invest if they want to stay compet-
itive. These investments are usually subdivided into expansion and replacement
investments. Expansion investments ensure the increase of capacities and are
indispensable if the firm should grow. The replacement investments, in contrast,
ensure the furtherance of the status quo. They are, hence, usually fixed according
to the accruals. We are working under the assumption that the firm being valued is
intending on making investments in every period. Sensibly enough, those are only
investment projects that are attractive from an economic perspective.
We refer to the difference between gross cash flow after taxes and the amount of
investment as the firm’s free cash flow. This amount can be paid out to the firm’s
financiers, namely the shareholders and the creditors.
Projection of Cash Flows The practically engaged evaluator must spend a con-
siderable amount of her precious time on the prognosis of future cash flows: we
already mentioned that it is not the historical payment surpluses that matter to the
firm being valued, but rather the cash flows that it will yield in the future. The work
of theoretically based finance experts is generally of limited use for this important
activity. We will not be discussing practical questions related to the prognosis of
cash flows in this book at all.
2.1.2 Taxes
Income-, Value-Based- and Sales Tax As a matter of fact, a company is not
dealing with only one single type of tax. We usually distinguish between income
taxes (for example, personal income tax), value-based taxes (for example, real-
estate tax), and sales taxes (for example, value-added tax and numerous others).
For the purposes, which we are aiming towards in this book, the sales taxes do not
play any significant role—they simply depict a component of the cash flow and are
otherwise of no further interest. Value-based taxes are also not usually discussed
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in-depth within the framework of literature on valuation of firms. We follow this
convention and are concentrating largely just on income taxes.
Business- and Personal Tax Income tax is imposed on the firm level, as well as
upon the shareholder level. In the first case we will speak about a corporate income
tax, and in the second about personal income tax. In the USA, a corporate income
tax is to be thought of with business tax; in addition, income tax accrues on the
shareholder level (on the federal and local levels).
Our readers should not expect that we will go into detail on either the US
American or other national tax systems. In this book we do not intend to treat the
particularities of national tax laws with their immeasurable details. We have two
reasons for this. For one, national tax laws are subject to constant changes. Every
such change would require a new edition of the book. We are concerned here with
a general theory, which is able to deal with the principle characteristics of tax law.
Secondly, we would thus not only have to deal with the integration of one single tax
law into the DCF approach, but rather of the tax laws of every important industrial
nation around the world. This would, however, overstep the intended breadth of the
book.
Those who identify the value of a firm with the marginal price from the viewpoint
of a normal person will have no other alternative than to consider the business as
well as the personal taxes.1
Features of a Tax In order to more exactly identify a tax, three characteristics are
to be kept in mind, which can be observed in every type of tax. Thus, the next
pertinent question is, who must pay the taxes: this is the tax subject. The tax base
expresses how the object of taxation is quantified. And finally, the tax scale describes
the functional relation between the tax due and the tax base. We are characterizing
the corporate income tax and the personal income tax as well in the following with
regard to the three named characteristics.
Tax Subject The tax subject describes who has to pay the taxes. In the case of
the corporate income tax it is the firm, which is to be valued, while the object of
taxation are the business activities of the firm. In the case of the personal income tax
it is the financiers (owner as well as debt holder) who are the tax subject. The object
of taxation are then the income streams from the firm or other activities particularly
on the capital market.
Tax Base The corporate income tax is calculated according to an amount that is
commonly referred to as profit. If one thinks of the US American corporate income
tax, one effectively envisages the tax profit. Regarding the personal income tax the
gross income minus some expenses form the tax base.
1In Germany that corresponds to the viewpoint of the profession of chartered accountants, see
Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer in Deutschland (2008).
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Tax Scale If the tax scale is applied to the tax base, the tax due is established.
Linear and nonlinear scale functions are usually observed. We will be working
with a linear tax scale and take neither allowances nor exemption thresholds into
consideration. The tax due is ascertained by multiplying the tax base by a tax rate,
which we assume is independent of the tax base.
Such an assumption is obviously unrealistic. We do not know any income tax
worldwide where the tax scale is certain, an allowance (as small as possible) causes
the tax function to be nonlinear. In the recent past there has been done some research
on nonlinear tax scales and valuation but the number of pertinent papers can be
counted on the one hand. Hence, we will uphold linearity.
What is more, we will assume that the tax rate at the time of valuation is known
and absolutely unchangeable! That is a far-reaching assumption, and we are entirely
aware of the resulting limitations. We feel that uncertain tax rates have not been
discussed in the literature until now, besides in isolated cases, and not at all in the
DCF approaches to date. There is a gulf here between theory and practice that we
will not be able to bridge over in this book. The practice-orientated reader will
regard our course of action as rather far off from reality. In this book, we will later
speak a lot about certain and uncertain tax advantages. If we state this here, and
then later follow through on it, the manager may suspect—not unjustifiably—the
most important source of uncertainty to be future unknown tax rates. Regardless,
all known DCF approaches rule out just this source of uncertainty before we even
begin. We still have a wide field of research ahead of us.
2.1.3 Cost of Capital
We do not know if this book’s reader is particularly interested in a precise definition
of cost of capital. We are convinced that for a theoretical debate of the DCF
methods, it is of considerable importance. We would be happy, if our reader would
be understanding of this, or would at least develop such an understanding in reading
the book.
Cost of Capital as Returns In order to make our considerations more understand-
able, let us leave out uncertainty. The company that is to be valued may promise
certain cash flows for the future, which we denote by FCF1, FCF2, . . .. We will gain
a preliminary understanding of the notion of cost of capital, when we ask about the
role the cost of capital should play. It serves for the determination of the company’s
value. For this purpose the certain cash flows are discounted with the (probably
time-dependent) cost of capital. A valuation equation would look, for example, like
the following:
V0 = FCF1
1 + k0 +
FCF2
(1 + k0)(1 + k1) + . . . , (2.1)
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where k0,k1, . . . are the cost of capital of the zeroth, first, and all further periods
and V0 is the company’s value at time t = 0. In the course of our book, we will
see that we repeatedly need an equation for the future value of firm Vt at t > 0. It
would be convenient if Eq. (2.1) could be used analogously at later times. For that
we had
Vt = FCFt+1
1 + kt +
FCFt+2
(1 + kt )(1 + kt+1) + . . . . (2.2)
And one obviously gains a computational provision from which such future business
values are established.
By assuming Vn→∞ = 0 Eq. (2.2) can be used to infer the relation
kt =Def FCFt+1 + Vt+1
Vt
− 1, (2.3)
that gives us a basis for a precise definition of the cost of capital as future return. The
economic intuition of such a definition is most easily revealed if one imagines that
an investor at time t acquires an asset for the price Vt . At time t + 1, this asset may
yield a cash flow (a dividend) of FCFt+1 and immediately afterwards be sold again
for the price of Vt+1. The return of such an action is then precisely given through
the definition (2.3).
Obviously, the definition of the cost of capital (2.3) and the application of the
valuation Eq. (2.2) for all times t = 0,1, . . . are two statements, which are logically
equivalent to each other. If it is decided to understand cost of capital as return in the
sense of definition (2.3), then the valuation statement (2.2) is straightforward. The
inversion is true as well: starting out from the valuation statement (2.2), it is implied
that the suitable cost of capital are indeed the returns. This simple idea will be the
red thread throughout our presentation.
Cost of Capital as Yields Let us suppose for a moment that it is possible at time
t to pay a price Pt,s and in return to earn nothing else than a dividend in amount of
FCFs (in which s > t). If under 1(1+κt,s )s−t the price of a monetary unit is understood
that is to be paid at time t and which is due at time s, then we designate κt,s as yield.
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The value of a firm at time t , which promises dividends at times s = t + 1, . . .,
could be (again assuming Vn→∞ = 0) written in the form
Vt = FCFt+1
1 + κt,t+1 +
FCFt+2
(1 + κt,t+2)2 + . . . . (2.4)
But to the contrary of the valuation Eq. (2.2), the formal structure of (2.4) cannot be
used at time t + 1. The yields of time t will certainly be different from the yields










+ . . .
For our purpose it is only appropriate to understand cost of capital as returns and
not as yields.
Those who are used to work with empirical data will not hesitate to agree with
our definition of the term. At any rate, in all empirical examinations known to us,
returns are always determined when cost of capital should be calculated. It is much
more difficult to estimate yields or discount rates (to say nothing of risk-neutral
probabilities which will be introduced shortly). Therefore, defining cost of capital
as returns is suitable.
The question must now be asked how the concept of cost of capital can be defined
under uncertainty. We will first be able to answer this question more exactly in a later
section of the book.
2.1.4 Time
In order to illustrate a basic idea of the DCF model, let us use an agricultural
analogy: a cow is worth as much milk as it gives. For businesses and their market
value, that means a firm’s market value is orientated on future payment surpluses. If
this is accepted, then the question arises as to how long a firm stays alive.
Life span So long as nothing to the contrary is known, one cannot go wrong in
assuming that the firm will be around for more than a year. Such a vague supposition
is of little help. As a rule it can be said that firms are set up for the long-run, and
that most investors involved in the purchase of companies—and who fall back on
procedures of business valuation for this means—have an investment horizon, which
clearly overstretches 1 year. However, we are running in circles, because whether
we assume the business will survive for more than a year, or think that it will remain
active until “however long,” the picture is still pretty unclear.
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Coming to a head, we question whether it should be suggested in business
valuation that firms either have a finite life span, or are eternally active. It seems
rather bizarre at first glance to conceive that firms live infinitely.
Regardless, there are worthwhile arguments in favor of the fiction of the eternally
living company. When valuing a firm, which only has a limited life span, its end-date
must be determined. An exact answer—apart from very few exceptions—would be
impossible. Moreover, on the last day of the firm’s history, a residual value will
be paid to the owners. If you wanted to answer the question as to how the firm’s
residual value is to be determined, you would have to fall back upon the subsequent
payments to be attained—that certainly does not fit into our assumption anymore
that the world is just about to end. That is why an exact calculation of the residual
value would likewise not succeed. If it can also be shown that it makes no difference
worth mentioning whether you operate under the premises of a business life span
of, let us say, 30 years, or that the business is incessantly active, then the fiction of
an perpetually active firm, albeit objectively false, can be justified for the sake of
convenience.2
What we want to get across to our readers is to the effect that we are working
on the basis of an investment horizon of many periods, and do not yet want to
conclusively commit to either a finite (denoted by T ) or an infinite horizon. Since in
actuality, were our theory really to be put into practice, we should suggest an infinite
planning horizon.
Trade- and Payment Dates It is necessary to specify the trade- and payment dates
of our model. An investor, who owns a share gets the cash flow at just the right
second before t (see Fig. 2.1). If she sells this security at t , then the buyer always
pays a “price ex cash flow.” Although this arrangement is fully normal within the
framework of the DCF approach, we explicitly stress it here. It leads to not being
able to illustrate particular trading strategies in our model. For dividend stripping,
for instance, a share would have to be bought immediately before the dividend
payment—a comportment our model does not allow.
Continuous or Discrete Time We have decided that the firm to be valued, will
be observed over a time frame of several periods. But should our model now be
continuous time or discrete time?
2If cost of capital in the amount of 10% and constant cash flows are implied, then the first 30 years
explain virtually 95% of the firm’s total value.
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In order to make the difference between both types of models clear, let us look
at a firm with a finite life span of T years. If we use a time-screen, in which there
are only times t = 0 (today), t = 1 (1 year from today), . . . , t = T (T years
from today), then the model’s framework is discrete. We could, without question,
divide up each year into quarters, months, weeks, or even days. In the last case,
we would run the time index t from 0 to 365 T , and since the days are countable,
we would still be dealing with a discrete model. The more minutely we choose to
divide up the time, that many more sub-periods there are in a year. But only after we
let the number of annual sub-periods grow beyond all limits, so that the number of
time intervals can no longer be counted, would we be looking at a continuous time
model.
After we have gotten a good enough idea as to where the difference between
discrete time and continuous time models lies, we turn back again to the question
as to which type of model we should choose. In so doing, we find out that we do
not have any criteria by which we can ascertain the advantages and disadvantages
of one type or another.
One could get the idea that this continuous modeling is unpractical, since just
as the cow cannot be continually milked, neither can a firm pay out dividends
incessantly. So, let us instead say that the cow is milked once a day, and a corporation
pays dividends once a year, for instance. Such intermittent events can, however, be
included within a continuous time model, as well as a discrete time model. We must
think of something else.
In the modern finance literature, continuous time models have experienced a
notable boom. They are much more popular than discrete models. But the math-
ematical tools required in the continuous time models are by far more demanding
compared to those, which can be used in discrete time models. From our experience,
new economical understanding in valuation of firms is not gained through the
assumption of a continuous time world. In this book we always apply the framework
of a discrete time model. This is purely and solely for practical reasons.
Distinguishing the current time t = 0 (present) from the future t = 1,2 . . . ,T ,
the ending time T as seen from today’s perspective can or cannot be infinitely far
off. The length of a time interval is not dependent upon the situation in which our
model will be used. Intervals of 1 year are typically the case.
2.1.5 Problems
1. Let the world end the day after tomorrow, T = 2. Assume that FCF2 = 100




= 100. The riskless rate is
rf = 5%. We now show that yields and cost of capital cover different economic
terms.
(a) Assume that the yield for the first cash flow is κ0,1 = 10%. Evaluate the
company and determine the cost of capital k0.
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(b) Assume that the cost of capital for the first cash flow is k0 = 10%. Evaluate
the company and determine the yield κ0,1.
2. The reference point of our definition of yields was given by the time t . If we
would have used time t + 1 the corresponding equation would read
Pt+1,t+2 = FCFt+2
1 + κt+1,t+2 .










As the evaluator of a firm, we find ourselves at time t = 0, that is, in the present.
The valuation of firms is taking place today, and it is not necessary to worry about
how our knowledge about the object of valuation will increase over time. Although
we cannot, so to speak, move ourselves out of the present, let us still consider what
we know today, and what we will know in the future. We do not clarify how our
knowledge is increasing, but rather only how the additional knowledge is dealt with
and what consequences that has for the valuation of a company. This requires the
understanding of uncertainty and the notion of conditional expectation.
2.2.1 Uncertainty and Information
We begin with the hardly surprising announcement that the future is uncertain. How
now? For the variables analyzed by the evaluator, it means that today it still is not
known what those variables will be. It is not known how many liters of milk the cow
will produce tomorrow. It cannot exactly be said what the cash flow of the firm to
be valued will be in 3 years. Instead, there exist many possibilities. We also speak
of events, which can influence the amount of the cash flows. Uncertainty in relation
to the cash flow is marked by adding a tilde to its symbol,
FCFt .
This type of notation is certainly out of fashion: In many papers and almost all
textbooks random variables are nowadays not identified by a particular symbol like
the tilde. From a typographical point of view this increases readability. But we
believe that for someone who must learn the difference between a random value
and a deterministic number it is of great help if the random variable has a clear and
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visible label. There are transformations that are allowed with deterministic numbers
and that fail with random variables3—without a unique label this can lead to serious
errors. Therefore, we will persist on using the tilde.
States of Nature This representation leaves us in the dark as to what the interested
variable is dependent upon. In fact, it is so that we foresee various possible states
of nature. Such states could be described, for example, through product’s market
shares, or unemployment quotas or other variables. The cash flow would then be
dependent upon however defined state variables denoted by ω. If we do not refer to
the entire random variable but to the cash flow in one particular state, we use the
notation
FCFt (ω).
There are theoretical as well as practical reasons for our not making use of this
detailed notation in the following, but instead only using the more simple spelling.
So we will make no statements in our theory at all about whether the number of
the possible future states is finite or infinite. Rather, we simply leave it open, as to
whether the state space is discrete or continuous. The formal techniques for dealing
with continuous state spaces are more complicated than the instruments needed for
the analysis of a discrete state space. We are trying to avoid wasting energy as much
as possible here.
From our experience, every evaluator gives up making statements about future
states of the world. One tries in practice to determine the expectations of the
established quantities. And anticipated cash flows, or anticipated returns, are
approximately estimated in such a way so that they do not need to rely upon the
state-contingent quantities. Then why should we not try to avoid these details in our
theory?
For both these reasons, we will in the future hold back the contingency of
uncertain variables from states of the world, and will not further clarify the structure
of the uncertainty.
Notation In order to make ourselves understood, we must introduce a few mathe-
matical variables into the discussion. In so doing, we will use the notation common
in current finance literature. The reader who is not used to this, may possibly ask at
first why we did not try for a less exacting notation. The formal notation that we are
now going to introduce, does in fact take some time to get used to, but is in no way
so complicated that one should get scared off. It presents a straightforward and very
compact notation for the facts, which need to be described in clarity. We therefore
ask our readers to make the effort to carefully comprehend our notation. We promise
on our part to make every possible effort to present the relations as simply as they
are.
3For example, see footnote 10 in Sect. 2.3.2.
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Let us now concentrate on, for example, the cash flow, which the firm will yield at
time t = 3, so FCF3. The evaluator will know something more about this uncertain
cash flow at time t = 2 than at time t = 1. When we are speaking about the
expected cash flow from the third year and want to be precise, we must explain
which state of information we are basing ourselves on. We denote the prospective





describes how high the evaluator’s expectations will be about the cash flow of time
t = 3 from today’s presumption of the state of information at time t = 1. If
the investor uses her probable knowledge at time t = 2, she will have a more
differentiated view of the third year’s cash flow. This differentiated view is described






How is that to be read? The expression describes what the investor today believes
she will know about the cash flow at time t = 3 in 2 years. So you see,
what at first glance appears to be a somewhat complicated notation, allows for a
very compact notation of facts. Facts, that anyone can only painstakingly present





is the conditional expectation of the random variable FCFt , given the information
at time s.
Classical Expectation What differentiates a classical expectation from a condi-
tional one? With the classical expectation, a real number is determined that gives
back the average amount of a random variable. Here, however, it is with the
limitation that certain information about this random variable is already available.
The information, for example, could relate to whether a new product was successful,
or proved to be a flop. Now the investor must determine the average amount of a
random variable (we are thinking of cash flows) according to the scenario—twice in
our example—to establish the conditional expectation. The conditional expectation
will no longer be a single number like in the classical expectation. Instead, it depicts
a quantity, which itself is dependent upon the uncertain future: according to the
market situation (success or flop), two average cash flows are conceivable. Summing
up this observation, we must consider the following: the conditional expectation
itself can be a random variable! This differentiates it from the classical expectation,
which always depicts a real number.
In our theory of business valuation, we will often be dealing with conditional
expectations. One or another reader may thus possibly be interested in getting a
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clean definition and being told about important characteristics of this mathematical
concept in detail. We will now disappoint these readers, as we do not intend to
explain in further detail what conditional expectations are. Much rather, we will
just describe how they are to be used to calculate with. There is one simple
reason as to why we are holding back. We have, until now, avoided describing
the structure of the underlying uncertainty in detail. If we now wanted to explain
how a conditional expectation is defined, we would also have to show how an
expectation is calculated altogether and what probability distributions are. But we
do not need these details for business valuation. A few simple rules suffice. The
entire mathematical apparatus can be left in the background. Likewise, if you want
to be a good car driver, you do not have to get involved with the physics of the
combustion engine or acquire knowledge about the way transmissions function. It is
enough to read the manual, learn the traffic signs, and get some driving experience.
Experts must forgive us here for our crude handling.4
2.2.2 Rules
In the following, we will present five simple rules for calculating conditional
expectations. You should make good note of these, as we will be using them again
and again.
What is the connection between the conditional expectation and the classical
expectation? Our first rule clarifies this.











The rule shows that the conditional expectation is dealing with a generalization of
the classical expectation that comprises more information and other times than the
present can take into consideration.
The second rule concerns the linearity, which is supposedly known to our readers
for the classical expectation.
Rule 2 (Linearity) For any real numbers a, b and any random variables ˜X and ˜Y ,
the following equation applies
E
[











4For those who would like to know more, in the last section we give recommendations for further
reading.
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For technical reasons we need a further rule, which concerns real numbers. We
know that these quantities correspond to their expectations. That should now also
be true when we are working with conditional expectations.
Rule 3 (Certain Quantity) For the certain quantity 1 we have
E [1|Ft ] = 1.
An immediate conclusion from this rule affects all quantities, which are not risky.
On grounds of the linearity (Rule 2) the following is valid for real numbers X,
E [X|Ft ] = X E [1|Ft ] = X. (2.5)
It should be kept in mind that condition Ft is not dealing with the information,
which we will in fact have at this time. Much rather, it is dealing with the information
that we are alleging at time t . The fourth rule makes use of our idea that as time
advances, we get smarter.














The rule underlines an important point of our methodology, although it is suppos-
edly the hardest to understand. Nevertheless, there is a very plausible reason behind
it. We repeatedly emphasized that we continually find ourselves in the present and
are speaking only of our conceptions about the future. The actual development in
contrast is not the subject of our observations. Rule 4 illustrates that.
Let us look at our knowledge at time s. If s comes before t , this knowledge
comprises the knowledge that is already accessible to us today, but excludes beyond
that the knowledge that we think we will have gained by time t . We should know
more at time t than at time s: We are indeed operating under the idea, that as time
goes on, we do not get more ignorant, but rather smarter. If our overall knowledge
is meant to be consistent or rational, it would not make sense to have a completely
different knowledge later on if it is built on our today’s perceptions of the future.
If we wanted to verbally describe rule 4, we would perhaps have to say the
following: “When we today think about what we will know tomorrow about the
day after tomorrow, we will only know what we today already believe to know
tomorrow.”
Rule 5 (Expectation of Realized Quantities) If a quantity ˜X is realized at time t ,
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Rule 5 illustrates again our methodology that we stay in the present thinking
about the future. At time t we will know how the random variable ˜X will have
materialized. ˜X is then no longer a random variable, but rather a real number. When
we then establish the expectation for the quantity ˜X˜Y , we can extract ˜X from the
expectation, just as we do so with real numbers: ˜X is known at time t . Rule 5 means,
if with the state of information Ft we know the realization of a variable we can treat
it in the conditional expectation like a real number: with the conditional expectation
known quantities are like certain quantities.
2.2.3 Example
The Finite Case To make the handling of conditional expectations and our rules
more understandable, let us look at an example. Concentrate on Fig. 2.2.
We are dealing here with a company, which will bear 3 years of payments to its
owners. The payments, however, cannot be predicted with certainty.
1. In the first year (t = 1), two situations are conceivable, which we want to
designate as “up” or “down,” as the case may be. From now on we will be using
the terms “up” and “down” not with respect to the actual cash flow movements.
Rather, up means that the cash flow of the next period is stated at the top of the
original value in our figure. Hence, up does not mean that the cash flow increases
(as, for example, is clearly visible from t = 2 to t = 3 with the cash flow 110
going up to 96.8).












= 0 = 1 = 2 = 3
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If the development is up, then the payment amounts to 110, otherwise to 90.
Both states are equally possible.5
2. In the second year (t = 2), three states are probable.
– If we operate in t = 1 from up, the development can again proceed up or
down. Should chance see to it that the sequence is up–up (abbreviated uu),
then the cash flow in the second year amounts to 132. If the development
happens, in contrast, to read up–down (abbreviated ud), then the owners only
get a payment of 110.
– But if the movement in t = 1 was down, then things could either turn up, or
they could again be down. The development down–up leads at time t = 2 to
payments in the amount of 110, in the case of down–down, the owners only
receive 88.
The three states can also be described differently: Chance twice ensures an
unforeseeable development.
– If it goes up twice, then the cash flow amounts to 132. The probability for this
comes to 0.52 = 25%.
– If it, in contrast, only goes up once, then the owners get a payment in the
amount of 110. Since there are two ways of ending up with this state, their
probability comes to 2 · 0.5 · (1 − 0.5) = 50%.
– If, finally, it never goes up, then there is a cash flow of only 88, and the
probability for that is (1 − 0.5)2 = 25%.
3. In the last year (t = 3) four states are possible, which can be reached as follows:
– The development proceeds up three times. That leads to a cash flow of 193.6,
and namely with a probability of 0.53 = 12.5%.
– It only goes up twice.6 There are three possible ways for moving into the state
with the payment of 96.8, which is why the possibility for this is 3 ·0.52 · (1−
0.5)1 = 37.5%.
– The development is now only up once. There are also three ways of reaching
this state, which is why its probability is 3 · 0.51 · (1 − 0.5)2 = 37.5%, and
namely with a payment in the amount of 145.2.
– Finally, it can also always go down. That leads to a cash flow of 48.4, and
namely with a probability of (1 − 0.5)3 = 12.5%.
We could now determine the conditional expectations for every period and in so
doing check our rules. As an example let us concentrate on the third-year cash flow
5In case the actual development will yield a value neither 90 nor 110 our model was wrongly
specified. Any decision based on this wrong model will be misleading.
6We continue to use the term “up” even if the path is udu = (110, 110, 96.8) and the cash flow in
this case in particular goes down from t = 2 to t = 3.
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At time t = 1, two states can have entered in. Let us at first look at the case
that we had an up development. From here, three developments are conceivable,
namely
– twice up: cash flow 193.6 with probability 25%,
– once up: cash flow 96.8 with probability 50%,
– never up: cash flow 145.2 with probability 25%.
The conditional expectation for the up condition at time t = 1 is then
0.25 · 193.6 + 0.5 · 96.8 + 0.25 · 145.2 = 133.1 .
Now, we still have the case to look at that at time t = 1 we experienced a
down development. Three developments are again conceivable from here that by
an analogous procedure lead to
0.25 · 96.8 + 0.5 · 145.2 + 0.25 · 48.4 = 108.9 .







133.1, if the development in t = 1 is up,
108.9, if the development in t = 1 is down.




is a random variable, since at time t = 0
it still cannot be known which of the two conditions will manifest at time t = 1.7
Let us now direct our attention to the unconditional expectation of the random
variables FCF3. We can get it directly from
0.125 · 193.6 + 0.375 · 96.8 + 0.375 · 145.2 + 0.125 · 48.4 = 121.
7The attentive reader will ascertain that the conditional expectation of the cash flow FCF3 and the




= 1.12 ·FCF1 is
namely valid, since 1.12 · 110 = 133.1 and 1.12 · 90 = 108.9 . This characteristic is not arbitrarily
chosen and will be analyzed more thoroughly in Sect. 3.1.2.
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. In order to show that we come to the same result this way, we again
have to use our rules. But, we can limit ourselves here to the iterated expectation


























And the result is in fact
0.5 · 133.1 + 0.5 · 108.9 = 121 .
With that we would like to bring the examination of our rules through the payment
example to a close.
The Infinite Case An essential difference from our example that we have been
looking at until now is that the firm will now live on indefinitely. We want to suppose
that the cash flows follow a binomial process according to Fig. 2.3. Seen from time t
onward, the cash flows can move up through time t + 1 with either factor u or move
down with factor d , in whereby we will speak of an upward movement in the first










Fig. 2.3 Part of the binomial tree of the infinite example
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For two consecutive times, the following is always valid:
FCFt+1 =
{
uFCFt if the development in t = 1 is up,
d FCFt if the development in t = 1 is down.
We will specify neither u nor d in more detail. We only suppose that they are not
dependent upon time and positive. The conditional probabilities at state ω and time
t + 1 with which the upward and downward movement occur will be denoted by
Pt+1(u|ω) and Pt+1(d|ω). These probabilities do not depend on time t +1 and state
ω, hence, we suppress both variables from now on.
If under the given assumptions we determine the conditional expectation of a







Pt+1(u|ω) uFCFt + Pt+1(d|ω) d FCFt
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]
= (1 + g) . . . (1 + g)FCFs
= (1 + g)t−sFCFs (2.6)
for s ≤ t on the basis of rule 4. We will always, for the subsequent examples, be
working from the basis FCF0 = E[FCF1] = 100 and assume that all parameters
have been so chosen that g = 0 is valid. It is also said in this case that the cash flows
form a martingale.
2.2.4 Problems






(This particular property of cash flows will become important in the next chap-
ter.) Assume that the up- and down-movements occur with the same probability.
Fill in the gaps.
2. The following problem shows that expectations under different probability
measures cannot be changed arbitrarily.
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Fig. 2.4 Cash flows in future periods of Problem 1
Go back to the solution of the last problem (see again Fig. 2.4). Let there be
two different probabilities: P assigning the same probability to the up- and down-



















This particular property of probabilities will be necessary when showing that cost
of capital are also discount rates. But be careful if the binomial tree distinguishes

































a binomial model can be established where the conditional expectations of these
cash flows satisfy an assumption that was mentioned in Problem 1:
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Fig. 2.5 Cash flows in future







time= 0 = 1 = 2
Consider a binomial tree where up- and down-movements occur with the same






d = 1, u > d > 0.
















4. Consider a trinomial tree as in Fig. 2.6. Three movements are possible: “up,”
“middle,” and “down.” They occur with the same probability and furthermore
(we use u, d , and m as in Fig. 2.6)
u d = m2.
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2.3 A First Glance at Business Values
In the following section, we will introduce a generalized form of a business
valuation concept, which we will regularly use in this book. The connections
between business values and cost of capital that will be discussed in this section
are to be understood as general in so far as we both want to and still can leave it
open as to whether we are analyzing levered or unlevered firms. That is why our
procedure still does not demand too polished a use of symbols at this point.
2.3.1 Valuation Concept
Every theory is based on assumptions. This is also not different for a theory of
business valuation. A central assumption on which further expositions are built up
is the following.
Assumption 2.1 (No Free Lunch) The capital market is free of arbitrage. q.e.d.
This assumption is usually specified in finance with the help of an extravagant
formalism. We would like to do away with that here, since the effort far outweighs
the usefulness and the following does not require such details. We limit ourselves
to illustrating the assumption. Arbitrage free means, in loose terms, that no market
participant is in the position to make earnings from nothing. Anyone, who has some
cash inflows will put up with cash outflows. We will go into the conclusions of this
assumption in somewhat more detail.
No Arbitrage and Equilibrium If we assume that the capital market does not
allow for a free lunch, we are quite sure that this assumption is indisputable.
One is usually convinced that arbitrage opportunities can hold only briefly and
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will be exploited sooner or later so that they disappear. For us, this assumption is
straightforward. But, we do not assume that there is an equilibrium on the capital
market and we explicitly stress that the existence of an equilibrium is far stronger
than the assumption of an arbitrage free market. Any (general) equilibrium will be
free of arbitrage, but not vice versa!
The central building block of our theory of business valuation is the so-called
fundamental theorem of asset pricing. It can be derived from the concept of no
arbitrage. We will not go through the trouble of proving the theorem. But to at least
make it plausible, we introduce alternative valuation concepts. While doing so, we
limit ourselves for simplicity’s sake to the one-period case.
Valuation (in the One-Period Case) Under Certainty Imagine a capital market
in which only claims for certain payments are traded that are due in t = 1. You can
think of a firm, which pays dividends at time t = 1 in the amount of FCF1. It is
obvious how these securities are to be valued when the capital market is arbitrage
free. The certain cash flows are discounted with the riskless interest rate. If we
denote the interest rate with rf , then equation
V0 = FCF1
1 + rf (2.7)
must be valid. Otherwise, one could end up with a strategy that practically comes
down to operating a private money pump. And that would be in opposition to the
assumption of no free lunch.
If, for instance, the left-hand side of the equation was smaller than the right-hand
side, an investor could take out a loan today with the interest rate rf and acquire the
firm for the price V0. The sum of all payments at time t = 0 would amount to zero.
At time t = 1, she would retain the cash flows and pay back the loan. And the now






That is an arbitrage opportunity, and it is exactly such results that we would like to
exclude with the Assumption 2.1.8
Valuation (in the One-Period Case) Under Uncertainty Future payments are
indeed not certain in the world we are looking at. We must thus ask, in what way
it can be managed to generalize the relation described in Eq. (2.7). There are three
different ways, the last of which deserves our particular attention, to incorporate risk
into valuation.
8We could make a completely analogous argumentation, if the left-hand side of Eq. (2.7) was larger
than the right-hand side.
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Certainty Equivalent If the cash flows payable at time t = 1 are uncertain, you
could ask about that certain payment at time t = 1, which the investor finds just as
attractive as the risky cash flows. Such a payment is called a certainty equivalent.
The certainty equivalent will be discounted with the riskless rate, instead of the
expected payments at time t = 1. The certainty equivalent itself must be determined
with the help of a utility function. According to our knowledge, this formulation is
rather seldom incurred in practice.
To illustrate the procedure through an example, let us again look at our firm.
There are two states of nature in the future. We concentrate solely on the payments
due at time t = 1. Assume then
FCF1 =
{
110 if the development in t = 1 is up,
90 if the development in t = 1 is down.
Assume further, that the two relevant states of nature are equally probable and the
riskless interest rate is rf = 5%.
The certainty equivalent is now that payment S1 for which the preference relation
S1 ∼ (110, 90 : 50%, 50%)
has been met. The certain payment S1 is just as attractive as a lottery, in which
one gets 110 or 90, respectively, with the same probability. That corresponds in the






















0.5 · √110 + 0.5 · √90
)2 ≈ 99.75.
From that we finally get,
V0 = S1
1 + rf =
99.75
1 + 0.05 = 95.00.
Cost of Capital There is the much more widely spread technique in the valuation
practice of raising the riskless interest rate with a risk premium. The sum of both
quantities is the cost of capital. In equation (2.7) we then adjust the denominator
and not the numerator.
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1 + rf + z ,
and one would come to the same result using the relevant numbers here with a risk
premium of z ≈ 0.264% as with the certainty equivalent method, since
Vt = 0.5 · 110 + 0.5 · 90




Risk-Neutral Probabilities With this third formulation, the riskless interest rate rf
is further used to discount with. In the numerator we find an expectation of the risky
cash flow. But the expectation is not calculated with the actual estimated subjective
probabilities. Instead of that, risk-adjusted probabilities are used, which are also
called risk-neutral.
In our example the subjective probabilities for the up, or, as the case may be,
down development come to 50% in each case. It is plain to see that one can express
risk aversion with measuring up with a lesser weight and down with a heavier
weight.
If the expectation calculated on the basis of risk-neutral probabilities is denoted






1 + rf .
It can be shown that with the relevant numbers here a risk-neutral probability of
48.75% for up leads to the same result as both concepts already described, since
V0 = 0.4875 · 110 + 0.5125 · 90




Several different terms have been used in the literature for this third way. Equivalent
martingale measure is also often spoken of, instead of risk-neutral probability.
We now turn to the second approach in more detail and will then be dealing with
the last approach.
2.3.2 Cost of Capital as Conditional Expected Returns
Discount Rates and Expected Returns In order to get a preliminary notion of
cost of capital under uncertainty, let us take a glance in the textbooks. It is often said
that cost of capital is an expected return. For example, Copeland et al. (2005, p. 557)
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use the expression “rate of return” instead of “cost of capital,” in order to present
the valuation concept for a firm. Brealey et al. (2020, p. 228) write explicitly, that
the “cost of capital . . . is the expected rate of return demanded by investors in the
firm’s common stock.” de Matos (2001, p. 43) also explains that the cost of capital
involves expected returns.
However, we also then find the suggestion within the literature to bring the notion
of the cost of capital to life somewhat differently. This concerns the idea that the cost
of capital should be suitable as discount rate for future cash flows. Brealey et al.
(2020, p. 39), for instance, speak of the cost of capital as those figures with which
cash flows are to be discounted. There is a related remark in Miles and Ezzell (1980,
p. 722), for example, where it is said that “at any time k, ρ is the appropriate rate for
discounting the time i expected unlevered cash flow in period j where ρ is referred
to as the unlevered cost of capital.”
It is not recommended to simply equate expected returns and discount rates. This
warning does not easily stand to reason with the critical reader. This will, however,
change from now on.
Conditional Expected Returns How can our definition of the cost of capital be
generalized, if the future is uncertain? We shift to time t > 0. The evaluator will
have some notions as to the returns at this time. In addition, she sets the reflux
one period later in proportion to the employed capital. When the evaluator does
this on the basis of the information at time t , then the employed capital ˜Vt is not
uncertain for her any more. The evaluator can now treat the employed capital like
a real number, granted that she always assumes the state of information at time
t . The evaluator considers the conditional expectation of the reflux t + 1 against
the employed capital ˜Vt . Through this understanding of the term cost of capital, a
derivation of the valuation equation analogous to (2.1) will be possible. To this end,
the following definition of the cost of capital is appropriate.
Definition 2.1 (The Firm’s Cost of Capital) The cost of capital ˜kt of a firm








Before we move on, we must, however, take note that our cost of capital
definition has a possible disadvantage. Look at numerators and denominators
separately. In the numerator of Definition 2.1, the expectations of payments at time
t + 1 stand under the condition that the evaluator possesses the state of information
of time t . One cannot simply assume that these expectations are certain. It is much
more likely that these conditional expectations at time t are uncertain, and thus
2.3 A First Glance at Business Values 33
depict random variables. If these random variables are now divided by ˜Vt , the result
is another random variable again, regardless whether ˜Vt is certain or uncertain. But
that means that the cost of capital, as it is so defined, constitutes a random variable.
Future expected returns from equity as well as debt are all of a sudden uncertain, and
that most surely comes as no great surprise for the manager either. Unfortunately,
one cannot discount today with quantities, the realization of which is not known at
time t = 0. So, we have a definition of the cost of capital that is not suitable for our
intended purpose here!
Deterministic Cost of Capital We will only make it out of this dilemma, if we
make an assumption on an heroic scale. One which purports that cost of capital, as
defined in Definition 2.1, should be certain. We are plainly and simply taking it for
granted that the cost of capital is certain, and will later show that it also makes a
suitable discount rate. In other words, those who comprehend the cost of capital as
conditional expected return, and assume that it is a certain quantity, may also use
them as discount rate.
Our critical colleagues may want to object at this point that the knowledge of
future anticipated returns in the valuation of firms depicts all too heroic of an
assumption; one which cannot actually be met in real life. To that, we can only
answer that it does indeed involve a very large assumption. Only, without this
assumption, no one, not even our critics, can prove a valuation equation analogous
to Eq. (2.1).9 Thus seen, although the assumption is admittedly heroic, it is also
indispensable for a theory of business valuation. Those who principally reject it,
must also renounce the determination of firms’ market values through the use of a
DCF approach. Regrettably, we have no other choice in the matter.
The attentive reader will still recall the objection mentioned in the previous
section. We had noticed that “time will tell.” If we already insinuate that the cost of
capital is certain at time t = 0, then we have taken it for granted that an enormous
amount of knowledge is to be gained. Everything that can be ascertained about cost
of capital is already known today. At this point we repeat the statement that there is
no business to be done without the assumption of certain cost of capital.
Attempts at Other Definitions We would like to point out with all clarity that our
definition of cost of capital cannot be made more simple. At first glance nothing
seems to speak against buying into Eq. (2.3) and to consider the fact that we are now








would then describe the cost of capital.
9One should never say never: We are currently working on a project where cost of capital can be
stochastic without violating basic principles of finance. See Kruschwitz and Löffler (2019).
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As an academic, you have the freedom to choose your terms as you like.
Definitions of cost of capital can be neither true nor false. They are at best suitable
or unsuitable. And the preceding definition is by all means unsuitable. To allow for











(1 + k)2 + . . .
to be obtained it is necessary to detach ˜Vt from the expectation above. But this is
impossible for a random variable due to Jensen’s inequality.10











does not lead to the kind of results with which we can be satisfied. True, if kt is











(1 + k)2 + . . . .
But we had more in mind for our definition of cost of capital. We were not just
thinking about a computational rule, which allows for the current business value to
be determined. More importantly, it should be possible to determine future business
values. While calculation of V0 can now be managed with this definition of cost of











(1 + k)2 + . . .
from the definition, since the cost of capital always depicts unconditional expec-
tations. This definition of cost of capital also turns out to be unsuitable for our
purposes.
Let us summarize. With a DCF approach, cost of capital is, sensibly enough,
taken as conditional expected returns. This idea will be the red thread throughout
our presentation. As already stated, we will still assume in the following that the cost










holds due to Jensen’s inequality. A similar result will apply to our attempted definition of cost of
capital.
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of capital does not involve random, but rather deterministic quantities. We cannot
get any valuation equation without this assumption.
2.3.3 A First Valuation Equation
In order to derive the valuation equation, we will use our rules for conditional
expectations for the first time. Although this calculation is rather simple, we want
to deal with it in some detail. Our intention in doing so is to get our readers more
comfortable with the formal usage of the rules.
Theorem 2.1 (Market Value of the Firm) When the cost of capital kt is determin-









(1 + kt ) . . . (1 + ks−1) .










σ=t (1 + kσ )
as more compact.






1 + kt .
The above equation is recursive, as ˜Vt is a function of ˜Vt+1. If we use the appropriate











1 + kt .
Because the cost of capital is deterministic and the conditional expectation is linear,
























(1 + kt )(1 + kt+1) .
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(1 + kt ) . . . (1 + kT−1) .









(1 + kt ) . . . (1 + ks−1) .
Under the particular prerequisite, that we are to look at the value of the firm at









(1 + k0) . . . (1 + ks−1)









(1 + k)t .
2.3.4 Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing
The idea of an equivalent martingale measure has to do with offering the evaluator
other probabilities for the states of nature and thus making her world risk-neutral.
That this method is always successful, that there always exist probabilities in which
the valuation can be made risk-neutral, is the content of the (first) fundamental
theorem of asset pricing.
The fundamental theorem maintains that the investor’s subjective probability can
be replaced by another probability measure Q. We denote the new expectations with
EQ. The following statement is valid for them.
Theorem 2.2 (Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing) If the capital market is
free of arbitrage, then conditional probabilities Q can be chosen to the extent that
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1 + rf .
The fundamental theorem is valid for all conceivable financial claims, for equities
as well as debts, for levered as well as unlevered firms.
In Theorem 2.1, we were able to gain a preliminary equation for the valuation of
firms out of the definition of the cost of capital. In a completely analogous way, we
could show that with the help of risk-neutral probabilities a valuation equation can












and does not need a new proof.
If we compare the fundamental Theorem 2.2 with Eq. (2.7), we then determine
similarities and differences: here as there, we are discounting with the riskless
interest rate. Instead of certain payments, we now deal with their conditional
expectations. The risk of future payments comes into the equation in so far as we are
not working with the subjective probabilities for future states of nature, but rather
instead with the so-called risk-neutral probabilities. It deals with a third way, other
than certainty equivalents and cost of capital, of incorporating risk into the valuation
equation. Again and again throughout this book we will see that the fundamental
theorem can be put to practical use.
Risk Neutrality Before we turn to the practical application of the concept, we want
to answer the question as to why the probabilities used here are termed as riskless
whatsoever. We will make use here as well of our rules for conditional expectations.
For this purpose, we reformulate the fundamental theorem. It goes as







We know according to Rule 5 (expectation of realized quantities), that the value of
the firm at time t is already known and therefore may also be included within the
conditional expectation, without changing the result,
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The one on the left-hand side is certain. On the grounds of rule 3 (certain quantities),












− EQ [1|Ft ] .














This presentation of the fundamental theorem allows for a clear economic interpre-
tation. We look to the returns as an argument for the conditional expectation. An
investor attains these if she acquires a security at time t , receives the cash flows
one period later and immediately afterwards again sells the security. The statement
of the last equation then reads that the conditional expected return of this strategy
is always riskless, if the risk-neutral probabilities are fallen back upon instead of
the subjective probabilities. The designation “risk-neutral probability” for Q relates
back to this characteristic.
Flat Term Structure Look again at the fundamental Theorem 2.2. The riskless
interest rate in this equation has no time index t . We have implicitly insinuated
with it that the riskless interest rates are constant over time. This limitation is not
necessary and can be easily dropped. If the term structure is not flat, then the riskless
interest rate simply attains a time index, and the statement of the fundamental
theorem remains further valid.
Uniqueness of Q The question arises whether the mentioned probability Q is
unique and what consequences can be drawn if several risk-neutral probabilities
exist. We do not want to go into detail here, but the following can be said. For the
existence of the risk-neutral probability measure it is completely sufficient that the
market is free of arbitrage. The assertion that any claim, so complicated as it may be,
is also traded (in this case the market is called complete), is not necessary to prove
the fundamental theorem of asset pricing. Admittedly, in this case of an incomplete
market one can show that Q need not to be unique. But this is not a problem at least
for valuation, since every “possible” probability will lead to one and the same price
of the firm.
It is, however, a problem if the firm to be valued is not or not yet traded on the
market. In this case the fundamental theorem may not yield one particular value but
instead a range of possible prices of the firm. Therefore, a second assumption that
is also necessary for DCF valuation is the following.
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Assumption 2.2 (Spanning) The cash flows of an asset to be valued can be
perfectly duplicated at the capital market. q.e.d.
Let us discuss this assumption. Again we suppress the formalism required to
formulate it in a mathematically precise manner. The assumption requires that the
possible cash flow of the company, complicated as it may be, can also be achieved
by holding a (possibly involved) portfolio of assets, bonds, derivatives, or any other
assets from the capital market. Instead of buying the company, the investor could
turn to the capital market and would receive not only a similar, but also the same
distribution of cash flows.
It might be questionable, why the investor at all would now buy the company
if she can invest in a portfolio of equities and bonds. But we do not care for
determining an investor’s optimal portfolio (this would require an examination of
her utility function). Instead we are decided to value a company by trying to replicate
the company’s cash flows by a portfolio of traded assets. We stress explicitly here
that in this book valuation is a comparison of a company with the capital market.
Spanning is necessary to perform this comparison.
2.3.5 Transversality and Infinite Life Span
We are working under the assumption in any case that the value of the business
closes in on zero, as the firm’s end approaches. In the case of a firm with a finite
life span, it is a very obvious, even trivial, statement. Beyond time T , the cash flows
do not flow any more, which is why the value of the firm must disappear. But we
also need an analogous business value characteristic when we have a firm with an
infinite life span as our basis. In the formally orientated literature, the so-called
transversality is spoken of when the discounted business value is heading towards
zero with the advance of time. If transversality is not accepted, the danger arises of
getting entangled in serious contradictions.11
If transversality is responsible for a vanishing firm value if time goes to infinity,
it is by no means clear how this condition should be formulated appropriately. One







(1 + rf )T = 0 .
11If, for example, a firm that is being looked at finds enough valuable investments over an infinite
period, no free cash flows are generated in this case. Since the firm’s free cash flow is always at
zero, the firm’s value (if the transversality condition is not taken into consideration) will also be
zero—although the firm is certainly worth more than nothing.
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But also the use of the subjective probability could be a possibility. In the first edition







(1 + k)T = 0 .
Meanwhile, we have figured out that this approach will get us nowhere and that
Eq. (2.9) provides the required results.12
Assumption 2.3 (Transversality) If the life span of a firm goes to infinity (T →







(1 + rf )T−t = 0 ∀t . (2.9)
Clearly, this is a mathematical limit. But it is far from easy to interpret a limit
correctly in this case. This is because we do not deal with real numbers here but





may be uncertain. Now we must take note that there is
no one and only definition of a limit of functions. Instead, there are several concepts
at hand.13
One can show that the so-called almost-everywhere convergence is appro-
priate. On this basis we state that a sequence of random variables Xt “con-





holds. By fixing the state ω we are no longer dealing with sequences of random
variables, but instead with sequences of numbers. Based on this fact we can
be certain whether a limit exists and equals a number ˜X(ω). However, we do
not know how large the set of all such states ω is. Therefore we say that ˜Xt
converges almost-everywhere to ˜X if the set of such states has probability one. Put
differently: “It is certain that the sequence ˜X(ω) converges for every ω to ˜X(ω).”
12See in particular Kruschwitz and Löffler (2013).
13 Convergence can be pointwise, almost-everywhere, in L2 or in probability, etc. (see Stoyanov
(2013, section 14) for an overview of different convergence concepts for random variables, their
interrelations and numerous counterexamples). Notice that further an assumption is necessary that
establishes a lower bound K of all cash flows at any time and any state. This lower bound can be
arbitrary but need to be a finite number. We believe that this assumption is of technical nature that is
not an important economic restriction. The following considerations are—in parts literally—taken
from Kruschwitz and Löffler (2013).
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Valuation equation (2.11)
Transversality (2.9) and Fundamental theorem (2.10)
Fig. 2.7 Transversality is necessary to use a valuation equation with infinite lifetime and
accomplish unique enterprise values
In that sense transversality includes the condition (2.9) for an almost-everywhere
convergence.
Transversality is not only a technical condition but can be interpreted in an
economic meaningful way. Let us assume for a moment that transversality would






1 + rf (2.10)
will even with given cash flows not yield a unique value of the company. Instead,
there exists an infinite number of variables ˜Vt that will satisfy the fundamental
theorem and could be acknowledged as “value of the company.” There is not one
but an infinite number of such “values.” The valuation of a company using the
fundamental theorem is doomed to fail. Transversality is in this sense indispens-
able.
Figure 2.7 illustrates the interplay between transversality and fundamental
theorem on the one hand and a unique firm value on the other hand. Transversality









(1 + rf )s−t (2.11)
are equivalent even in the case of infinitely living firms. Those, who presume
the fundamental theorem can utilize the valuation equation and vice versa if
transversality holds. Exactly this is the meaning of Fig. 2.7.
Let us summarize. The transversality condition 2.3 is necessary if we want
to value companies that stay on forever. Forgoing this assumption will lead to
inconsistent results.
Notwithstanding we want to emphasize that we do not believe in companies
living forever. The main reason for dealing with these peculiar firms is the fact that
this assumption simplifies our considerations very much.
14For details see Kruschwitz and Löffler (2013, theorem 2).
42 2 Basic Elements: Cash Flow, Tax, Expectation, Cost of Capital, Value
2.3.6 Problems





Assume that cost of capital (conditional expected returns) are deterministic.











This is also known as independence of returns.




u ˜Vt if up,
d ˜Vt if down.






Hint Remember g = 0.
3. Assume that cost of capital k are deterministic and constant. The firm is infinitely





= (1 + g)t C
for deterministic and constant g with −1 < g < k and C > 0. Find a simple
formula for the value of the firm V0 using Theorem 2.1. What happens if g ≥ k?
4. This problem will show that without transversality the value of a company might
not be unique. To this end assume that we have an infinite number of company
values ˜Vt and a sequence of cash flows FCFt such that the recursion
˜Vt = EQ[
˜Vt+1 + FCFt+1|Ft ]
1 + rf
is satisfied. Transversality shall not hold. Show that the new sequence ˜V ∗t :=
˜Vt + C(1 + rf )t with an arbitrary number C = 0 is also a “valid firm value” in
the sense that this ˜V ∗t also satisfies the valuation equation.
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5. The following problem is based on Froot and Obstfeld (1991). Let us assume that
the cash flows follow a white noise process, i.e.,
FCFt = FCF0 + εt ,




are the corresponding firm values because they satisfy the following two
characteristics
(a) The recursion equation holds, i.e., (1 + rf )˜Vt = EQ[˜Vt+1 + FCFt+1|Ft ].
(b) For every t the transversality condition limT→∞ EQ[
˜VT |Ft ]
(1+rf )T−t = 0 holds.
2.4 Further Literature
The concept of the conditional expectation goes back to the work of the Russian
mathematician Kolmogorov from the 1930s and is found in every textbook on
probability theory. The presentation given in the textbook from Williams (1991)
is worth reading. Although it deals only with discrete time, this textbook also gives
a very good introduction to the theory of martingale measure. This also applies to
Shreve (2004a). Those who want to read more about continuous time models can
turn to Karatzas and Shreve (1991), Musiela and Rutkowski (2005), Revuz and Yor
(1999) or Shreve (2004b). Though all books are written for students majoring in
mathematics.
The fundamental theorem of asset pricing was gradually recognized in several
papers and is based on works from Beja (1971), Harrison and Kreps (1979), and
Back and Pliska (1991). A proof can also be found in the textbook Musiela and
Rutkowski (2005) and in Revuz and Yor (1999).
The definition and determination of cash flows are dealt with in-depth in every
textbook on balance sheet analysis; Koller et al. (2015) is a good reference. The
topic of the prognosis of future cash flows is unfortunately very often left out, Welch
(2014, chapter 20) is a notable exception.
Rapp (2006) and Laitenberger (2006) discuss the question whether a suitable
definition of cost of capital can be found that does not need the restriction of
nonrandom returns.
Niemann (2004) analyzes uncertain tax rates and their impact on neutrality of tax
systems. An overview about national tax codes can be found in Koller et al. (2010,
pp. 357–380). (The 2015 edition does not contain a chapter on national tax codes
anymore.)
In Husmann et al. (2006) it is shown how several national tax codes can be
implemented into our model.
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Transversality is extensively discussed in Kruschwitz and Löffler (2013). A lot
of examples, counterexamples as well as proofs can be found there.
Asymmetric taxation with respect to valuation was discussed in Schaefer (1982),
Dybvig and Ross (1986), Ross (1987), Dermody and Rockafellar (1991), and
recently Becker and Löffler (2016).
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There is a variety of problems in the valuation of firms. That is why the evaluator has
to make some simplifications in order to come up with a result. That also goes for
the theory of valuation. We will take the first step in assuming that the firm has no
debt. In simplifying with this assumption, we shall see that a number of economic
problems can be discussed. In the next step we will turn to indebted firms.
3.1 Unlevered Firms
Whoever has to value levered firms, also has to be able to value unlevered firms.
Both are mutually conditional.
By itself, this claim does not shed any light. It should be understood that if a
levered firm is spoken of without naming any further details, then that remains
unclear. Are we dealing with a heavily or only moderately levered firm? Will the
firm’s debt increase, or are the responsible managers planning to reduce the firm’s
credit volume? In contrast to a levered firm in which this must all be explained
in detail, the circumstances of an unlevered firm are clear and simple. When we
speak of an unlevered firm, we mean a firm, which will not have debts today, nor
anytime in the future. Of course it is difficult to believe that there are actually such
firms in our world. But this—no doubt fully correct assessment—does not matter
here. All we want to state is that what we mean by an unlevered firm is completely
straightforward, while by a levered firm it is not so clear without further information.
Cost of Capital and Leverage A firm’s cost of capital essentially depends upon
two influences: firstly, the firm’s business risk, and secondly, its indebtedness. It is
fundamentally valid that the greater the risk is and the greater the firm’s debt-equity
ratio is, that much higher the expected returns are. And if we make the connection
between this law and the considerations of the preceding paragraph, then the cost
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of capital of an equity-financed firm is straightforward, while the cost of capital of
an indebted firm is dependent upon the level of debt. Of course this is all only valid
so long as we keep all other influences upon the cost of capital—particularly the
business risk and the tax rate—constant.
The indebted firm’s cost of capital is needed in order to be able to correctly value
it. To put it more exactly: the cost of capital is needed of a firm, which has two things
in common with the firm to be valued. These regard, namely, its business risk and its
debt. If you want to determine this cost of capital by using empirical data from the
capital market, you typically get into the following situation. You go to the trouble of
finding a firm that belongs to the same, or at least very similar risk class (comparison
firm) and estimate the expected value of the returns, which the financiers receive.
In doing so you almost always have to observe that the comparison firm is financed
differently than the firm to be valued. But if the debt now has an influence on the
amount of the cost of capital, the comparison firm’s cost of capital cannot simply
be applied to the firm to be valued. As we already made clear, indebted firms are
not necessarily comparable even when they belong to the same risk class. And it is
exactly here that the equity-financed firm comes into play as reference firm.
The indebted firm, this will become clear in a moment, is under any circum-
stances more valuable than an equity-financed company with identical cash flows.
Hence, raising debt will serve as a leverage that can increase the firm’s value. In
this case one also speaks of a leverage effect caused by debt. That is why we will
use the expressions indebted and levered as well as equity-financed and unlevered
as synonyms.
Unlevering and Relevering In order to determine the cost of capital of the firm
to be valued, the comparison firm’s cost of capital is to be adjusted because of the
reasons described here. Academics, who are involved with the theoretical side of
valuation of firms, have to develop functional equations, which allow for the cost
of capital of the—levered—comparison firm to be converted into the unlevered
firm’s cost of capital. If they are successful, then the equations can be used to
infer the reference firm’s cost of capital from the comparison firm’s cost of capital
(unlevering), but also to infer the cost of capital of the firm to be valued from the
reference firm’s cost of capital (relevering).
And thus the circle is complete: whoever wants to value a levered firm, must
also be able to value an unlevered firm. The academics are then naturally required
to live up to the expectations placed on them and must actually be in the position
to develop the necessary adjustment equations. Should they fail at this, then the
discounting of levered firms’ cash flows with the appropriate cost of capital must
simply be forgotten.
Notation In the first chapter of this book, we spoke of free cash flows and firm
values without troubling ourselves with how the firms are financed. Now we
are concentrating on firms, which are completely equity-financed. Therefore, the
relevant symbols get an appropriate index. We use a superior u for unlevered firms.
We will, for instance, designate the free cash flows after corporate income taxes of
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such firms with FCF
u
t , and the firm values with ˜V
u
t . Notice that since only cash
flows after taxes can be paid to the owners of the firm, FCF
u
t will denote free cash
flows after corporate income tax. Unlevered firms have only one single group of





We assume in the following that it is possible to successfully come up with the
required adjustment equations and will actively attempt to do so ourselves as best
we can. Under this condition, the cost of capital of the totally equity-financed firm
can be considered to be known. We assume that the evaluator knows the unlevered






for time s = t + 1, . . . ,T .
Definition 3.1 (Cost of Capital of the Unlevered Firm) Cost of capital ˜kE,ut












The reader should notice that we use the cash flows after corporate income tax in
our definition of cost of capital. Therefore, kE,ut are variables after corporate income
tax, too. The question, how we can defer from these any cost of capital before tax
is not our concern, since we do not investigate how the value of a company changes
with a changing of the tax rate. Although possibly time dependent, our tax rates are
fixed once and for all today. Nevertheless, if anyone tries to determine the cost of
capital before tax he cannot operate on grounds of our theory since it does not tell
anything about how the value of a firm changes with the tax rates.
The valuation of the unlevered firm is absolutely unproblematic under these
conditions.
Theorem 3.1 (Market Value of the Unlevered Firm) If the cost of capital of the
unlevered firm kE,ut are deterministic, then the value of the firm, which is only
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We do not have to further involve ourselves here with the proof of the assertion. We
already handled it in a generalized form in Sect. 2.3.3 and do not need to bore our
readers here by repeating ourselves.1
3.1.2 Weak Auto-Regressive Cash Flows
In Theorem 3.1 we determined a valuation equation for unlevered firms that the
evaluator can only use if she knows the cost of equity of the unlevered firm. This
condition can only very rarely be counted upon in practice. If the required conditions
to use the theorem are not met, then the valuation is anything but a trivial problem.
Cash Flows of the Unlevered Firm You can only get further in such a situation
if the adjustment equation already mentioned above is available. The derivation of
such an equation is, however, only possible if the appropriate suppositions are met.
In the following sections of this book we will develop adjustment equations for
demanding cases. Our results are indeed based on a special condition regarding the
structure of the unlevered firm’s free cash flows after taxes. From now on we will
assume that the cash flows form a so-called weak auto-regressive process.2 The
reader may rest assured that without recourse to this assumption, development of
correct adjustment formulas is doomed to fail.
Assumption 3.1 (Weak Auto-Regressive Cash Flows) There are real numbers







= (1 + gt )FCFut
is valid for the unlevered firm’s cash flows after taxes. q.e.d.
We must assume that gt is greater than −100% in order to prevent cash flows
from having oscillating signs which would be rather unrealistic. It is not necessary
















can also be gotten analogously without needing a new proof.
2We use the term weak auto-regressive to distinguish it from a simple auto-regressive model.
Here a growth factor gt will occur that has to be time-independent with auto-regressive processes.
Furthermore, our increments are uncorrelated, not necessarily independent.
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Uncorrelated (Additive) Increments In order to understand this assumption, we




t+1 = (1 + gt )FCF
u
t + εt+1. (3.1)
gt is a deterministic amount that is already known in t = 0. What does our
assumption on weak auto-regressive cash flows imply for the increments εt+1? It
will imply that these increments have expectation zero and are uncorrelated to each
other (sometimes called “white noise” although this in fact refers to independent
increments).
It is not immediately recognizable that this assumption really implies uncorre-
lated noise terms. In order to prove that, we have to carry out a little calculation. In
doing so, we will again make use of the rules for conditional expectations. We first
of all show that the noise terms’ expectation disappears,3
E [εt+1] = E [εt+1|F0] Rule 1







































− (1 + gt )FCFut |F0
]
Rule 5
= E [0|F0] Assumption 3.1
= 0 .
Now we come to the proof that the noise terms are uncorrelated. We look at two
points in time s < t and have to show that the covariance Cov[εs, εt ] disappears. We
already know that the noise terms’ expectations are zero. And so from the covariance
it immediately follows:
Cov[εs, εt ] = E [εsεt ] − E [εs] E [εt ]
= E [εsεt ] .
From the rules as well as from the definition of noise term it follows:
Cov[εs, εt ] = E [εsεt ]
= E [εsεt |F0] Rule 1
3We abstain from using the tilde for the random variable ε.
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= E [E [εsεt |Fs] |F0] Rule 4
= E [εs E [εt |Fs] |F0] . Rule 5
Now we concentrate on the conditional expectation, which comes up in the last
equation and get the following from the rules as well as the fact that cash flows are
weak auto-regressive:





























− (1 + gt−1)FCFut−1|Fs
]
Rule 2, 5
= 0 . Assumption 3.1
The covariance disappears, which is exactly what we wanted to show.
Independent (Additive) Increments Until now, we have proven that the vanishing
expectation of the noise terms εt+1 as well as their uncorrelation results from the
Assumption 3.1. You may get the impression that the reverse is true as well. This is
not the case. For reasons of order, we have to ascertain that it is the condition
E [εt+1|Ft ] = E [εt+1] (= 0) ,
which is logically sufficient to weak auto-regressive cash flows.
To understand this condition, we refer to the fact that numerous financial models
work on the assumption that a firm’s free cash flows would follow a random walk.
What does that mean? It means that the cash flows possess increments, which are
independent from each other and distributed identically. The noise terms εt+1 have
an expectation of zero, are distributed identically and are mutually independent.
This is a big assumption, far bigger than the one we made. The independence
of the noise terms implies, for instance, that the increments of the cash flow in t is
not connected to the cash flows from years 1 to t − 1. If we have been looking at
continuously growing cash flows in the last few years, that by no means suggests
that this growth will remain in year t . You cannot draw any conclusions in the least
from the development of the years 1 to t −1 for the year t! Uncorrelation in contrast
does not pose such a strong challenge.
While uncorrelation excludes only a linear relation, independence negates every
single causal relation: In our notation independence is equivalent to
E [f (εt+1)|Ft ] = E [f (εt+1)]
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for any function f (x).4 Compare this to the equation above, where f needs only
to be linear. If the equation does not hold for any linear function, then there may
well be any other nonlinear functional relation f . Independent random variables
have always correlation zero, but uncorrelated random variables are—apart from
normally distributed random variables—not independent from each other. This
again makes clear that in the assumption on weak auto-regressive cash flows we
are dealing with a weaker formulation. We are not insinuating any random walk
with regard to the cash flows within the framework of our theory, but are instead
working on the basis of the less demanding uncorrelated growth.
Multiplicative Versus Additive Increments Understanding auto-regressive cash
flows is not an easy task. In the previous section, we looked at additive increments
of cash flows in order to find an appropriate way of interpretation. But the additive
context is by no means compelling. We could have used a multiplicative link as
well. In the following, we will briefly discuss this and show that the result does not
change at all. So, whether we go the additive or a multiplicative path is pure taste.
A multiplicative relation is defined by
FCF
u
t+1 = (1 + gt )FCF
u
t (1 + εt+1) . (3.2)
First, we will check which properties of the error terms εt guarantee that the cash
flows turn out to be weak auto-regressive once again. By inserting Assumption 3.1
in the definition we get
(1 + gt )FCFut = E[FCF
u
t+1|Ft ] Assumption 3.1
= (1 + gt ) · FCFut · (1 + E[εt+1|Ft ]) Rule 5.
This means that
E[εt+1|Ft ] = 0
is sufficient and necessary for weak auto-regression. Differences between additive
and multiplicative increments only play a role when the distributions of the error
terms come into play. However, these differences are not important in the following.









(1 + gt )FCFut
)
+ log (1 + εt+1) .
4See, for example, Ingersoll jr. (1987, p. 15). Also compare Problems 3 and 4.
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In a multiplicative model the logarithms of the cash flows follow an additive model
with log (1 + εt+1) representing the error terms.5 Based on these considerations we
will restrict ourselves on additive error terms from now on.
Justification of Weak Auto-Regressive Cash Flows Every economic theory is
based on assumptions. The numerous jokes usually told about us economists are
based on the fact that we occasionally apply unrealistic, odd conditions. Economists
who would like to be taken seriously must put up with the question as to whether
their assumptions are justifiable. May we actually insinuate in good conscience that
the Assumption 3.1 is met in terms of a firm’s free cash flows? Isn’t this assumption
perhaps totally “far-fetched”?
From our experience, practically engaged evaluators normally do not deal at all
with the question as to which distribution laws uncertain future cash flows follow.
On the contrary they limit themselves to estimating the expectations of these future
cash flows. It can now be shown that there are always state spaces with upwards
and downwards movements like that analogous to Fig. 2.2 for whatever sequence of
expectations you like. Assumption 3.1 is thus met in this model.6 But that does not
mean anything else than that an evaluator working with estimated expectations of
cash flows can operate upon the basis that—so to speak behind the scenes—there
is always a state space that corresponds to the Assumption 3.1. All in all, that is
why we hold the assumption on weak auto-regressive cash flows to be practically
acceptable.
The question can be raised at this point as to why exactly the unlevered firm’s
cash flows should be weak auto-regressive. It is obvious that our Assumption 3.1
is arbitrary and it does not make any sense to hide that. Couldn’t we have just as
well replaced our assumption with the condition that the free cash flows of a levered
firm are weak auto-regressive? Could this levered firm be chosen in just any way, or
would it have to be a firm with a particular financing policy? We must give a clear
answer to the questions raised here: Varying results would be gotten in any case
for the valuation equations, which we will be developing in the following. What is
more, we think the following ascertainment is important: If it were to be supposed
that a levered firm has weak auto-regressive cash flows, then it would not necessarily
follow that the free cash flows of a firm with a different financing policy have this
same characteristic as well.7
5See Problem 1.
6The proof demands some rather involved calculations, which we would spare ourselves here.
Whoever takes the trouble and turns back to our example from Fig. 2.2, will determine that the
assumption on weak auto-regressive cash flows is valid for the cash flows in this example. Also
Problem 3 was devoted to that calculation.
7Problem 1 is devoted to this point.
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Conclusions from Weak Auto-Regressive Cash Flows: Dividend-Price Ratio If
cash flows are weak auto-regressive, then it can be proven that the unlevered firm’s
value is a multiple of the free cash flow. To put it differently, the unlevered firm must
always show a deterministic dividend-price ratio. This result is well-known in the
case of a perpetual rent from the Williams/Gordon-Shapiro formula.
Theorem 3.2 (Williams/Gordon-Shapiro Formula) If the cost of capital is deter-







holds for deterministic and positive dut > 0 which will be called dividend-price
ratio. q.e.d.
We have banned the proof for this theorem to the appendix.























− 1 = d
u
t (1 + gt )
dut+1
− 1
and is zero in particular if the dividend-price ratio is constant and the growth rate is
zero.
Conclusions from Weak Auto-Regressive Cash Flows: Discount Rates We had
already made it clear in the introduction that for the case under certainty, the returns
and not the yields present the appropriate means of determining the value of cash
flows. Now we take up the question as to the relation which exists between returns
and discount rates. Let us take a look in order to get a certain idea of the free cash
flows of any year you like. Without further assumptions on the capital market, we
cannot act as if a claim to this single cash flow will be traded. Otherwise, the owner
of a share would have claims to dividends, so to speak, but not to the share price of
the security. Nevertheless, the question that we want to ask ourselves is: what price
should an investor pay at time t < s for an isolated free cash flow FCF
u
s ?
Although we have not precisely developed the basic elements of the arbitrage
theory, we may make use of the fundamental theorem in terms of an analogous
argument. If we can actually value levered as well as unlevered firms with this
principle, then this should also be possible for the claim to an isolated cash flow.
This cash flow is valued by constituting the expectation in terms of the risk-neutral
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(1 + rf )s−t .
The above expression gives the value of the free cash flows FCF
u
s at time t . It
is immediately noticeable that this valuation formula, albeit extremely elegant, is
totally useless: we know next to nothing about the probability measure Q. We will
now turn our attention to a second outcome, which can be gotten from the fact
that cash flows are weak auto-regressive. If cash flows are weak auto-regressive,
then there is another way to value them which is of interest to us. In order to let
that become clear, we must precisely define the term discount rate, which has until
now been only vaguely introduced. For that we will make use of a few preliminary
considerations.
Under the discount rate κt we understand that number, which allows the price of
the cash flow FCF
u
t+1 at time t to be determined. According to our statements up
to present, the discount rate κt shall serve as an instrument to value the single cash
flow FCF
u














1 + rf . (3.3)
Yet, this consideration alone is not sufficient for our purposes. We do not simply
want to make use of the discount rates to value cash flows, which are each one
single period away from the time of valuation. If we are, for instance, dealing with
the valuation of the cash flow FCF
u
t+2 at time t , then we want to manage this task


















is valid. But now it is not so unmistakably clear whether κt is serving the valuation of
the cash flow FCF
u
t+1 or the cash flow FCF
u
t+2. And we can also no longer assume
that the discount rate κt from Eq. (3.3) agrees with κt from Eq. (3.4).9 We will thus
suggest a definition for the discount rates that takes the cash flows to be valued into
consideration and which requires a somewhat more complicated notation.
8We already mentioned that it can be shown with advanced mathematical methods that this
procedure is in fact permissible with regard to all conceivable payment claims.
9See Problem 10 for the last remark.
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Definition 3.2 (Discount Rates of the Unlevered Firm) Real numbers
κt→st , κt→st+1 . . . are called discount rates of the cash flow FCF
u
s of the unlevered





















We stress that this is only one of many conceivable definitions. We could, for
instance, also define the discount rates as yields instead of the version we have
chosen. If we do not do so, it is due solely to practical considerations.
We can, on the basis of definition (3.2), clarify the question as to whether the cost
of capital kE,u prove to be appropriate candidates for discount rates of the unlevered
cash flows. In answering this question we fall back upon the assumption that the cash
flows of the unlevered firm are weak auto-regressive. Cost of capital does not then
just only prove itself as appropriate discount rates. It has, much further, the pleasant
characteristic that it is independent of the particular cash flow to be valued FCF
u
s .
This characteristic will later prove itself to be very helpful.
Theorem 3.3 (Equivalence of the Valuation Concepts) If the cost of capital is
deterministic and the cash flows of the unlevered firm are weak auto-regressive,























This is the same as to say that cost of capital are indeed discount rates regardless
of s > t ≥ τ
κs→τt = kE,ut .
That this theorem follows from the met assumptions can hardly be so easily
recognized. Since the proof would demand a fair amount of space and perhaps not
even be of interest to every reader, we have banned it to an appendix.10
Critical readers could suspect that this theorem has to do with a simple
application of the definition of the cost of capital. This would most definitely be
a wrong conclusion and in order to make it more understandable, we would like to
10In the given theorem the cost of capital has a time index, which the riskless interest rate in
contrast does not. We had already pointed out that we are supposing a flat term structure; it is no
problem whatsoever, though, to generalize this theorem for the case of a non-flat term structure as
well.
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go into it in more detail. Just equating Eq. (2.8) with Theorem 3.1 leads us in terms






























The preceding equation is of little surprise, as it only claims the equivalence of
two different ways of calculation: either the risk-neutral probability and the riskless
interest rate is used, or the evaluator applies the subjective probability and the
(correspondingly) defined cost of capital. Since the cost of capital is now so defined
that both expressions give identical values, there is no reason to worry about coming
up with equal firm values.
Of surprise, however, is the declaration that not only do the sums agree in the last
equation, but the summands as well. This is everything but obvious, as the simple
example
4 + 6 = 3 + 7 but 4 = 3 and 6 = 7
shows. The reader should keep both statements (i.e., the identity of the sums as well
as the identity of the summands) clearly separate. Our statement is everything but
self-evident and is thoroughly in need of a proof.
A First Look at Default Until now we had purposely not included the case in
which the firm to be valued can go bankrupt. But as the company grows, the
probability of going into default is increasing.
If the court in charge allows for the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings,
the consequences for creditors, suppliers, employees, owners, and managers are
determined in detail by the bankruptcy law. As a rule a liquidator is placed in charge
of the business affairs and examines how each party’s payment claims can best be
settled. The liquidator makes suitable suggestions within a given time frame and
tries to get the agreement of the creditors and the court.
There are principally three possibilities. You can try to rehabilitate the firm, that
is, to re-establish the profitability through suitable restructuring measures. In order
to do this, the creditors must be willing to renounce some of their claims. If that is
not feasible, then the insolvent firm can be transferred over to a bail-out firm and the
creditors are paid off by the sales proceeds. If such a solution is also not practical,
then there is no other option than to close down and liquidate the firm. What then
remains is the smaller the faster the breakup of the firm takes place.
In the following we only assume that in determining future cash flows as
well as in laying down future financing and investment policies, all conceivable
developments were taken into consideration. If all conceivable developments are
being spoken of, then that also includes situations in which the firm goes into default
or has gone into default.
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Unlevered firms can go bankrupt if claims of tax authorities, employees, and the
like are not satisfied. Formal insolvency proceedings are regulated differently from
one jurisdiction to the other. However, most countries apply similar default triggers.
Usually, illiquidity and over-indebtedness are typical default triggers. A company
gets illiquid if its net cash flows (i.e., cash flows to equity or CFE) are negative. A
company is over-indebted if the value of equity is negative (whereas market as well
as book values are being used in this definition).11 Similarly, e.g., the UK Insolvency
Act initiates bankruptcy proceedings if a firm either does not have enough assets to
cover its debts (i.e., the value of assets is less than the amount of the liabilities), or
it is unable to pay its debts as they fall due.
Let us first concentrate on the case of an unlevered firm. It is tempting to suggest
that an unlevered company is illiquid if the owners’ net cash flows turn out to be
negative or FCF
u
t (ω) < 0. But it is clearly apparent that this definition has its
pitfalls when used in a DCF context. Why do we have to emphasize this? If net cash
flows are positive, the company pays money to the owners. But if not, it is just the
other way round: the owners pay money to the company if net cash flows appear to
be negative. Now, if a sufficient amount of money is paid to the company, the firm
is no longer illiquid. The owners simply rectify the unpleasant situation. Hence, if
and only if the owners do not completely comply with their reserve liabilities, one
can actually speak of a lack of liquidity of the company.
We hold the following: whenever the owners cannot or do not meet their funding
obligations, the company effectively faces illiquidity.12 However, the mere existence
of negative net cash flows does not automatically imply such a run of events. We
should therefore speak of the danger of illiquidity that arises if net cash flows turn
out to be negative or FCF
u
t (ω) < 0.
Let us now turn to over-indebtedness as the second default trigger. How could this
term be interpreted when we look at an unlevered firm? We will characterize such
a situation by ˜V ut (ω) < 0. If this condition is fulfilled, from the owner’s point of
view continuing the business would be out of the question. It would undoubtedly be
appropriate to speak of “not continuable unlevered firms.” However, for systematic
reasons we use the terms “in danger of illiquidity” and “in danger of negative
equity,” provided the mentioned inequality is met.
The following proposition will show that now over-indebtedness and danger of
illiquidity are in the case of unlevered firms merely equivalent. Both default triggers
in fact turn out to coincide and it was too much of an effort to distinguish both cases.
But it will turn out that in the case of a levered firm things will become much more
complicated.
11According to German Bankruptcy Code (Insolvenzordnung), for example, a firm has to file for
bankruptcy if illiquidity or over-indebtedness occurs.
12In principle, a third party could enter the scene and take the company’s debt. But we want to
exclude this case.
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Theorem 3.4 (Default of the Unlevered Firm) Consider an unlevered firm with
weak auto-regressive cash flows. If the company is in danger of illiquidity at date t
in some state, it will also be in danger of negative equity at the same date for the
same state. q.e.d.
This immediately follows from Proposition 3.2.
Notice that the market value of equity for corporations cannot be negative, since
they have limited liability. The market value of non-corporations, say partnerships,
can be negative though. This is the reason why we speak only of danger of
insolvency instead of insolvency itself. Our theorem mainly discloses how a
consistent valuation model even of an unlevered firm has to be built in order to
avoid such logical contradictions.
We now have the basic elements of our theory on discounted cash flow. In the
following sections it must be shown what can be done with these basic elements.
3.1.3 Example (Continued)
The Finite Case Beforehand we want to take up our example from Sect. 2.2.3
and establish the value of the unlevered firm. As we have seen the cash flows
follow a weak auto-regressive development. In addition, we assume that the cost
of capital of the unlevered firm is constant in time and amounts to 20%. According






























Although the use of this calculation is perhaps not recognizable yet here, we want to
determine the market value of the unlevered firm for time t = 1 as well. This is not
clear, because we cannot yet know today, if the outcome at time t = 1 will result
in the condition up or down. Depending upon the condition, we are discounting
different cash flows. In the condition of up, we get13

























2(ω|d)) denotes the cash flow at time t = 2 given that the first movement
was up (or down).
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while for the condition of down




















is what we get. With that we get altogether
˜V u1 ≈
{
193.26, if the development in t = 1 is up,
158.13, if the development in t = 1 is down.









121.00, if the development is up–up,
100.83, if the development is up–down or down–up,
80.67, if the development is down–down.
An additional result, which, however, is not required for the valuation of
the unlevered firm but which will be used subsequently, is that the risk-neutral
probability Q can be worked out. To this end we suppose a riskless interest rate of















1 + kE,u .










1 + kE,u .
The conditional Q-probabilities add to one
Q3(u|ω) + Q3(d|ω) = 1 .
The conditional P -probabilities of an up- or a down-movement each come to 0.5.
From that we get, for example, at ω = dd
Q3(u|dd) ≈ 0.4167, Q3(d|dd) ≈ 0.5833 .
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Fig. 3.1 Conditional















= 0 = 1 = 2 = 3
Using this idea at any time t and any available state ω we can finally determine all
conditional probabilities. We have summarized our results in Fig. 3.1.
The Infinite Case Let the unlevered cost of capital be kE,u = 20%. Then the value


































As in the finite example we can evaluate the conditional up- and down-proba-















1 + kE,u .
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The cash flow FCF
u
t (ω) cancels. Furthermore the growth rate of the cash flows is
zero (g = 0) and we arrive at
Qt+1(u|ω) u + Qt+1(d|ω) d = 1 + rf
1 + kE,u .
The conditional Q-probabilities add to one
Qt+1(u|ω) + Qt+1(d|ω) = 1 .








regardless of t and ω.
This is an interesting result. The factors u and d cannot be chosen arbitrarily if
the cost of capital are to be constant. Furthermore we can see that
d <
1 + rf
1 + kE,u < u
must hold in order to ensure positive Q-probabilities. Any increase of the cost of
capital enforces a decrease of the corresponding d .
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3.1.4 Problems
1. The next two problems shall clarify the differences between additive and
multiplicative increments. The error terms ε may be iid with values of 0.5 or
−0.5, respectively, with 50% probability. In this case there is no growth, i.e.,
g = 0.
(a) Consider additive increments. Assume that the cash flows follow the process
FCF
u
t = 1 + ε1 + ε2 + . . . + εt .
Show that under these conditions the cash flows form a binomial tree.




t = (1 + ε1)(1 + ε2) · · · (1 + εt ) .
Show that the logarithmized cash flows are binomially distributed.
2. Let error terms ε be iid.
(a) Consider additive increments that are normally distributed with expectation
0 and variance 1. The cash flows may follow the process
FCF
u
t = 1 + ε1 + ε2 + . . . + εt .
Show that FCF
u
t must be normally distributed with expectation 1 and
variance t .
(b) Switch to multiplicative increments that are lognormally distributed with
expectation 0 and variance 1. The cash flows follow the process
FCF
u
t = (1 + ε1)(1 + ε2) · · · (1 + εt ) .
Are the cash flows now lognormally distributed with expectation 1 and
variance t?
3. Assume that cash flows follow a process as in (3.1). Show that
0 = E [εt+1|Ft ]
is sufficient for the cash flows to be weak auto-regressive. Show furthermore
that the noise terms are uncorrelated, i.e., for s > t
Cov [εs,εt ] = 0 .
4. Consider the binomial tree from Fig. 3.2 (additive increments). Up- and down-
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133.1 + ( )
133.1 + ( )
110.8 + ( )
+ ( )
time= 0 = 1 = 2
110.8
(a) Determine all possible distributions of the noise terms ε at time t = 2 such
that
E [ε2|F1] = E [ε2] = 0
holds (uncorrelated additive increments).
(b) Determine all possible distributions of the noise terms ε at time t = 2 such
that furthermore
E [f (ε2)|F1] = E [f (ε2)]
holds for any function f (x) (independent additive increments).
5. Consider the binomial tree from Fig. 3.3. Up- and down-movements have the





example the noise terms are multiplicative instead of additive.
(a) Determine all possible distributions of the noise terms ε at time t = 2 such
that
E [ε2|F1] = E [ε2] = 0
holds (uncorrelated multiplicative increments).
(b) Determine all possible distributions of the noise terms ε at time t = 2 such
that furthermore
E [f (ε2)|F1] = E [f (ε2)]
holds for any function f (x) (independent multiplicative increments).
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133.1 · (1 + ( ))
133.1 · (1 + ( ))
110.8 · (1 + ( ))
110.8 · (1 + ( ))
time= 0 = 1 = 2










Show that it is deterministic for weak auto-regressive cash flows and determine









7. Assume that the cost of capital kE,u are deterministic and constant. The firm is
infinitely living (T → ∞). Assume that the cash flows of the unlevered firm
are weak auto-regressive as in Assumption 3.1 for deterministic and constant g
with −1 < g < kE,u.
(a) Find a simple formula for the value of the firm ˜V ut analog to Theorem 3.1.
Evaluate the capital gains and the dividend ratio for that case.
(b) What happens to the firm value if g ≥ kE,u?
(c) Show that the free cash flows are furthermore weak auto-regressive under














and determine gQt .
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= FCFut + Xt ,
where Xt is a random variable satisfying
E [Xt |Ft−1] = EQ [Xt |Ft−1] = 0
and furthermore Xt is uncorrelated to FCF
u
t . Hence, this random variable is
white noise and has no price at t − 1. Several problems will be devoted to this
special case.
(a) Assume that the firm will live forever (T → ∞). Verify that the value of









and show that the variance of the firm value ˜V ut is strictly greater than the










and hence the expected capital gains rate is zero.
(c) In this particular case the cost of capital may be used as discount rates








































= FCFut + C
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for constant C = 0 (see, for example, Feltham and Ohlson (1995) or Barberis
et al. (1998), although they consider a different approach). Several problems
will be devoted to this special case.
















(1 + x)s =
1 + x
x2
if x > 0 .
















for the expectation of the cash flow under Q. Does Theorem 3.3 still hold?
10. The Definition 3.2 of a discount rate is cumbersome since it always refers to the
time the cash flow is paid and the time the cash flow is valued as well. The aim
of this problem is to show that even in simple cases if κr→st shall be independent
from r and s, this can lead to a contradiction.
Consider cash flows that are independent from each other and identically













, . . .
will always be a real number.14 Furthermore, the discount rate κr→st shall
depend neither on r nor on s
κr→st = κt .
(a) Show that the discount rates are equal to rf = κt .














14We do not go into detail here. You are asked to use our recommended literature if you want more
explanation on this assertion on independent random variables.
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3.2 Basics About Levered Firms
We now bring to a close the debate of unlevered firms and turn towards the truer-
to-reality case of the levered firm. To do so we first of all need a clear separation
between equity and debt.15 In addition, we will work out in which the taxation
of levered firms is different from the unlevered firm. These differences in taxation
influence the value of the firm. And the degree of influence on value is dependent
upon the type of financing policy the managers of the firm to be valued are operating
under. In connection to the fundamental representation of this relation, we will
analyze how numerous conceivable forms of financing policy effect value of firms
and derive each appropriate valuation equation.
3.2.1 Equity and Debt
To come quickly to a needed result, we suppose that the firm to be valued is a
corporation, where financiers can be divided into two groups. The financiers come
up with capital, which the managers use to employ on risky investments. In return,
the financiers get securities which we term debt or equity, as the case may be.
Although we presume our choice of words is already sufficiently clear, we do,
however, want to get down an important characteristic of the securities. We assume
that equity and debt are traded on capital markets, that is, they can be bought and
sold at any time. The securities thus have market prices, and we designate the market
value of the equity at time t with ˜Et , and the market value of the debt with ˜Dt . The
tilde over the symbol makes it clear that a random variable is being dealt with. If
we want to express that there are no random variables, we write Dt . Interest paid at
time t + 1 is ˜I t+1.
The firm’s generated net profit in total is uncertain and is distributed among
the financiers so that debt financiers (creditors, debt holders) are taken care of
first, while the equity financiers (owners, shareholders) have to make do with what
possibly remains. Further financiers are not to be considered. The distribution rule
is completely straightforward.
Notation In the equations that we have used until now, we were always dealing
with free cash flows and values of firms. In the previous chapter, when unlevered
firms were dealt with we added the index u to the symbols which we needed. Now
we will use the index l, since levered firms are being dealt with. We thus write FCF
l
t .
For the equity cost of capital of the levered firms we will use the symbol˜kE,lt .
We will have to introduce a whole range of other symbols. It will always be
recognized when these symbols are used in the context of an unlevered firm by
15It is well known that a straightforward separation can bring considerable difficulties with it, if
you want to undertake this within the context of all the financing contracts which occur in reality.
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index u. If, on the other hand, a levered firm is being dealt with, we will make that
clear with the index l.
The Firm’S Market Value, Debt-Equity Ratio, and Leverage Ratio The goal of
our theory is the establishment of the market value of a firm. For the market value
of the levered firm at time t , we use the symbol ˜V lt . The market value of the firm is
equal to the sum of the equity’s market value and the debt’s market value,
˜V lt := ˜Et + ˜Dt .
Debt equity ratios and leverage ratios will play a big role in our further











Even though we will use the debt ratios in later sections, we can also apply the





is valid. With these symbols we stress that all quantities are measured in market
values.
Book Values In a few sections of this chapter the book value of equity and debt will
be dealt with. These are those values, with which the owners’ or creditors’ claims
are to be found in the balance books of the firm to be valued. As symbols for debt
and equity for book values, we use ˜Dt and ˜Et , respectively. The sums of equity and
debt at time t are written in the form
˜V
l
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for the correspondingly measured leverage ratio. Again, debt ratio and leverage ratio
can easily be converted into each other.
3.2.2 Earnings and Taxes
In the foundational chapter of this book, we gave a preliminary introduction of gross
cash flows and free cash flows. The terms developed there were perfectly adequate
to come up with valuation equations for firms where the financing policy was not
set in detail (Chap. 2) or which were totally financed with equity (Sect. 3.1). Now
we are supposed to be dealing with levered firms, which forces us to bring more
structure to the terms.
Tax Equation In order to understand the relevant relationships, we again present
the ascertaining of free cash flows from Fig. 2.1, but now with a more detailed
notation that will be used in this chapter, see Fig. 3.4. Interest on debt is of course
only accrued by levered firms. If we add it to the earnings before taxes (EBT), then
we get the earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT). If we add accruals, we arrive
at the gross cash flow before taxes, also called EBITDA. If we finally deduct the
investment expenses and deduct taxes as well, then we get the free cash flow. This
cash flow is fully distributed to the owners of the company.
As was announced earlier, we are limiting ourselves in this chapter to a business
tax and leave out the income tax on the shareholder’s level of the company. The tax
base of the profit taxes is the earnings before taxes (EBT)
˜Tax = τ · EBT . (3.8)
Fig. 3.4 From earnings




= Earnings before interest and taxes
+ Accruals Accr
= Gross cash flow before taxes GCF
− Corporate income taxes Tax
− Investment expenses Inv
= Free cash flow FCF
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The tax equations should be valid independent of the sign of the tax base. If the
tax base is positive, the firm has to pay taxes; if it is, on the other hand, negative, then
the firm gets a return in the amount of the tax due. We will not give more realistic
models of loss set-off or loss carryback rules than that.
In order to describe the difference between the levered and the unlevered firm we
will assume that their investment policies coincide.
Assumption 3.2 (Identical Gross Cash Flows) The gross cash flows before taxes
as well as the accruals and investment expenses of the unlevered firm do not differ
from those of the levered firm. q.e.d.
Hence, the EBIT must be just as large for the firm financed by equity as it is
for the firm financed by debt. In Fig. 3.4 the third and the fourth lines are thus
identical for the levered and unlevered firms, while taxes and free cash flows will
show different values. The taxes of the levered firm are thus smaller by the product






t = τ ˜I t .
Financing by debt is thus favored in this model.
By Assumption 3.2 the free cash flows before taxes of the levered and unlevered





t + τ ˜I t . (3.9)
The firm financed by equity has lower free cash flows than the firm financed by
debt, because interest may be deducted from the tax base. The following concerns
the question as to the value of these tax advantages. A—if not the—central problem
of the DCF theory is the establishment of the value of the tax advantages governed
by credit conditions.
3.2.3 Financing Policies
No Default We are supposing at first that credit is not threatened by default and
thus follow a widely held tradition within DCF literature,
˜I t = rf ˜Dt−1 . (3.10)
This notion flagrantly contradicts the experience of banks with their borrowers. In
reality financiers’ claims are obviously under notable threat of default. In a later
subsection we will show how default can be handled in our theory.
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Components of Tax Advantages Now we make a first attempt at turning to the
valuation of tax advantages of the firm financed by debt. The tax advantages are, as
we just determined, attributed to the fact that interest on debt may be deducted in
the firm’s tax base. This comes to—in terms of the levered firm—a tax savings (also
called tax shield) in the amount of
τ rf ˜Dt−1 .
Whoever is involved professionally with valuation of firms as certified public
accountant, investment banker or as business consultant, knows only too well that
in practical terms both the tax rate and the interest rate are uncertain. Looking at
the assumptions, we have, however, made sure that only the amounts of debt ˜Dt−1
can be uncertain. The interest rate of debt rf as well as the tax rate τ are certain
according to the requirements.
Value of Tax Advantages To value tax advantages appropriately, we need further
information about the uncertainty to which they are exposed. It is true, we know—in
accordance with the assumption—how high the tax rate and the interest rate will be.
But we cannot, however, know without further assumptions regarding the financing
policy at time t = 0, how high the debt of the firm to be valued will be at time t > 0.
We have no other options than to come to further assumptions regarding
information about the firm’s future debt policy. This is the only way in which we
can come up with what amounts of debt ˜Dt−1 will be established in times t > 0,
with what risk these amounts bear and how the resulting tax advantages are to be
accordingly valued. Without any information of the levered firm the tax advantages
cannot be properly valued.
The practically engaged evaluator may perplexedly note here that the valuation of
the firm is bound to the assumptions pertinent to it. In so doing the firm value takes
on an air of doing what one pleases of it, or—to put it more drastically—an element
of manipulation. To that we must answer, every valuation is based on expectation
about the future. Whoever does not forecast the turnover numbers, whoever does not
know what the cost of materials will be, cannot value a firm. All of these and further
assumptions come off as somewhat arbitrary. That also applies for the financing
policy of the evaluator.
Different Financing Policies Now let us turn to different possible financing
policies. We find that within this area of DCF literature, two concepts are regularly
brought into play. Autonomous financing supposes that the amounts of debt are
already fixed at the time of valuation. Financing based on value supposes, in
contrast, that the debt ratios are fixed in the present.
We too will examine both financing policies. When debt ratios measured in
market values are being dealt with, we will, however, to be more precise refer to it in
the following as financing policy based on market values. Moreover, we will bring
four further financing policies into the discussion. We will term these policy based
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on cash flows, policy based on dividends, policy based on book values and on cash
flow-debt ratio. These six policies can be characterized in brief by the following:
1. With autonomous financing methods, the future amount of debt is deterministic.
2. With the financing based on market values, the evaluator sets the future debt
ratios based on market values.
3. With the financing based on book values, the future debt ratios are not fixed to
market values, but rather to book values.
4. With the financing based on cash flows the amount of debt is based on the firm’s
cash flows.
5. With the financing based on dividends the firm’s amount of debt is managed so
that a previously determined dividend can be distributed.
6. With the financing based on dynamical leverage ratio the evaluator sets the future
cash flow-debt ratios.
We cannot and do not want to answer the question here as to which of these
financing policies is particularly close to reality. Instead, we see our task as to
compile all possibly conceivable financing policies, and to show how to go about
valuing when these policies are met. The direction the specific firm goes in depends
upon the credit agreements with the financiers as well as the goals and ideas of the
managers.
Further, we will not discuss the question, which of the mentioned financing
policies maximize the value of the levered company. Later on it will become
apparent that with an extended leverage the value of the company increases. Hence,
the owners of the company should select a leverage as high as possible if they act
rationally. However, here the leverage policy will be considered as a term which is
given exogenously. The owners will pursue a prespecified financing policy without
racking one’s brains if this policy will be the best option.
Assumption 3.3 (Given Debt Policy) The debt policy of the firm (although prob-
ably uncertain) is already prescribed. q.e.d.
To determine the values of firms under the different financing policies, we require
an important equation. The statements of the fundamental theorem of asset pricing
are valid for the levered as well as the unlevered firm,16 particularly the valuation
statements coming out of Theorem 2.2. We thus know that the value of the unlevered
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The validity of the fundamental theorem does not depend upon how the firm is


















Using (3.9) we can immediately read from both valuation equations that the market
value of the levered firm is different from the market value of the unlevered firm
only in terms of the value of the tax advantages





1 + rf + . . . +
EQ
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With (3.10) and rule 2 (linearity) this yields













We will be able to use this equation for all financing policies. Fernández (2005)
gives the same result in the following Presentation:17
˜V lt = ˜V ut + τ ˜Dt +
τ EQ
[
˜Dt+1 − ˜Dt |Ft
]
1 + rf + . . . +
τ EQ
[
˜DT − ˜DT −1|Ft
]
(1 + rf )T−t .
(3.12)
3.2.4 Debt and Transversality (Again)
In the following we will focus on levered companies that accept loans which run
forever. Anyone familiar with basic financial mathematics knows that the present
value of a riskless loan equals the sum of discounted cash flows if the credit is
temporary. So if credit is granted today in the amount of ˜D0 and the borrower in later






(1 + rf )˜Dt − ˜Dt+1
(1 + rf )t
must hold if ˜DT = 0 is assumed.
17See also Problem 4.
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What will happen for T → ∞? One can easily imagine that the loan is not repaid







(1 + rf )˜Dt − ˜Dt+1
(1 + rf )t , (3.13)
and under what conditions is this not permissible? Transversality, again, will give the
answer. For this reason, we reassume this condition. However, we will concentrate
on uncertainty from the beginning. It can immediately be seen that this is an
assumption with regard to the infinite finance policy.
Assumption 3.4 (Debt Policy Satisfies Transversality) The debt policy of the firm




(1 + rf )T−t = 0.
To fully understand this assumption, let us look at two (extreme in our eyes)
examples of infinite financing policies. In the first case transversality will be
violated, in the second one it will be fulfilled. Our readers must decide, whether
the examples are intuitively clear.
First, assume that the payment obligations due to interest liabilities will be
completely credit-financed. This boils down to the relation
˜Dt+1 = (1 + rf )˜Dt ,
and it is immediately clear that the transversality condition cannot be fulfilled: The
creditor increases his loan from year to year and never gets a refund. Equation (3.13)
can therefore never be satisfied for a positive ˜D0. In finite time the credit might grow
enormously, but would eventually be repaid.
The next example shows that Eq. (3.13) can be sustained with a financing policy
that is only slightly different from the previous one. To this end, let us assume that
an investor finances only half of the interest obligations by a credit. Again, the loan
is increasing year by year. And it is also true that in finite time there is never a
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(1 + rf )T−t
˜D0
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The difference between the two financing policies is quickly detected. For Eq. (3.13)
to be satisfied, the lender must receive any payments from the debtor at any time.
The compounding effect then ensures complete refunding of the loan. However, if
the redemption payments go back to zero (as in the first example), the transversality
condition is inevitably violated.
The issue raised here is only important for credit agreements with an infinite
duration. Therefore, we will treat T → ∞ only exceptionally, and will regularly
restrict ourselves to contracts with finite duration.
3.2.5 Default
Authors who are involved in credit risks take care to thoroughly discuss default
probabilities. Surprisingly, it is the same facts of the case that are regularly
disregarded in the DCF literature. There is no doubt that it is necessary to pursue
the question as to how a firm can be valued with the risk that it will not be able to
meet all its credit obligations.
It will turn out that in the case of a levered firm default is becoming much more
manifold.
There are legal stipulations that regulate under what conditions default for a
levered company is given. We have already stressed that in most countries of the
world there are several factors that can lead to bankruptcy. Lack of liquidity is such
a factor everywhere. But there are also countries in which the managers are required
to start bankruptcy proceedings when the firm’s balance sheets read that the assets
no longer cover the debts, or when the finance plans indicate the inability to pay in
the near future.
Homogenous Expectations Up to now we have worked on the basis that debt
and equity financiers are equally well informed. This condition is of particular
importance with the threat of insolvency and can surely be seen critically. But
there is no getting around conceding certain information about the firm to the
debt financiers. No one loans out money without having beforehand checked up
on the contract partner’s business ideas, risks, and market chances in some detail.
Yet asymmetric information as a rule is truer to reality than our condition of
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homogenous expectations. It, however, applies that whoever wants to deviate from
this assumption, has to very precisely define the information which both sides either
have or do not have access to.
Identical Cash Flows and Default Until now we have worked on the basis of some
assumptions within the framework of our theory which should also remain valid in
the case of default. We would in the following like to briefly discuss how we justify
that.
We had thus continually assumed that gross cash flows from levered and
unlevered firms are not different from each other. It should be stressed that until
now levered firms not in danger of going into default have been dealt with. If we
want to maintain the assumption, then it must be broadened to include the gross
cash flows of the firm in danger of going into default and that not going into default
being the same.
That is quite a far-reaching limitation. A firm can of course get into a situation
due to financial difficulties which has consequences for its gross cash flows.
Financial strains often cause suppliers as well as clients to reconsider continuing
doing business with the firm affected. Some clients leave altogether or cancel long-
term contracts; suppliers may deliver only on condition of prepayment. Managers
who would remain faithful to the firm under more favorable circumstances look
for other jobs, taking with them the important know-how required in such times
and aggravating the crisis. All the financial consequences of a high leverage which
we have pointed out here, are usually referred to in the literature as indirect costs
of default. It can then be said that in our model we abstract the existence of
such costs of default. But indirect costs of default are difficult to quantify. If you
wanted to substitute with a more realistic premise and at the same time avoid
having the new assumption remaining subject to change, then despite all difficulties,
you would have to formulate a functional relation between gross cash flows and
advanced leverage. A firm’s gross cash flows have two components in a model of
several periods: on the one hand their amount, and on the other their duration. Our
assumption says that increasing leverage affects neither the amount nor the duration
of the gross cash flows.
Let us now open up the question as to how great the amount is that the owners
receive at time t . The starting point was the firm’s identical gross cash flows before
interest and tax GCFt . To arrive at the free cash flows from here, we have to deduct
the firm’s (internally financed) investments and taxes. It needs to be further clarified
how these amounts differ from each other when dealing with, on the one hand, an
unlevered firm and, on the other, a levered firm also in danger of going into default.
Again, we only get further with the assumption that the investment and accruals of
the firm in danger of going into default agrees with that of the firm not in danger of
going into default. We can thus sum up our conditions in the following specification
of Assumption 3.2.
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Assumption 3.5 (Gross Cash Flows and Default) The gross cash flows as well as
the investment and accruals of the unlevered firm do not differ from those of the firm
in danger of going into default. q.e.d.
Bankruptcy Estate If the company does not file for bankruptcy, then the creditors’
claims can be satisfied in full. Two parties are to be differentiated here, the state and
the investor. The order in which the claims of the finance administration and the
other creditors are satisfied does not matter as long as we are not dealing with going
into default. The owners’ claims will be settled last in any case. In the worst case
the shareholders can end up with nothing. Since corporations do not have personal
liability, we can disregard the owners having to make payments from their private
pockets in very unfavorable situations.
As a rule the requisitioned property does not suffice in the case of bankruptcy
to completely settle up with the state and the creditors. Thus it does matter which
claims take priority. Is the state to be completely taken care of first? Or, are the
other creditors to be paid off while the state has to stay? Answers are provided by
the pertinent legal stipulations. We do not want to discuss that any further here, but
solve the problem by introducing an appropriate assumption that is (more or less)
satisfied in most industrial countries.
Assumption 3.6 (Prioritization of Debt) The tax office’s claims come before those
of other creditors. The cash flows are always sufficient to at least pay off the tax
debts in full. q.e.d.
The tax office will therefore be given priority over the creditors when dealing
with a firm in danger of going into default so that the tax claims can be satisfied in
full. And the default is never so drastic in our concept that the state loses a share of
its claims.
Notation The notation used so far is not sufficient for the deliberations to be put
forth in the following. Let us again suppose that the firm took in a credit of ˜Dt at
time t . In the earlier section the variable ˜Dt signified two different things, namely
for one, the credit which the firm took in at time t , and, for the other, the amount,
which apart from the interest it redeems at time t + 1.18 In case of default, the
amount, which the company amortizes at the time t + 1, will not coincide with the
repayment sum to which it is legally obligated. ˜Dt shall be the credit which has been
raised at time t and ˜Dt+1 the corresponding amount a year later. Consequently, the
difference between ˜Dt and ˜Dt+1 accounts for the amount which the company needs
to pay back to the creditor (or, if this amount is negative, has to be raised). In the
following we will assume that the company pays back the amount ˜Rt+1 which can
18See Sect. 3.2.1.
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be at the most as high as ˜Dt − ˜Dt+1, hence
˜Rt+1 ≤ ˜Dt − ˜Dt+1.
If the repayment sum is smaller than the amount which the company owns its
creditors, the term
˜Dt − ˜Dt+1 − ˜Rt+1
describes a remission of debts. We do not need a new symbol for the interest ˜I t+1
resulting at time t + 1.
Only looking at the relationship between the firm to be valued and its financiers
in the case of default, it does not matter how the existing remainder of funds is
distributed among the interest and principle repayment due. In terms of the tax
office, however, it is different, since interest lowers the tax base, and the debt
repayment, in contrast, does not.
We proceed on the basis that the tax office allows interest in the amount of ˜I t+1
to be deducted from the tax base. On the other hand, the state in many countries
insists that during bankruptcy the cancellation of debt be taxed in amount of ˜Dt −
˜Dt+1 − ˜Rt+1. According to (3.8), the following applies for the taxes of the firm





GCFt+1 − Accrt+1 − ˜I t+1 + ˜Dt − ˜Dt+1 − ˜Rt+1
)
.
Since the unlevered firm’s tax equation does not change and the gross cash flows
as well as investments are identical, we now get
FCF
l
t+1 = GCFt+1 − ˜Invt+1 − ˜Tax
l
t+1
= GCFt+1 − ˜Invt+1 − ˜Taxut+1 + τ
(
˜I t+1 − ˜Dt + ˜Dt+1 + ˜Rt+1
)
= FCFut+1 + τ
(
˜I t+1 − ˜Dt + ˜Dt+1 + ˜Rt+1
)
. (3.14)
The fundamental theorem of asset pricing now also applies to the levered firm in
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Default Triggers Firstly, we want to examine whether a company that is over-
indebted will be illiquid at a future point in time and, vice versa, whether a firm
that becomes illiquid will have encountered over-indebtedness. We believe that the
relationship between both triggers requires more attention than they are currently
given in the literature.19 Authors who address valuation problems seem to assume
that it does not matter which insolvency trigger is used—a view we challenge
although in Proposition 3.4 we have exactly shown that. While default has been
intensively investigated in prior research, until now the relationship between these
two triggers has not been subject to a detailed analysis. However, for investors and
financiers (e.g., in context of insolvency risk forecast) it is important to understand,
whether these triggers are substitutes to each other, or whether one trigger is stricter
than the other in the sense that one default criterion is met earlier.
We analytically provide evidence that over-indebtedness always implies illiq-
uidity although the converse is not true and that the relationship between both
default triggers depends on the given financing policy. To this end, we must define
what over-indebtedness and lack of liquidity shall be for levered firms. Whereas
illiquidity focuses on cash flows, we will be using the term over-indebtedness if
the assets of the firm are smaller in value than its debt. In the following, however,
we consider only market values instead of, for example, book values in the case of
over-indebtedness. The reason for our approach is obvious: by strictly using market
values we are in a position to easily produce clear conceptual relationships and
provide necessary and sufficient conditions for bankruptcies. That would be much
more difficult, if not impossible, if we used book values or fair values. Hence, falling
back on market values is in line with the simplification strategies that prevail in
economics.
Definition 3.3 (Default) For a given financing policy, a levered firm will be in
danger of illiquidity at time t in state ω if the cash flows in state ω ∈ Ω do not
suffice to fulfill the creditors’ payment claims (interest and net redemption) at





(1 + rf )˜Dt−1(ω) − ˜Dt(ω)
)
< 0. (3.16)
For a given financing policy D, a levered firm will be over-indebted at time t
in state s if the market value of debt exceeds the firm’s market value,
˜V lt (ω) <
˜Dt(ω). (3.17)
Notice that both definitions refer to a future date t and the state ω from today’s
point of view. It can easily be seen that our definition covers also the unlevered firm.
19The following considerations are—in parts literally—taken from Kruschwitz et al. (2015).
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Finally, we assess the consequences of bankruptcy. Consider a firm today with
a given financing policy that is in danger of illiquidity at time t in state ω but not
over-indebted. The management of the said firm will certainly be able to raise credit
in order to ensure the continuance of the firm. If this new financing policy does not
result in a lack of liquidity, the bankruptcy problem is solved. The situation could
be interpreted as follows: the firm uses the new financing policy for refinancing.
Illiquidity turns into a mere postponement of payments.
Yet what happens if the first financing policy in question leads to over-
indebtedness at date t? Refinancing as in the previous paragraph is not possible
since the “substance” of the firm, namely its expected future cash flows, does not
suffice to satisfy the creditors’ payment claims. Moreover, we assume that credit is
only granted for a single period. Therefore, the creditors anticipate at date t − 1 that
the loan will not be repaid in full in t . Consequently, rational creditors will not agree
to issue the necessary credit in time t − 1 which again has an impact on the loan
granted in t − 2. As a result, we conclude that the creditors are able to detect later
over-indebtedness already in t = 0. Within our framework we thus conclude that
over-indebted companies are unable to realize their initial financing strategy.
Valuation of Defaulting Firms The debt holders behave rationally. Therefore, the
fundamental theorem of asset pricing is applicable for debt and we have for any time




˜I s+1 + ˜Ds+1 + ˜Rs+1|Fs
]
1 + rf . (3.18)
Using rule 5 this gives us
rf ˜Ds = EQ
[
˜I s+1 + ˜Rs+1 + ˜Ds+1 − ˜Ds |Fs
]







˜I s+1 − ˜Ds + ˜Ds+1 + ˜Rs+1|Ft
]
. (3.19)
Entering in Eq. (3.15) results in











This equation is not at all different from Eq. (3.11), through which we had
precluded bankruptcy risks! That means that including the default risk has no impact
whatsoever on the firm’s value. If the financing policy concerns the credit amounts
agreed upon, then we do not need to differentiate in the valuation equations between
whether the bankruptcy risks are given or not. Just the possibility of default changes
absolutely nothing in the valuation equations.
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If this outcome is taken seriously, then it seems that even given the risk of
bankruptcy, the value of firms can be successfully calculated with the DCF theory.
It has of course to be examined if the conditions of the theory are still satisfied even
when there are risks of default. And this is exactly where problems could come
up: if the danger of going into default exists for the firm, it can happen that the
creditors will not want to grant credit to the same extent they would if there was
no risk of default. A financing policy which was agreed upon to the neglect of risks
of default can no longer be maintained when considering these risks. But if the
financing policies differ from each other with and without the inclusion of the risk
of default, then the respective values of firms no longer correspond to each other
either.
The message of this subsection can be summed up as follows: The problems of
valuing firms when the risk of default exists do not lie in the failure of the DCF
theory. On the contrary, this theory remains valid. The difficulties of taking the risks
of default into consideration lie much more so in that the financing policies which
are relevant for the firm must be formulated with more deliberation.
Over-Indebtedness Implies Danger of Illiquidity Another important implication
of Eq. (3.19) concerns the relation of the two bankruptcy triggers.
Disregarding specific assumptions concerning the dynamics of the free cash
flows, we can prove that over-indebtedness implies illiquidity. This result is
immediately apparent. Just realize that debts represent the present value of cash
outflows while assets represent the present value of cash inflows. Having said this,
it must be that at some future point of time an outflow is greater than an inflow if
debts exceed assets today.
This result is everything but trivial. To this end, consider an unlevered company
whose market value contains information about its future cash flows. If we know
that this market value is negative, this means that the owners of the company expect
(at least in some states, not necessarily in all) that future cash flows are negative as
well. That the same idea is true for levered firms is proven in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.5 (Over-Indebtedness Implies Danger of Illiquidity) If a levered
company is over-indebted at time t in some state, then there is a date s ≥ t and
a state where the firm is in danger of illiquidity. q.e.d.
Notice that illiquidity does not necessarily imply over-indebtedness.20
We prove the theorem by contradiction. To this end, we consider an over-indebted





(1 + rf )˜Ds−1(ω) − ˜Ds(ω)
) ≥ 0
20For details, we refer to Kruschwitz et al. (2015, p. 211f.).
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applies for all states ω ∈ Ω and times s ≥ t . Multiplying the preceding inequality









(1 + rf )˜Ds−1 − ˜Ds |Ft
]
.



























˜I s + ˜Rs |Ft
]
(1 + rf )s−t .
Now, (3.18) implies that this sum is nothing more than ˜Dt because if debt ˜Dt is
granted the debtor will get ˜I s+ ˜Rs for all s > t (see also Problem 1). Since the term
on the left-hand side of the inequality is the firm value ˜V lt , we have a contradiction
to over-indebtedness. This was to be shown.
Cost of Debt If debt were completely riskless, there would be no reason to
negotiate an interest rate different from rf with the creditor. Since we will later
consider default it might be that in some (possibly very uncertain) states of the world
the payments for interest and redemption lie below the riskless rate and therefore the
firm demands a higher interest rate in the remaining states. Analogous to the cost
of equity this requires a definition of cost of debt. Someone who invests ˜Dt today
is entitled to payments amounting to ˜Dt + ˜I t+1 less remission of debts. Due to a
remission of debts of ˜Dt − ˜Dt+1 − ˜Rt+1, we obtain the following definition.









However, unless there is the probability of default there is no reason whatsoever
to assume that the cost of debt is different from the riskless rate
˜kDt = rf .
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Notice that we do not require the cost of debt to be deterministic today. Although
this will be a necessary requirement for different types of cost of capital later,21 cost
of debt will not be used itself to determine the value of firms and hence need not to
be deterministic.
3.2.6 Example (Finite Case Continued)
Let us turn back to our finite example and suppose a tax rate of τ =50%. Now we
will go into the question as to if a particular finance policy can lead to bankruptcy
and, if possible, complete our model in a suitable way. To this end let us assume that
the provisional (riskless) leverage policy takes the form
D0 = 100, D1 = 100, D2 = 50 .
We want to evaluate the cash flow FCF
l
t of the levered firm with default risk.





1 + (1 − τ )rf
)
Dt−1 + Dt.
In order to calculate these claims correctly we have to take our assumptions into
consideration. First, the unlevered firm’s gross cash flow must not be different from
those of the levered firm (Assumption 3.2). Second, the unlevered firm’s tax base
must only be different from that of the levered firm by the paid interest and the
cancelled debt as in (3.14).
Default Trigger (in Our Example) Default occurs when the creditors’ payment
claims cannot be satisfied in full. The exact meaning of this term is not entirely
evident. In any case there exist different possibilities to specify them in the context
of our model.
One of the possibilities to discuss default is if we deal with a situation in which





1 + (1 − τ )rf
)
Dt−1 + Dt < 0.
In this case, we will talk about an interruption of payments. We have systematically
compiled the corresponding amounts in Fig. 3.5 for all times t . The illustration
shows that up through time t = 2, all creditors’ claims can be satisfied. If we define
default that way, bankruptcy is at issue at state ω = ddd .
Of course, the owners would have the option to avoid default in such a situation
by ceding a part of their assets. It stands to reason to define the default trigger in
such a way that the assets of the owners are enclosed. Hence, default would only be
21See the subsections on TCF, FTE etc.
86 3 Corporate Income Tax: WACC, FTE, TCF, APV
Fig. 3.5 Shareholder’s
claims if D0 = 100,D1 =
100,D2 = 50,˜kD,nom = rf











= 0 = 1 = 2 = 3
caused, if in a state ω
˜Et(ω) + FCFut (ω) −
(
1 + (1 − τ )rf
)
Dt−1 + Dt < 0
is obtained. Even if the shares of the shareholders will be assigned to the creditors
the latter cannot be entirely satisfied. In contrast to the case studied before, in
situations similar to those mentioned above we want to call this inability to pay.
If inability to pay exists in every state, we deal with a special case. This corre-
sponds to Over-indebtedness. If the conditional expectation under Q is attained, the
last inequality will be transferred to
EQ
[
˜Vt + FCFlt |Ft−1
]










In this case the creditors can be sure that it will not be possible for the company to
operate a credit in the amount of Dt−1. Consequently, in such a case they would be
acting irrationally if they were to grant a credit of a dimension like that anyway.
Certainly, a default trigger can be defined in many ways. As we can show in
our example, t = 3 will cause an interruption of payments as well as an inability
to pay at the same time. But this does not include over-indebtedness. The terms
and definitions do not necessarily have to coincide. Consequently, they can evoke
different strategies of the investors and different legal consequences in particular.
Nominal Interest Rate If the creditors do not have to worry about default, then
they will demand the riskless rate. That is not so, in contrast, when there is a
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danger of going bankrupt. Here the creditors run the risk that their interest and debt
repayment demands would not be completely paid off in any state of the world that
might occur. In order to get an adequate reward for this kind of risk they force the
creditor to accept a nominal interest rate which is higher than the riskless rate. In
the following the nominal rate will be designated by ˜kD,nomt . And we will have
˜k
D,nom
t > rf when there is a certain probability of bankruptcy. Regarding the
calculation of the premium, we assume that the creditor knows the rule according
to which the state takes priority and anticipates the repercussions of this rule. In
the case of bankruptcy, the creditors retain the free cash flow to pay back debt
granted. If, in contrast, there is no question of going into default, then besides the
debt service, they receive the nominal interest agreed upon beforehand. Notice that
we do not require our nominal rate of interest to be deterministic today.
We can maintain the resulting claims of the creditors,








t (ω) + ˜Et(ω), (1 +˜kD,nomt−1 )Dt−1
)






At t = 0,1 and in the states ω = uu and ω = ud, du bankruptcy (in terms of
interruption of payments or inability to pay) cannot occur. Hence, in these states the
financiers will agree on a nominal rate of ˜kD,nom2 (ω) = rf . Using (3.9) it is now
easy to determine the levered cash flows FCF
l
for all states except ddd and ddu.
State ω = dd is different. If the next movement is down (and only if it is
down), bankruptcy enters in. Hence, the creditors will negotiate a different nominal
rate ˜kD,nom2 (dd) > rf . We assumed that the state’s claims take priority over the
creditors’ claims and that the firm’s cash flow is sufficient in any case to pay the
taxes due. With this in aim, let us concentrate on the situation in which the creditors’
claims cannot be paid off in full. In this situation from Eqs. (3.20) and (3.14) the
following is valid (notice that ˜E3 = 0):
˜R3(ddd) + ˜I 3(ddd) = FCFl3(ddd) + ˜E3 =













1 − 0.5 (48.4 − 0.5 · 50)
= 46.8 .
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It remains to evaluate the nominal rate ˜kD,nom2 to determine the cash flow
FCF
l
3(ddu). The financiers will only be ready to grant credit if the market price
of their capital lending just corresponds to the credit volumes D2. Due to Eq. (3.19)




˜R3 + ˜I 3|F2
]
1 + rf . (3.21)














· 50 · 0.4167 + 48.4 − 0.5 · 50










3(ddu) + τ ˜kD,nom2 (dd)D2
≈ 145.2 + 0.5 · 0.32962 · 50 ≈ 153.44 .
We run into another problem here, which, luckily, does not have any further
repercussions in our example. However, much higher the agreed upon nominal rate
is that much more likely it is that an inability to pay will be set off in the states,
which up until now have not been affected by bankruptcy. Yet in our example, a
nominal rate of 32.96% does not result in additional default situations.
Finally we have completed the evaluation of all levered cash flows. The
summarized results can be found in Fig. 3.6.
3.2.7 Problems







˜I s + ˜Rs |Ft
]
(1 + rf )s−t .












= 0 = 1 = 2 = 3
Fig. 3.6 Levered cash flows FCF
l








= 0 = 1 = 2
Fig. 3.7 Debt ˜Dt of Problem 2
2. A levered firm lives until T = 3. Assume that the conditional Q-probability
of the up-movement is 0.25 and the riskless rate is 10% , the tax rate is 50%.
Evaluate the tax shield ˜V l0 − ˜V u0 if the debt schedule (without default) is as in
Fig. 3.7.
3. Prove that the tax shield ˜V lt − ˜V ut satisfies
˜V lt − ˜V ut =
EQ
[
˜V lt+1 − ˜V ut+1|Ft
]
1 + rf +
τrf ˜Dt
1 + rf .
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4. Prove that from (3.11) it follows that








(1 + rf )s−t .
This is the main result in Fernández (2005).
3.3 Autonomous Financing
3.3.1 Adjusted Present Value (APV)
When all future amounts of debt are already determined at valuation time t = 0,
we are speaking of autonomous financing. In this case, the firm is following a
completely fixed redemption plan. We are not really interested in whether or not
autonomous financing is dealing with a realistic assumption. We, however, suppose
that autonomous financing is pretty close to reality.
Definition 3.5 (Autonomous Financing) A firm is autonomously financed
exactly then when its future amount of debt ˜Dt is already a certain quantity
today. q.e.d.
Under this assumption, the tax advantages are also certain and can be discounted
with the riskless rate. These leads straight to the so-called APV formula. The
abbreviation stands for adjusted present value.
Theorem 3.6 (APV Formula) In the case of autonomous financing, the following
equation is valid for the market value of the levered firm at any time:








This theorem can be proven as in the following. We work from the base of
Eq. (3.11) and make use of the fact that our firm is following a fixed redemption
policy. If the ˜Dt are, however, no longer random variables, then the last equation is
simplified on the basis of rule 3 to
˜V lt = ˜V ut +
τrf Dt





And that is how our theorem is proven.
Notice that our equation also holds for a firm with debt threatened by default! The
value of the firm in danger of bankruptcy exactly corresponds to the value above, as
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long as the granted debt is certain. Although it can come to bankruptcy, the value
of firms continues to be established by discounting the tax advantages from granted
debt with the riskless interest rate and not the cost of debt or any other discount rate!
What at first glance appears an unexpected result comes up because the creditors
anticipate the threat of bankruptcy and therefore require interest payments, which
perfectly compensate a possible loss of value due to bankruptcy.
Long-Term and Constant Amount of Debt Finally, we want to look at the case
where the amount of debt always remains the same. We then require that at time t
the current debt will not change through redemption measures or further loans. In
this case the last valuation formula can be simplified to an equation, which is named
after those who discovered it.
Theorem 3.7 (Modigliani–Miller Formula) If the firm goes on forever, the condi-
tions of Theorem 3.6 are met and debt remains constant, then the following is valid
for the market value of the levered firm
˜V lt = ˜V ut + τDt .
To prove the theorem we convert the right summands in Theorem 3.6 with help
of the geometric annuity. If debt remains constant we get












And that is what we wanted to show.22
We get a somewhat altered representation, if we concentrate on time t = 0 while
supposing that the expected cash flows remain constant at that time. The amount of
debt D0 as the product of the debt ratio l0 and market value of the levered firm can
be written,
V l0 = V u0 + τ l0 V l0
(1 − τ l0)V l0 = V u0 .
If we use the assumption that the expected free cash flows remain the same in time,
then we can calculate the market value of the unlevered firm as cash value of a
22Notice that transversality for debt is trivially satisfied in this case since ˜Dt is constant.
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perpetual return, from which














(1 − τ l0)kE,u
follow. The last equation is also called Modigliani–Miller adjustment. The valuation
equation proven in this chapter solves the problem as to how the market value is to
be determined in full. We will come back to this equation once more in relation to
the Miles–Ezzell adjustment.23
Over-indebtedness and Illiquidity with Autonomous Financing In the case of
autonomous financing both default triggers can be precisely characterized. This
is the main result of our next proposition where we assumed constant debt for
simplicity.
Theorem 3.8 (Autonomous Financing) A levered firm with an infinite life span
whose amount of debt always remains the same is over-indebted in time t in state ω










t (ω) < rf (1 − τ ) ˜D
is satisfied, the levered firm is in danger of illiquidity at date t in state ω. q.e.d.
Specifically, illiquidity (in state ω) implies over-indebtedness at time t (in the same
state ω) if g <
kE,u−rf
1+rf .
Notice that the right-hand side of both inequalities is constant. If the cash
flows of an unlevered company fall below this threshold, over-indebtedness occurs.
The second inequality offers a more intuitive economic interpretation. If the cash
flows go below the required interest payments after taxes, the firm is in danger of
illiquidity.
The proof of the theorem is straightforward. The company is in danger of
over-indebtedness if ˜V lt (ω) < ˜D holds. For the financing policy considered here,
23See Sect. 3.4.4.
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is true. Using Theorem 3.2 and solving for FCF
u
t (ω) proves the proposition.
In order to prove the second statement we start with the fact that (due to constant
debt) the firm is in danger of illiquidity if FCF
l
t (ω) < rf
˜D holds. Making use of
the relationship between the free cash flows of a levered and those of an unlevered
firm (3.10) and employing constant debt we get
FCF
u
t (ω) + τrf ˜D < rf ˜D
which proves the second statement.
3.3.2 Example (Continued)
The Finite Case Without Default Here debt will be riskless, hence ˜kDt = rf . If
we suppose a future development of the amount of debt of
D0 = 100, D1 = 100, D2 = 50 ,
the value of the levered firm at time t = 0 is gotten with
Vl0 = Vu0 +
τrf D0









≈ 229.75 + 0.5 · 0.1 · 100
1.1
+ 0.5 · 0.1 · 100
1.12
+ 0.5 · 0.1 · 50
1.13
≈ 240.30 .
The value of the levered firm is not essentially different from the value of the
unlevered firm. That has to do with the fact that the firm in our example only has a
lifetime of three years.
We deduced the market value of the levered firm at time t = 1 in an analogous
way,
˜V l1 = ˜V u1 +
τrf D1





= ˜V u1 +
0.5 · 0.1 · 100
1.1




199.88, if the development in t = 1 is up,
164.74, if the development in t = 1 is down.
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Finally, we want to determine another additional outcome of our example. The





199.88 = 50.03% , if the development in t = 1 is up,
100
164.74 = 60.70% , if the development in t = 1 is down.
If the firm is following an autonomous financing policy, it cannot be supposed that
the debt ratio is certain. That is much more characteristic of financing based on
market values.
Valuation in the Finite Case with Default Risk It is not at all complicated to
value the firm threatened with going into default in our example: we can use the
APV formula. Therefore the value of the firm in danger of bankruptcy is calculated
in our example by means of the Theorem 3.6 and exactly corresponds to the value
above
Vl0 ≈ 240.30 .
Another way of obtaining this value of the firm would be to use the levered cash
flows from Fig. 3.6, determine the expectations under Q and discount them with the
riskless rate. This must yield just the same value.24
An additional result, which, however, is not required for the valuation of the firm,














≈ (1 + 0.32962) · 50 · 0.5 +
1




If the considerations employed above in relation to the nominal interest rates and
their resultant cost of debt rates are systematically used again for other values of
D2, then for the interval D2 ≤ 70, the relation depicted in Fig. 3.8 is gotten (see the
Problem 5 below).
The Infinite Case Let the tax rate be τ = 50%. The levered firm maintains a debt
schedule such that the amount of debt remains constant, Dt = 100. Debt is not
threatened by default. As already indicated in the Modigliani–Miller formula the
24See Problem 4.








Fig. 3.8 Cost of debt and nominal interest rate with increasing leverage
value of the levered firm is given by








= V u0 + τD0
= 500 + 0.5 · 100 = 550 .
3.3.3 Problems
1. Let debt be riskless. Assume that the cash flows of the unlevered firm are weak
auto-regressive. What assumptions on the debt schedule are necessary such that
the cash flows of the levered firm FCF
l
t are weak auto-regressive as well?







3. Show in the infinite example with constant (riskless) debt that the dividend-price
ratio of the levered firm is a random variable (i.e., not deterministic) if rf = kE,u.
4. Consider the finite example with default. Evaluate the Q-expected cash flows
(see Fig. 3.6) and verify that the firm has indeed a value of 240.30.
5. Consider the finite example with default. Evaluate the cost of debt ˜kD2 as a
function of debt D2 ≤ 70.
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3.4 Financing Based on Market Values
Let us turn our attention now to a further financing policy. In the following we will
suppose that the managers of the firm to be valued are following a policy based on
market values.
Definition 3.6 (Financing Based on Market Values) A firm’s financing is
based on market values exactly then when its debt ratios ˜lt are today already
certain quantities. q.e.d.
A characterization of this financing in another context was that the firm’s leverage
“breathes” with the equity’s market value. If the equity’s market value changes, then
the amount of debt has to be adjusted.
Uncertain Tax Advantages If a firm’s debt ratios and not its amount of debt
are available, then autonomous financing is no longer the case. To illustrate the
consequences, we suppose that management is aiming towards coming up with a
debt ratio of 50:100, for instance, at a future time t > 0.25 If we solve the debt
ratio’s definition equation (3.5) according to ˜Dt , then with a deterministic ratio we
get
lt ˜Vt = ˜Dt .
That means: If the value ˜Vt is an uncertain quantity from today’s perspective, then
the amount of debt relevant at this time is also stochastic, because the multiplication
of a random variable by a real number results again in a random variable. Half
of an uncertain quantity is of course also uncertain. In order to fully understand
the relations, look at Fig. 3.9. With financing based on market values, the evaluator
cannot say with certainty at time t = 0 how big the amount of debt will turn out to be
at time t , since the value ˜Vt is still uncertain and the amount of debt is firmly linked
with this through the ratio. If this uncertainty is resolved—just a second after time
t—then the interest payments to be rendered at time t + 1 are, in contrast, certain
(if we neglect default for the moment). The same goes for the resulting tax savings
τ ˜I t+1 at time t + 1. The tax savings is thus to be discounted with the riskless rate
from time t+1 to time t . But the discounting of t to 0 may not be carried out with rf .
It is uncertain from today’s perspective as to how much tax the firm proportionately
financed by debt will save. Even with no default the discounting from t to 0 cannot
be done with rf . Today we cannot know how large the tax advantages from debt
are.
25We do not want to further pursue where management is getting this target quantity from.






Fig. 3.9 Time structure of financing based on market values
Miles and Ezzell (1980) have examined this case in detail and have determined
that the APV equation of Theorem 3.6 is no longer suitable. The tax savings per
terms of credit are uncertain and uncertain tax savings may not be discounted with
the riskless rate.26
Three Calculation Procedures In the case of such a leverage policy, there are three
different calculation procedures, which all lead to the same value of the firm. This
value must differ from the value that would be calculated with the APV equation,
since it is not based on an autonomous financing policy.
Which of the three calculations should be used by the evaluator depends upon,
among other things, the state of information that she has on hand. We point out here
that the content of the three equations which we have to prove is independent of
financing based on market values: a policy based on market values is not absolutely
necessary in all cases. Somewhat weaker conditions are instead enough: What is
always important is that particular cost of capital are deterministic. To make this
relation—which does at first glance seem complicated—understandable, we will
first present the three formulations as generally as possible. At the end we will then
show how they interrelate. It is not until this second step that the assumption of
financing based on market values (and the fact that free cash flows of the unlevered
firm are weak auto-regressive) will be made use of.
3.4.1 Flow to Equity (FTE)
In this section we will work with the assumption that the levered firm’s cost of
equity is deterministic. In order to do so we must define the cost of equity. It is
recommended to start off with determining the refluxes, which the equity financiers
of the levered firm are entitled to. The starting quantities are the free cash flows of
the indebted firm FCF
l
t+1.
We have to deduct the payments to the creditors. These are entitled to interest as
well as debt repayments at time t + 1. The interest claims amount to ˜I t+1. We can
26“Even though the firm might issue riskless debt, if financing policy is targeted to realized market
values, the amount of debt outstanding in future periods is not known with certainty (unless the
investment is riskless) . . . ” Miles and Ezzell (1980, p. 721).
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evaluate the debt service as the difference between the paying back of former debt
and the current value of debt, thus as ˜Rt+1. Altogether, the creditors are entitled
payments in the amount of
˜I t+1 + ˜Rt+1.
If this is deducted from the starting amount, there then remains a residual amount
for the owners (value of equity plus a dividend) of
˜Et+1 + ˜Divt+1 := ˜Et+1 + FCFlt+1 − ˜I t+1 − ˜Rt+1. (3.22)
This makes it clear as to how the definition of the cost of equity should read.
Definition 3.7 (Cost of Equity of the Levered firm) The cost of equity ˜kE,lt










The index E with the cost of capital indicates that the cost of equity is being dealt
with.
We now require that this cost of equity is deterministic. If we were to carry this
assumption over to an actual firm listed on the exchange, it would entail being able
to determine a firm’s future (conditional) expected returns on shares. We are fully
aware that this condition is very rough. But it would be underhanded if we did not
lay bare the implications of the assumptions, which form the basis of the various
theories on discounted cash flow.
The valuation equation, which we now get is termed flow to equity (FTE), or
also equity approach, in the literature. The reason flow to equity is spoken of is that
the entire cash flows after taxes are not discounted, but rather those cash flows after
taxes which the firm’s owners are entitled to.
Theorem 3.9 (Flow to Equity) If the cost of equity of the levered firm kE,lt are
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We have already used the method of proof required.27 We can thus spare our
readers it here.
3.4.2 Total Cash Flow (TCF)
If it is supposed that instead of the levered firm’s cost of equity the firm’s average
cost of capital is deterministic, then it is the TCF approach and not the FTE approach
which is being dealt with.
First the cost of capital which is now relevant has to be defined again. Which
payments do the financiers of the levered firm receive? The answer is easily given.
It is of course the free cash flows of the levered firm FCF
l
t that are the subject here.
The capital employment of both groups of financiers is ˜Et + ˜Dt = ˜V lt , so that the
definition of the cost of capital for the case we now have to look at is absolutely
clear.
Definition 3.8 (Weighted Average Cost of Capital—Type 1) The weighted













How close to reality is the assumption of deterministic weighted average cost
of capital? If we take a firm listed on the stock exchange for instance, then this
condition calls for a knowledge of the entire future returns of the firm. A knowledge
is needed thus not of the shares, or the (conditional) expectation of the returns
on debt, but rather of the weighted average of both random quantities. A totally
different assumption is being dealt with here than that condition on which the FTE
formulation is based. We will be able to find out somewhat later if and in how far
both conditions are compatible.
If we want to know, which value the levered firm has at time t , we can find the
answer analogous to Theorem 2.1. The case being looked at here is termed total
cash flow formulation (TCF), because the entire expected cash flows after taxes are
discounted with the weighted average cost of capital.
27See Theorem 2.1.
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Theorem 3.10 (Total Cash Flow) If the weighted average cost of capital k∅t are


















A formal proof could be carried out again just as in Sect. 2.3.3, which is why we
forgo with presenting it here again.
What can we say about the weighted average cost of capital (of type 1) and the
cost of equity of a levered firm? Can we, for instance, ascertain that deterministic
cost of equity also results from deterministic average cost of capital? Are then the
FTE and TCF formulations compatible with each other? Or do both assumptions
mutually exclude each other? Answers to all these questions are gotten by the so-
called textbook formula.
Theorem 3.11 (TCF Textbook Formula) For the type 1 weighted average cost of








It is just now that it becomes really clear why weighted average cost of capital is
spoken of in relation with the TCF formulation. The levered firm’s cost of equity is
weighted with the equity ratio, and the cost of debt with the debt ratio.
To prove the theorem, we use the definition of the levered firm’s cost of equity.






˜Et+1 + FCFlt+1 − ˜I t+1 − ˜Rt+1|Ft
]
.
Since the firm’s total value corresponds to the sum of equity and debt, you can apply


























= ˜k∅t + 1.
Such is the assertion.
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The textbook formula as it appears in Theorem 3.11 is remarkable in several
aspects. To begin with, it is striking that it is obviously valid regardless of whether
the relevant variables are understood as random variables or as deterministic
quantities. Neither the weighted average cost of capital (type 1) nor the cost of
equity of the levered firm (both a prerequisite of the FTE and the TCF approach)
need to be deterministic in order to prove the textbook formula. A closer look at the
textbook formula allows us to make the following determinations:
1. If it is assumed that the levered firm’s weighted average cost of capital (type 1)
as well as cost of equity and debt are certain, then the debt ratios must also be
certain.
That is a big limitation, which cannot simply be accepted. But if we are
working on the basis of certain debt ratios, then the textbook formula shows
how the different cost of capital involved can be converted into each other. TCF
and FTE may alternatively be used and inevitably lead to the same result.
2. If, on the other hand, in the case of no default the future debt ratios are seen
as uncertain, either the weighted average cost of capital (type 1), or the cost of
equity of the levered firm have to be uncertain.
If the weighted average cost of capital (type 1) is deterministic, then the TCF
concept has to be used; but if, on the other hand, the cost of equity is certain, then
the FTE formulation has to be put into use, since uncertain cost of capital simply
cannot be used to discount with. It does not make sense to pose the question
here as to whether TCF and FTE methods lead to the same result. The textbook
formula has no practical value in the case of uncertain debt ratios.
What further stands out with the textbook formula as it appears in Theorem 3.11
is that it is different from the usual textbook formula as it is given in relation to the
weighted cost of capital (WACC) concept. In the former, the cost of debt cannot
be reduced to the firm’s profit tax rate. We now want to discuss the question as to
whether this cost of capital that is found in the literature also makes economic sense
or whether it puts forth totally useless quantities.
3.4.3 Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC)
Look at the Definition 3.8 of the weighted average cost of capital. We now want
to alter a very insignificant detail of this definition and call the resulting quantities
WACC (weighted average cost of capital). The unlevered firm’s free cash flows
take the place of the levered firm’s free cash flows.
Definition 3.9 (Weighted Average Cost of Capital—Type 2) The cost of
capital WACC of a levered firm are the expected returns q.e.d.










If these cost of capital is deterministic, we can again prove the existence of a
valuation equation analogous to our previous approach. Beforehand, however, we
want to discuss the question as to how realistic the assumption is that such cost of
capital is observed on the market.
Whoever wants to establish the cost of capital in the sense of Definition 3.9,




, and on the
other pays free cash flows in an amount as if it were not levered, FCF
u
t . It is clear
that apples and oranges are being mixed here, and thus we may assume that no one
can a priori know such cost of capital. We think that every other assertion would be
senseless.
If we just momentarily free ourselves from this observation and the shackles it
would enchain us in, then we could still formulate a valuation equation on the basis
of this—albeit somewhat odd – definition of cost of capital. It would read as follows:
Theorem 3.12 (Weighted Average Cost of Capital) If the levered firm’s cost of
capital WACCt are deterministic, then the value at time t of the firm financed by











(1 + WACCt ) . . . (1 + WACCs−1) .
The proof shows a clear course.
Critical readers will ask why we waste so much time on a cost of capital definition
about which we have said that it makes no economic sense. The reason lies in the
fact that this cost of capital definition—the direct interpretation of which makes no
sense—will prove itself to be extremely useful in the following.
Theorem 3.13 (WACC Textbook Formula) For the firm’s type 2 weighted aver-





+˜kDt (1 − τ )˜lt .
The WACC textbook formula is different from the TCF textbook formula only
in that the interest on debt is reduced by the tax rate. That corresponds to the usual
textbook formula given in the literature. Then the weighted average cost of capital
results in that the cost of equity of the levered firm ˜kE,lt is weighted with the equity
ratio and the cost of debt—reduced by the firm’s income tax rate—with the debt
ratio. Our calculation proves that this relation is valid independent of whether cost
of equity and the debt ratio are certain or uncertain.
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In order to prove the theorem we give the Definition 3.9 of the firm’s cost of
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+˜kDt (1 − τ )˜lt .
And that is what we wanted to show.
This textbook formula also allows for the following conclusions.
1. If it is assumed that the weighted average cost of capital as well as the cost of
equity and debt of the levered firm are certain today, then the debt ratios must be
certain. We are then dealing with a financing policy based on market values. FTE
and WACC result in identical values of the firm in this case.
2. If the future debt ratios are, however, assumed to be uncertain, then in the case of
no default either the weighted average cost of capital, or the cost of equity of the
levered firm have to be uncertain. Thus one of the two theorem’s formulations
cannot be used to calculate with.
We want to summarize our statements made up to now on financing based on
market values in Fig. 3.10. The illustration makes clear that the three procedures
FTE, TCF, and WACC result in an identical value of the firm exactly then when the
debt ratio is deterministic. In all other cases, only one of the three procedures can
be used at most.
The attentive reader will notice that in all statements in this and the former
section we have not made use of our assumption that the cash flows are weak auto-
regressive. We now turn to the adjustment formulas where this assumption will be
necessary.








Fig. 3.10 DCF theory for financing based on market value
3.4.4 Miles–Ezzell- and Modigliani–Miller Adjustments
In the previous sections we got three different valuation equations for a levered firm
with financing based on market values: FTE, TCF, and WACC formulas. We could
clearly work out that these valuation equations can always typically be used when
either the levered firm’s cost of equity or the weighted average cost of capital (from
type 1 or 2) is deterministic. We could make connections between the different cost
of capital relevant for the three formulations with the so-called textbook formulas.
Financing policy based on value stands out in that the debt ratios are deterministic.
Our analysis of the textbook formulas established that with this type of financing
policy, deterministic cost of capital of the two remaining valuation formulations
logically results from deterministic cost of capital of a valuation formulation.
Until now, however, the relationship these three cost of capital demonstrate to the
cost of capital of an unlevered firm has remained a secret. And exactly that is the
subject of our subsequent considerations. If we require that the levered firm follows
a financing policy based on market values, and if in addition we assume that the cost
of equity of the unlevered firm are deterministic, then two questions arise:
1. Under these conditions, are the requirements of Theorems 3.9 and 3.12 met? Are
the levered firm’s cost of equity and the weighted average cost of capital then
also deterministic?
2. Can we calculate the levered firm’s cost of capital from the unlevered firm’s cost
of capital?
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Adjustment According to Miles and Ezzell The answer to both questions is given
by the so-called adjustment formula from Miles and Ezzell (1980).
Theorem 3.14 (Miles–Ezzell Adjustment Formula) Financing based on market
values is under consideration. The cash flows of the unlevered firm are weak auto-
regressive. If the unlevered firm’s cost of capital or the WACC of the levered firm
are deterministic, the following relation is valid:






1 + rf lt
)
,
in which all quantities in the equation are deterministic. q.e.d.
We prove this theorem as follows. According to the fundamental theorem and












1 + rf .
Since the market value of the firm at time t is already known, the following results












Using the debt ratio, this can be rewritten in the form
(
1 − τrf

























We are then looking at a type of recursive relationship from which we have already
gotten a valuation equation several times.28 Following this direction, we get this
28See, for example, our proof of the Theorem 2.1 in Sect. 2.3.3.
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Now we will only get further by falling back upon the Assumption 3.1 and the




















































A comparison with the Definition 3.9 shows that we have proven the claim.
If the equation from Theorem 3.14 is linked up with the textbook formula from
Theorem 3.13, the meaning of the outcome becomes much clearer. Putting the












1 + rf rf
))
, (3.23)
in which Lt represents the debt-equity ratio in the sense of Eq. (3.6). The cost of
capital of the levered firm can be determined with this formula, if the cost of capital
of the unlevered firm, the cost of debt, the income tax rate as well as the aspired
leverage ratio and the riskless interest rate are known. If the above equation is solved
according to kE,ut , the leverage ratio, and income tax rate are known, it calls for
converting the cost of capital of a levered firm into the cost of capital of the unlevered
firm. The condition is that the levered firm follows a financing policy based on
market values.
29See Sect. 3.1.2.
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The reader may want to take the time and take another look at Eq. (3.23). It is
different in two not so unimportant details which are found in the original theorem
from Miles and Ezzell (1980). We want to mention these differences with absolute
clarity as the work from Miles and Ezzell has firmly established itself in today’s
textbook literature. With their formula there is no time index for the leverage ratio
and also no time index for the cost of capital. In the current literature then, the
adjustment formula does not run as it does in our Theorem 3.14, but rather






1 + rf l
)
. (3.24)
Miles and Ezzell derived their result under the limitation of the assumption that the
cost of capital and the debt ratio are constant in time. As a rule, this limitation is
clearly pointed out in the textbook literature. The outcome that we have shown thus
has much fewer restrictions than the original result from Miles and Ezzell.
Second, our adjustment formula also holds in case of a firm in danger of default.
Even though the firm can go bankrupt, still not the cost of debt or any other discount
factor but the riskless interest rate is found in Theorem 3.14. This is a surprising,
but an inescapable consequence of our assumptions, that not only the owners, but
also the creditors anticipate the threat of bankruptcy.
Problematic Adjustment According to Modigliani and Miller In the discus-
sion of autonomous financing, we had mentioned that besides the Miles–Ezzell
adjustment, there is yet another adjustment formula. It is termed Modigliani–Miller
adjustment, originates from Theorem 3.7 and takes the form
WACC = kE,u(1 − τ l0). (3.25)
In practice, this adjustment formula is very popular, supposedly because it looks
much more simple than the Miles–Ezzell equation (3.24). If you follow the
relevant literature, then you get Eq. (3.25) from the conditions of Theorem 3.7 and
particularly from the assumption of autonomous financing. Such a firm then cannot
be financed based on market values. We will now present a surprising outcome.
Theorem 3.15 (Contradiction of the Modigliani–Miller Adjustment) The cash
flows of the unlevered firm are weak auto-regressive. If the weighted average cost
of capital of type 2 (WACC) and the unlevered firm’s cost of equity (kE,u) are
deterministic, then the firm is financed based on market values. q.e.d.
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First off we will prove the theorem and end up trying to recognize its significance.
To prove the theorem we turn to the Theorems 3.1, 3.7, and 3.12 and use the fact
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Besides the debt ratio ˜lt we only find deterministic quantities. It is no problem to
convert them according to ˜lt . But then ˜lt has to be a deterministic quantity itself.
That is what we wanted to show.
Of what significance is our assertion now? A Modigliani–Miller adjustment
formulated as in Eq. (3.25) requires that the weighted average cost of capital as
well as the equity of the unlevered firm are deterministic. The equation does not
make sense under other conditions. Under this condition—we have just proven
this—the case of financing based on market values is now indeed conceivable.
And here is where the anomaly lies: the condition of the Modigliani–Miller model
was, namely, autonomous financing with constant debt. Since a firm cannot be
financed autonomously as well as based on market values, we have a contradiction.
We do not object that there will be real numbers WACC that (in the case of
autonomous financing) lead to the correct value of the levered firm. These numbers
are appropriate discount rates given the above setup—but they cannot be interpreted
as cost of capital as in Definition 3.9. This again highlights that cost of capital and
discount rates cover different economic items.
Can we go a step further and claim to have refuted the theory of Modigliani and
Miller? Have we perhaps detected an error in the argumentation of both authors? In
answering this question, we have to carefully separate two aspects from each other.
In this book we take the point of view that cost of capital are expected returns. For us
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that is the nucleus of a theory of valuation of firms. If this line of thought is followed,
then the ideas of Modigliani and Miller simply do not hold up. Whoever interprets
WACC as expected returns, cannot simultaneously suppose a deterministic debt
ratio and the Modigliani–Miller model (a constant amount of debt), without getting
caught in a contradiction. To come at it from a totally different angle, we can ask
if Modigliani and Miller had even understood WACC as cost of capital and been
aware of the contradiction. The answer here is unambiguous. For both authors—
as, moreover, also for Miles and Ezzell—the weighted cost of capital WACC was
always only a quantity, which when used as a discount rate leads to the correct
outcome; that is, the correct value of the firm.30 Not one of these authors thought
of an interpretation of these quantities as expected returns. This is why we are far
away from blaming Modigliani and Miller for making an error.
3.4.5 Over-Indebtedness and Illiquidity with Financing Based on
Market Values
We now turn to the case of financing based on market values. Here, the case of over-
indebtedness will never occur. Illiquidity is possible and a sufficient condition can
be precisely formulated.
Theorem 3.16 (Over-Indebtedness and Debt Ratio) A levered firm with an









(1 + rf (1 − τ ))(1 + g)
1 + kE,u−g
l
− 1+kE,u1+rf rf τ + g
is satisfied, then the firm is in danger of illiquidity at date t in state ω. q.e.d.
Again, the implications of this proposition can be illustrated by means of a
binomial tree with only the case of illiquidity being of interest. The second part of
the theorem requires that the growth factor for the down-movement (the left-hand
side of the inequality) must not fall below a specific threshold.
The first statement of the theorem can easily be proven because for l ≤ 1 we
obtain l ˜V lt (s) ≤ ˜V lt (s) and thus ˜Dt(s) ≤ ˜V lt (s). The proof of the second statement
is more sophisticated. Let us assume that the firm always remains liquid. In this case
FCF
l
t (ω) ≥ (1 + rf )˜Dt−1(ω) − ˜Dt(ω).
30That (1−τ l0)kE,u has this character was shown for the case of constant expected free cash flows
in Sect. 3.3.1.
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To refer to the unlevered firm’s cash flows, we make use of Eq. (3.10) and obtain
FCF
u
t (ω) + τrf ˜Dt−1(ω) ≥ (1 + rf )˜Dt−1(ω) − ˜Dt(ω)
FCF
u
t (ω) ≥ (1 + rf (1 − τ ))˜Dt−1(ω) − ˜Dt(ω)
FCF
u
t (ω) ≥ (1 + rf (1 − τ ))l˜V lt−1(ω) − l˜V lt (ω).
In the case of an eternally active firm with constant cost of capital, the firm value can
be calculated by dividing the expected free cash flow by the cost of capital less the





suits. Therefore, we obtain a total of
FCF
u
t (ω) ≥ (1 + rf (1 − τ ))l
(1 + g)FCFut−1(ω)
WACC − g − l
(1 + g)FCFut (s)
WACC − g
(





t (ω) ≥ (1 + rf (1 − τ ))l
(1 + g)FCFut−1(ω)
WACC − g
which proves the assertion.
3.4.6 Example (Continued)
The Finite Case Without Default In our example the firm will be financed based
on market values. In this case all three approaches FTE, TCF, and WACC will yield
the same value of the firm. Since the leverage ratios are given, we concentrate on
the WACC approach.
Now we suppose in contrast to the autonomous financing that the following
capital structures are realized at future times:
l0 = 50% , l1 = 20% , l2 = 0% .







1 + rf l0
)
− 1
= (1 + 0.2)
(
1 − 0.5 · 0.1
1 + 0.1 · 0.5
)
− 1 ≈ 17.27% ,
WACC1 ≈ 18.91%,
WACC2 = 20%.
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1.1727 · 1.1891 +
121
1.1727 · 1.1891 · 1.20 ≈ 236.46 .
Financing based on market values obviously leads to a totally different value of the
firm than autonomous financing.
















(1 + WACC1)(1 + WACC2)
≈
{ 121
1.1891 + 133.11.1891·1.20 ≈ 195.04, if up;
99
1.1891 + 108.91.1891·1.20 ≈ 159.58, if down.
Due to the financing policy based on market values, the payments for the creditors
shown in Fig. 3.11 will be yielded in the future. Please observe that l2 = 0 applies.31
The Finite Case with Default Now we will go into the question as to if a finance
based on market values can lead to bankruptcy and, if possible, complete our model
in a suitable way. To this end we remind our reader that the provisional leverage
policy is assumed to take the form
l0 = 50% , l1 = 20% , l2 = 0% .
We want to evaluate the free cash flows FCF
l
t of the levered firm with default risk.







lt−1 ˜V lt−1 + lt ˜V lt < 0
is given. Again, we have systematically compiled the corresponding amounts in
Fig. 3.12. The figure shows that at time t = 1 a problem comes up, the case of
bankruptcy is at issue.
31Notice that with this financing policy the binomial model is not (fully) recombining: even with
a nominal interest rate of 10% the states ud and du do not yield the same cash flows to the debt
holder. This is so because the debt and hence the tax shields are different: ˜D2(ud) = l1˜V l1 (u) =
l1˜V
l
1 (d) = ˜D2(du). The same does not apply at t = 3 because l2 = 0.
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Fig. 3.12 Shareholder’s claims without default if l0 = 50% , l1 = 20% , l2 = 0%
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This generates an interruption of payments but does not cause an inability to pay.
Therefore, in contrast to the situation in Sect. 3.2.6, the shareholders can avert a
default. It is quite obvious that in t = 1 the credit D0 as well as the owing interests
rf D0 cannot be paid completely. A possible solution would be an extension for
payment. Assuming that the creditors accept an extension for capital deficit of 2.23
until t = 2, a default would be prevented. But such a step disagrees with our
assumptions: We assumed that the investors pursue an exogenous leverage policy
even if it is not optimal. In our case, it is the described extension for credit which
disagrees with the assumption. This example shows exactly the limitations of our
model. If (and only if) the leverage policy is given, the default risk has no influence
at all on the value of the company.
As a matter of course, in a situation such as shown in Fig. 3.12, the owners of the
company will certainly demand a financing policy which is different from the one
originally planned. It is obvious that a different financing policy leads to another
company value. But we will not care about the question which financing policy
would be the most reasonable. Even though the originally agreed financing policy
could be evaluated, we state that this policy is economically illogical. Therefore, we
will cease the discussion of our example.
The Infinite Case Let us turn to the infinite case. We assume that the leverage ratio
l = 50% remains constant. If we use the Miles–Ezzell adjustment (Theorem 3.14),
the weighted average cost of capital are
WACC = (1 + kE,u)
(
1 − τrf
1 + rf l
)
− 1 ≈ 17.273%























This is the value of the levered firm at t = 0.
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3.4.7 Problems
1. Consider a company having (unlevered) cash flows as in Fig. 2.2. The tax rate is
50% and the riskless interest rate 10%. Assume further that WACC = 18%,
but nothing is known about the cost of equity kE,u. We do not require that
the company maintains a deterministic leverage ratio ˜l and will show with this
problem that the other DCF methods of this chapter are not applicable.
(a) Evaluate the value of the firm using the WACC method for t = 0,1.
(b) Convince yourself that no assumptions are made yet about the expected
future amount of debt since we do not require a deterministic leverage ratio.
Instead, for t = 0,1 we will assume the following debt: schedule




Determine the leverage ratio at t = 1 and show that the firm is not financed
based on market values.
(c) Evaluate the weighted cost of capital (type 1) at t = 1 as well as the cost of
equity of the levered firm and show that they both are random variables.
2. Show that for kE,u > rf the Miles–Ezzell-WACC from (3.24) is always larger
than kE,u(1 − τ l0) if l0 = l is the leverage ratio of the firm.








(This is the main result of Miles and Ezzell (1985).)
4. Cost of capital are often evaluated using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM).
Due to the CAPM any cost of capital k are given by
kt = rf +
(
E [rM ] − rf
)
βt ,
where rM is the return on the market portfolio and βt the so-called beta factor.




t . Write down a beta
form of the Miles–Ezzell formula.
3.5 Financing Based on Book Values
Until now, we have debated two forms of financing policy, which are often discussed
in the literature. With autonomous financing the taking out and redemption of
debt followed a static, pre-given plan, which did not take any kind of random
developments into consideration. With financing based on market values in contrast,
the risk of debt was linked to the random development of the equity’s market value
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by a given relation. For firms listed on the exchange that means that with climbing
share prices, loans are to be taken out, and that with falling prices, debts are to be
redeemed. We have stressed again and again that we want to lay back on making
claims about which of the different financing policies is particularly realistic. If
we bring another financing policy into play in the following, it is because we have
the impression that it most probably plays an important role in business practice.
If the managers of a firm announce that they are planning on lowering or raising
the leverage ratio, then they are usually not measuring the leverage ratio in market
values, but in book values. Both value formulations widely diverge from each other.
That motivates us to analyze a third financing policy in the following section. Just
as financing based on market values, this is based on debt ratios; this time, however,
as book values.
3.5.1 Assumptions
With debt and equity as book values, those amounts are in question with which the
debts or—according to case—equity are reported in the balance books of the firm
to be valued. The first assumption consists in there being no difference between
market value and book value of the debt. The credit amounts given in the balance
sheets of the firm to be valued correspond to their market prices. Furthermore, we
will assume that there is no danger of default.
Assumption 3.7 (Book Value of Debt) The firm will not default
˜Rt+1 = ˜Dt − ˜Dt+1 and ˜I t+1 = rf ˜Dt .
Furthermore, the debt’s market value continuously corresponds to its book value,
˜Dt = ˜Dt .
It is different with equity. If you are working from an initial quantity of ˜Et and
inquire about the book value of the equity at time t + 1, then you have to look at
those quantities, which can change it. There are three:
1. Equity grows, if the owners subscribe additional equity within the framework of
an increase of capital. The amount of the increase in capital between the times t
and s is designated by e˜lt,s .
32
32It is possible that the amount of increase in capital turns out to be different between the unlevered
and levered companies. At first glance, this sounds paradoxical, because if both increases in capital
diverge there should be a statement about the appropriation of the additional funds. Nevertheless, it
can be proven that such conditions are not necessary due to our assumptions regarding the policies
of investment and distribution. The explanation is simple: We have mentioned nothing about the
asset side on the balance sheet in our model.
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2. Equity grows further if the managers retain earnings. The levered firm’s earnings
after taxes at time t + 1 amount to
(
EBIT t+1 − ˜I t+1
)
(1 − τ ).
3. Equity decreases if the firm pays dividends to the owners. In relation to the FTE
approach and using Eq. (3.14), we made clear that payments in the amount of
FCF
u
t+1 + τ ˜I t+1 −
(
˜I t+1 + ˜Dt − ˜Dt+1
)
are being dealt with.33





t + e˜lt,t+1 +
(
EBIT t+1 − ˜I t+1
)





t+1 + τ ˜I t+1 −
(
˜I t+1 + ˜Dt − ˜Dt+1
))
= ˜Elt + e˜lt,t+1 + EBIT t+1(1 − τ ) − FCF
u
t+1 + ˜Dt − ˜Dt+1.
This gives nothing more than the clean surplus relation.






t + e˜lt,t+1 + EBIT t+1(1 − τ ) − FCF
u
t+1 + ˜Dt − ˜Dt+1.
Since ˜V t = ˜E
l
t + ˜Dt , the book value of the firm’s value then obeys the following
equation.






t + e˜lt,t+1 + EBIT t+1(1 − τ ) − FCF
u
t+1.
Furthermore, the book values of the levered and the unlevered firm differ only if
there are different changes in subscribed capital. q.e.d.
Due to the fact that the earnings before interest and taxes as well as the free cash
flows of the unlevered firm are random variables, the book value of the firm must be
stochastic as well.
The financing policy to be looked at in this section is now characterized by the
following definition.
33See Sect. 3.4.1.
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Definition 3.10 (Financing Based on Book Values) A firm is financed based
on book values if the debt ratios to book values ˜l t are deterministic. q.e.d.
How is a firm’s market value to be determined if we suppose a financing policy
based on book values? In order to get any further, we have to characterize such a
firm more in detail. In doing so we want to differentiate three cases that deal with
the investment policy of the firm.
In two of them we have to work with assumptions which combine the volume
of investment functionally with other economic ratios of the company. This might
surprise the attentive reader due to the principle we assumed earlier. This stated
that investments will be carried out only if their net present value is positive. If
we adhere to this principle, it is not at all apparent that the volume of investment
will be directly linked to specific characteristics like the cash flow or depreciation
in a certain way.34 But admittedly, we are not able to develop valuation equations
without such relationships.
1. The firm could carry out a policy of full distribution. In this case the owners
annually receive a dividend in amount of the net profit after taxes.
2. The firm could dispense with the policy of full distribution, but carry out an
investment policy, which is heavily linked to accruals. In this case the firm would
limit itself to undertaking replacement investments.
3. The firm could not link its investments to the accruals but instead to the cash
flows. If the cash flows grow, a lot is invested; with low cash flow, in contrast, the
investments are returned.
We can give valuation formulas for each of these cases. Each of these valuation
equations does indeed require that the changes in the subscribed capital are
deterministic. Thus
Assumption 3.9 (Subscribed Capital) The changes in subscribed capital e˜lt,t+1
are deterministic for all t ≥ 0. q.e.d.
Investment and Accruals In the following we will examine three different
investment or distribution policies, as the case may be. Although to do so, we need
to more precisely define our notion of investment expenses within the framework
of our model. For that we look at Fig. 3.4. This presents a relation between the free
cash flow, the gross cash flow as well as the investments. Therefore, using (3.8) the
34There are plenty of research studies about the question of whether the volume of investment is
linked to the cash flow of the company, for example. We refer to Fazzari et al. (1987) who show
that with market imperfections some firms are constrained in their ability to raise funds externally,
hence fluctuations in cash flows account for economically important movements in investment.
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following relation is valid for the unlevered firm:
FCF
u
t+1 = GCFt+1 − τ EBIT t+1 − ˜Invt+1. (3.26)
We must also more precisely define the relation between the gross cash flows and
accruals in the firm. For that we again take a look at the figure and infer the relation
GCFt+1 = EBIT t+1 + Accrt+1
with which the above equation can be simplified to
EBIT t+1(1 − τ ) − FCFut+1 = ˜Invt+1 − Accrt+1. (3.27)
Let us next turn to the full distribution policy.
3.5.2 Full Distribution Policy
It is doubtful whether there are really firms, which continuously distribute their
earnings fully. Those persons based on the tradition of Anglo-Saxon financing
theory would even regard such a dividend policy as rather foolish. If you believe,
namely that the managers should go ahead with all investment projects, which have
a positive NPV, then only those funds would be distributed which have no chance
of turning over a profit within the firm. If the firm resolutely adheres to this idea,
then the dividend policy is a plain residuum. And then too of course if the managers
do not retain earnings on principle, we can hardly be speaking of far-reaching ideas
being made on the managerial level regarding a sensible dividend policy. But if we
still discuss this case further on, it is because it has a long tradition in Germany
within the practice of valuation of firms.35
The profit after interest and taxes that the levered firm attains amounts to
(
EBIT t+1 − ˜I t+1
)
(1 − τ ).
When we were previously discussing the FTE formulation, we already made it clear
that the owners of the levered firm annually receive distributions in the amount of
(see (3.22))
˜Divt+1 = FCFut+1 + τ ˜I t+1 −
(
˜Dt + ˜I t+1 − ˜Dt+1
)
.
In the case of full distribution of the profit made, both amounts must be identical.
This leads us to the following definition.
35See, for example, Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer in Deutschland (2013).
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Definition 3.11 (Full Distribution) The levered firm for which
(
EBIT t+1 − ˜I t+1
)
(1 − τ ) = ˜Divt+1
is valid each time t ≥ 0, is following a policy of full distribution. q.e.d.
This can be rearranged to
FCF
u
t+1 = EBIT t+1(1 − τ ) + ˜Dt − ˜Dt+1 .
Let us make use again of the considerations of the previous section, particularly
in relation to gross and free cash flows in Eq. (3.27). We want to use this equation to
help us characterize the implicit basis of investment policy. To do so we concentrate
on those investments, which are not replacement investments: these are those
investments which will be concluded in excess of the difference ˜Invt+1 − Accrt+1.
Eq. (3.27) shows that a full distribution is being looked at exactly then when these
investments are being financed by debt, thus when





The full distribution results in that the equity’s book value can change solely due
to changes in the subscribed capital: if we enter in the condition of full distribution











which agrees with what we have stated. Apart from changes to the subscribed
capital, the equity’s book value remains constant through time.
With no further work, we can now assume that the equity’s book value at time
t = 0 is known. Thus, no random variable is being represented. From this we get
˜E
l
t+1 = El0 + el0,1 + . . . + elt,t+1
= El0 + el0,t+1.
for the book value of equity at time t+1. Since there are only deterministic quantities
on the right-hand side, the book value of equity at time t + 1 must be deterministic.
Let us now make use of the fact that the debt ratio lt measured in book values
is deterministic. The leverage ratio Lt , which must be deterministic as well, can be
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is valid for the book value of debt at time t+1, and from that it follows that the book
value of debt is deterministic. If we bring this together with Assumption 3.7, we can
determine that the market value of debt is deterministic. The firm is autonomously
financed. These realizations can be summed up in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.18 (Market Value with Full Distribution) If a firm is financed based
on book values and simultaneously carries out a policy of full distribution, then the
following equation is valid for the market value of the levered firm at all times:











We need not repeat the proof here.
3.5.3 Replacement Investments
If a firm solely carries out investments in the scope of its accruals, it foregoes
expansion investments and only takes on replacements investments. There are a lot
of similarities here to the policy of full distribution just discussed. But it is not totally
the same, as we will shortly make clear.
Definition 3.12 (Replacement Investment) A levered firm exclusively takes
on replacement investments, if it only invests within the scope of accruals in
each period,
˜Invt = Accrt
for all t > 0. q.e.d.
The main consequence of this definition is the fact that the book value of the
firm only changes when the subscribed capital changes. Entering in Eq. (3.27) under
Assumption 3.12 brings us to
EBIT t (1 − τ ) − FCFut = ˜Invt − Accrt (3.28)
= 0.
That means: If a firm exclusively takes on replacement investments, then there is no
more difference between the profit after taxes of the unlevered firm and that amount
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that the unlevered firm would distribute to its owners. If we enter in this result into
the valuation equation for the book value of the value of the firm (Theorem 3.17),





t + elt,t+1 ,
and we can recognize that the book value of the firm in fact only can change on the
basis of changes in subscribed capital. Since we require that the book value of the




t+1 = V l0 + el0,1 + . . . + elt,t+1
= V l0 + el0,t+1.
Since there are only deterministic quantities on the right-hand side, the book value
of the value of the firm must be deterministic at time t + 1.
If we now take advantage of the firm implementing a financing policy based on
book values, then the following is valid for the book value of debt at time t + 1:
˜Dt+1 = lt+1
(
V l0 + el0,t+1
)
.
It follows from this that this quantity is deterministic. In relation to Assumption 3.7,
it again comes down to the realization that we are dealing with a firm where
the financing policy is autonomous. Consequently, we have proven the following
theorem.
Theorem 3.19 (Market Value with Replacement Investments) If a firm is
financed based on book values and exclusively carries out replacement investments,
then the following equation is valid for the levered firm at each time:











Long-Term Constant Amount of Debt In the section on autonomous financing,
we concentrated on an (exacting) special case, which is mentioned in the literature
as the Modigliani–Miller equation.36 We also want to deal here with this case
concerning the debt which continuously stays the same.
Theorem 3.20 (Modigliani–Miller Formula Based on Book Values) The firm
lives forever and the conditions of Theorem 3.19 are valid. The debt ratio remains
36See Sect. 3.3.1.
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constant through time. The following is then valid for the market value of the firm:
˜V lt = ˜V ut + τ l
(
V l0 + el0,t
)
.
We cannot recognize any essential difference from the original equation from
Modigliani and Miller (see Theorem 3.7). The proof of the theorem is virtually
trivial. Since the debt ratio as well as the book value of the value of the firm remain
constant, the amount of debt is constant. With that the conditions of the Modigliani–
Miller equation (Theorem 3.7) are met. And it is just that which must be shown.
3.5.4 Investment Policy Based on Cash Flows
It is not very often that firms exclusively carry out replacement investments, or have
a policy of full distribution. They most often follow an investment policy, which is
independent of the accruals. They will, for instance, make expansion investments
or occasionally let the capacity of the firm shrink. The considerations of the two
previous sections do not help us any further in these much more realistic cases. We
have to develop new ideas. Let us start out looking at the investment policy and end
up with accruals.
Concerning investment policy we want to follow the idea that the managers
constantly reinvest an exogenously predetermined percentage of the cash flows. This
percentage may be deterministic and already be fixed at time t = 0.
Definition 3.13 (Investments Based on Cash Flows) We define an invest-
ment policy as based on cash flows, if the investments for all future times t > 0
are a deterministic multiple of the free cash flows of the unlevered firm,
˜Invt = αt FCFut .
You could of course get involved in linking the investment policy to the free
cash flows of the levered firm, and thus work with the definition ˜Invt = αt FCFlt .
It does not matter in the end whether you are referring to the free cash flows of the
unlevered firm or the levered firm. But we regard our procedure as being justified
for the following reasons: if we want to value levered firms with their correct cost
of capital, the unlevered firm only ever represents a reference point for us. This
reference firm should differ neither with respect to its investment policy nor in
regard to its accruals from the actual firm—as a rule a levered firm—to be valued,
see our Assumption 3.2.37 And Definition 3.13 sees to it that the investment policy
is independent from the leverage.
37See Sect. 3.2.2.
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Our assumption could likewise be viewed critically, because the investments ˜Invt
were already deducted from the cash flows FCF
u
t . It would then practically be a
relation, in which consideration is better given to the gross cash flows after taxes:
˜Invt = βt
(
GCFt − τ EBT t
)
.
But from Eq. (3.26) there results after a little reformulating for the unlevered firm




We come to the following conclusion from this: If parameter β ∈ (0,1) is seen as
realistic, then α will typically be greater than zero, but not necessarily smaller than
one. Furthermore, values of α are conceivable, which exceed the value of one.
We address ourselves to the accruals now. Provided that the congruence principle







For this expression the past and future sums need to be determined. However, this
equation is not sufficient if more precise statements for the value of the company
are needed.
In the literature, one differentiates between accruals which are discretionary and
non-discretionary. Non-discretionary accruals have a definite functional correlation
with the investment payments. Furthermore they are marked by a certain regularity.
In the following, the non-discretionary accruals will be only those which result from
a direct linear correlation to the amounts invested. This seems to be especially advis-
able if the accruals consist solely of depreciations and a straight-line depreciation
is applied. Obviously, the congruence principle which we just mentioned is valid in
this case as well.




˜Invt−1 + . . . + ˜Invt−n
)
.
If we want to value a firm at time t = 0, the investment expenses of the previous
periods of time t = −1 to t = −(n − 1) must also be known. It should not be
impossible to obtain this information.
The subsequent calculations show that the lack of discretionary accruals is not of
critical importance for the development of a valuation equation. It is sufficient that
the accruals linearly depend on investments the investment expenses ˜Inv−1 through
˜Invt−n.
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The Definition 3.13 and the Assumption 3.10 now suffice to prove the following
theorem.
Theorem 3.21 (Investment Policy Based on Cash Flows) The cash flows of the
unlevered firm are weak auto-regressive and the firm follows a financing based on
book values. There are only non-discretionary accruals and the investment policy is
based on cash flows. The following is then valid for the market value of the levered
firm:











































with ls = 0 for s ≥ T . q.e.d.
Since this theorem’s proof is very involved, we refer interested readers to the
appendix.38 The equation named in the current theorem is only formulated for time
t = 0, and is nevertheless anything but pleasant to read. It can be generalized
with considerable technical effort so that a result for ˜V lt can be obtained. This
representation certainly does not give any new insights. That is why we forego
presenting it here.
Long-Term Constant Debt Ratios We also want to again examine here how the
valuation equation changes when we make certain simplifications. To do so we
particularly require that there is no resulting increase in subscribed capital and
that the parameters αt and lt remain constant. We further suppose that the firm
exists infinitely long. In contrast to Theorem 3.7, we do not, however, assume that
the cash flows have a constant, or constantly growing, expectation. We can then,
nevertheless, substantiate the outcome—which at first seems surprising and is by no
means obvious—that a valuation formula, which is very similar to the Modigliani–
Miller equation, is valid.
Theorem 3.22 (Adapted Modigliani–Miller Formula) The conditions of Theo-
rem 3.21 are valid. The firms exist perpetually. The debt ratio l and the investment
parameter α are constant. The influence of past investments on the book value can
be disregarded. The following is then valid for the market value of the firm:
V l0 = V u0
(
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The proof is again found in the appendix.39 In comparison to the original equation
from Modigliani and Miller, two terms appear, which are easy to handle mathemat-
ically with all the technics in use today. But since it is, nevertheless, not readily
understandable, we want to simplify it somewhat. For low interest rates, it appears
that





≈ (n + 1)rf
2
is valid.40 With that a preliminary estimate of the order of magnitude of this term is
easily possible.
Adjustment Formulas We also need adjustment formulas in the case of financing
policy based on book values. Whoever wants to, for instance, work with the
valuation equation of Theorem 3.21, can only do so if the cost of capital of the
unlevered firm kE,u is known. We see two ways of obtaining this information if
there is no reference firm available that is actually free of debt.
If we know all variables of the valuation equation besides kE,u of a levered
reference firm, the cost of capital being sought after can be determined with the
help of an iteration.41 The fact that we cannot simply solve the valuation equation
according to kE,u, would then be a cosmetic blemish at best.
3.5.5 Example (Continued)
The Finite Case The duration of depreciation is n = 2. Under this condition
the assumption that investments will be made exclusively at time t = 1 and not
afterwards is useful,
α1 = 50% , α2 = α3 = 0% .
39See Sect. 6.3.
40With help of a Taylor expansion the following holds:
(
1 + rf
)−n ≈ 1 − nrf + n(n + 1)2 r
2
f
and from that immediately results





≈ n + 1
2
rf .
41In doing so, constant investment parameters α and constant debt ratios l would presumably be
worked with within the framework of a practical application.
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The book value of the levered firm at time t = 0 is
V l0 = 150.
For the debt ratios based on book values, we choose just those ratios, which were
also used in the example of financing based on market values,
l0 = 50% , l1 = 20% , l2 = 0% .
For simplicity’s sake, we assume that in the previous periods there were no
investments and there were no systematic increases in the subscribed capital,
Inv−1 = Inv0 = 0, e0,2 = 0.
If we employ everything in the valuation equation according to Theorem 3.21, we
then get




































The Infinite Case As in the above example we assume that the debt ratio measured
in book values remains constant. If we use
n = 2, α = 50% , l = 50% ,
then if there are no investments before t = 0 and with Theorem 3.22 we arrive at a
firm value of
V l0 = V u0 + τD0 +






= 500 + 0.5 · 100 + 2 · 0.1 − 1 + (1 + 0.1)
−2
2 · 0.1 0.5 · 0.5 · 0.5 · 500
≈ 678.125 .
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3.5.6 Problems






where εt+1 are independent and normally distributed with expectation zero and
variance one. Cost of capital kE,u are constant, the firm follows an investment
policy based in cash flows. There were no investments before t = 0 and there
will be no increases in subscribed capital in the future. Furthermore, α does not
depend on t .
(a) Determine the distribution of the cash flows FCF
u
t .
(b) Write down the perpetual rent formula for the value of the unlevered firm ˜V ut .
How is the value distributed?
(c) 42 Write down a simple formula for the book value ˜V t . (You might have to
look at the proofs. . . ) How is the book value distributed?
Hint: Any addition or any difference of two normally distributed random
variables is again normally distributed. The expectation of the sum (or the
difference) is the sum (or the difference) of the expectations. If both random
variables are independent, then furthermore the variance of the sum is the sum of
the variances.
2. Often people use the WACC approach and do not distinguish precisely between
market and book values. This problem shows what can go wrong in the case of
an infinite rent (i.e., constant expected cash flows).
Assume that a firm is infinitely living, financed by book value, and follows an
investment policy based in cash flows. There were no investments before t = 0
and there will be no increases in subscribed capital in the future. Furthermore, α
as well as l do not depend on t .
Compare the value of the unlevered firm financed by book value and market
value. Let E[FCFu] = 100, rf = 5%, kE,u = 15%, n = 4, l = 0.7, D0 = 500,
α = 50%, and τ = 34% and write down both values. Is it fair to evaluate a
company financed by book values with WACC?
Hint: Use the formula obtained from Problem 3 in Sect. 3.4.6 for the firm
financed by market value. Notice that l0 is not given.
3.6 Other Financing Policies
We see our task as examining every conceivable finance policy and deriving
appropriate valuation equations. In this section we introduce three finance policies,
which in our opinion are not as equally significant as those we have dealt with up to
42This problem is hard to solve.
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now. Yet there will be situations in which the application of one of these three forms
is called for. Throughout this section we will assume that debt is riskless.
3.6.1 Financing Based on Cash Flows
We want to discuss a fourth form of financing policy in this section that is based on
the firm’s free cash flows. If the free cash flows should happen to be high, then a
lot of debt will be paid back. If in contrast, the cash flows turn out to be lower, debt
redemption is abstained from. One such form of financing policy seems to us to be
fully plausible with high leverage (at least for the time being).
One-Period Financing Policy As far as we know, a financing policy of this kind
was only examined twice in the literature until now. That shows that considerable
difficulties come up with the establishment of values of firms when it is supposed
that financing based on cash flows is carried out over a longer period of time: the
value of the firm is then dependent upon the price of certain exotic options. To keep
these difficulties at a minimum, we observe a special case. The leverage should be
based on free cash flows only in the first year; afterwards the amount of debt may
remain constant. This leads to the following definition.43







1 − rf D0
))+
for t ≥ 1. α is thereby a real number between zero and one, α ∈ (0,1]. q.e.d.
The definition reads as follows: The future amount of debt is established in
that the initial amount is decreased by a random debt service. This random debt
repayment is established as a part of that amount, which remains from the first year’s
free cash flow when the interest due has been subtracted. If the random redemption
should be larger than the initial debt, then it is at most as large as this. The maximum
condition is required so that negative amounts of debt are avoided.44
43The symbol X+ is defined as
X+ =
{
X if X ≥ 0,
0 otherwise.
44If full distribution is not insisted upon, one could interpret negative debt as retained earnings. In
this case the maximum condition can be left out which simplifies the calculation. But notice that
such a behavior is suboptimal since the company will pay corporate tax on interest obtained.
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We can give a valuation equation for this case. To do so we use a put option on
the value of the unlevered firm at time t = 1 with an exercise price of 1+αrf (1−τ )
αdu1
D0.
This put has the value Π . The following relation is then valid.
Theorem 3.23 The firm lives until T and follows a financing policy based on cash
flows. The cash flows of the unlevered firm are weak auto-regressive. Debt is riskless.
The market value of a levered firm is then established from
V l0 = V u0 +
τrf D0










We refer readers, who want to grasp this somewhat difficult formula, to the
appendix.45
The last theorem clarifies that for the valuation of the levered firm, it is necessary
to trade a put with a determined exercise price. If this put is not traded, the valuation
will not be successful. It is said in this case that the market is not complete.
Perpetual Annuity In general we cannot most likely assume that the put option
required for the valuation of the firm where the financing is based on cash flows is
traded. But the last theorem then has no practical relevance for valuation of firms.
The derivation of a valuation equation that does not have to fall back on options is
possible under a broader assumption.
Theorem 3.24 The conditions of Theorem 3.23 are valid. In addition, the first
period’s debt is larger than zero, and finally, the expectation of the cash flows is
constant. The market value of the levered firm is then established from
V l0 =
⎛









1 + (1 + α(1 − τ ))rf − 1+α(1−τ)rf
(1+rf )T −1
1 + rf τD0.
The proof is again found in the appendix.46
Example (Finite Case Continued) We also want to calculate the firm value with
financing based on cash flows in our example. To do so we suppose that at time
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and the factor α amounts to exactly
α = 1 .
We are concentrating our attention on the put and next establish its exercise price.
For this we need the dividend-price relation of the unlevered firm. Since we have
already determined the cash flows as well as the values of the firm at time t = 1,











The exercise price of the put therefore comes to
1 + αrf (1 − τ )
αdu1
D0 ≈ 1 + 0.1 · (1 − 0.5)
0.5692
100 ≈ 184.48 .












D0 − ˜V u1 (u)




D0 − ˜V u1 (d)
)+ ≈ 26.35 , if down in t = 1
.
Since it is supposed that there is no free lunch in the market the fundamental






1 + rf .
Employing the appropriate risk-neutral probabilities from Fig. 3.1 gives
Π ≈ 0.0833 · 0.00 + 0.9167 · 26.35
1.1
≈ 21.96 .
We end up calculating the value of the levered firm with
V l0 = ˜V u0 +
τrfD0










≈ 229.75 + 0.5 · 0.1 · 100
1.1
+ 0.5 · 0.5692 · 21.96 · 0.1736 ≈ 235.38 .
For the case of an infinitely living firm financing based on cash flows requires
the knowledge of a multiplicity of complicated derivatives. We believe that this
assumption is far from being realistic to pursue this case.
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3.6.2 Financing Based on Dividends
Distribution and Debt Redemption It is apparent with many corporations that the
managers hold the dividends constant to be paid to the shareholders over a longer
period of time. Such a policy has consequences for the firm’s amount of debt. It
emerges from Fig. 2.1 that there are only two uses for the free cash flow: distribution
to the owners, or to serve the creditors with interest and debt repayments. In all
of the financing policy variations discussed up to now, the debt redemption was
exogenously set and followed a more or less realistic plan. Now we want to look
at a new possibility and assume that the management determines the distribution. A
look at Fig. 2.1 makes it clear that with a pre-given free cash flow, such a policy has
consequences for debt redemption. If the managers subordinate the redemption of
debt under the implemented policy of dividends in the way described, then we want
to speak of financing based on dividends.
In relation to the equity approach, we made it clear that the shareholders of a
levered firm receive payments at time t of (in the case of no default)47
˜Divt = FCFlt − ˜Dt−1 − ˜I t + ˜Dt.
If the firm now tries to manage the amount of debt so that this exactly corresponds
to the already determined dividends Div, then the following definition is useful.
Definition 3.15 A firm is financed based on dividends over n periods, when
the development of debt meets the condition
˜Dt :=
(
Div − FCFlt + ˜Dt−1 + ˜I t
)+
for all times t ≤ n. The payments Div are then deterministic and correspond
to the distributions to the shareholders at times t ≤ n. q.e.d.
We could, in an analogous way to the financing based on cash flows, now again
prove a theorem, which brings the value of the levered firm in proportion to the value
of the unlevered firm and one option. But since we already stressed in the previous
section that we regard such valuation equations as useless in practice, we want to
look right away here at a special case.
Time Limitation of the Dividends Policy It does not make sense to assume that
a policy of constant dividends can be carried out for a very long time. Firstly, that
does not agree with the picture that can be empirically observed, and secondly, you
fall into a logical contradiction if you assume that constant dividends can be paid for
47See Eq. (3.22).
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all eternity from a taxable, levered firm. If, namely, the same dividends Div would
really be continuously paid, then the market value of the levered firm would come
to Div
rf
+ D0 at time t = 0. The tax advantages bound up with the financing policy
would, it is true, be achieved, but never distributed to the shareholders and that could
be a contradiction of the condition of transversality.
Constant Rate of Growth The same now applies for the method of financing based
on dividends just as it did for the financing policy based on cash flows, namely
that without simplifying assumptions we can only derive valuation equations with
unpleasant options terms. For this reason, and only for this reason, we suppose that
the amount of debt remains constant beyond time t = n, and the expected cash flows
of the unlevered firm grow constantly with the rate g.
Theorem 3.25 The firm implements a financing policy based on dividends over n˜lT
periods, the cash flows of the unlevered firm are weak auto-regressive and debt is
riskless. In addition, the amount of capital is continuously larger than zero up to the
nth period. The expectation of the cash flows of the unlevered firm grows with the
constant rate g. The market value of a levered firm is then established from
V l0 =
(





























rf (1 − τ )+
+
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(1 + rf )2
)))
V u0
1 − δT ,
where γ = 1+rf (1−τ )1+rf and δ =
1+g
1+kE,u .
You find the proof in the appendix.48
For the case of an infinite life span, the above equation is simplified to the extent
that the factor δT then moves towards zero.
Example (Finite Case Continued) We again fall back upon the payment values
of our example to establish the value of the firm for the case of financing based on
dividends as well. We suppose that the firm at time t = 1 distributes a dividend of
Div = 150
48See Sect. 6.5.
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and the firm does not change the amount of debt necessary to do so from n = 1 on.
According to Definition 3.15, at future time t = 1 an amount of debt is required of
˜D1 =
(




145 if up in t = 1,
165 if down in t = 1.
The conditions of the theorem are obviously met with that; debt remains positive.
Let us first establish the parameters γ and δ
γ = 1 + rf (1 − τ )
1 + rf =
1 + 0.1(1 − 0.5)
1 + 0.1 ≈ 0.9545 ,
δ = 1 + g
1 + kE,u =
1 + 0.1
1 + 0.2 ≈ 0.9167 .
































rf (1 − τ )+
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1 − δ3 .
Entering all values known to us results in
V l0 ≈ 237.498 .
We already mentioned that an eternally constant dividend could be a contradic-
tion to transversality. That is why we will not evaluate our infinite example here.
See the problem set for another infinite example.
3.6.3 Financing Based on Debt-Cash Flow Ratio
Dynamic Leverage Ratio The dynamic leverage ratio is a real number by which







134 3 Corporate Income Tax: WACC, FTE, TCF, APV
This ratio serves as a (simpler) criterion for the length of time in which the firm
would be completely self-financed only using cash flows for debt redemption. We
want to use this ratio to look at a sixth financing policy.
Definition 3.16 A firm is financed based on debt-cash flow ratios if these ratios
are deterministic. q.e.d.
If a firm follows this debt schedule the following theorem can be verified. The
proof can be found in the appendix.49
Theorem 3.26 (Debt-Cash Flow Ratio) The firm implements a financing policy
based on debt-cash flow ratios. The cash flows of the unlevered firm are weak auto-
regressive and debt is riskless. The market value of a levered firm is then established
from































where for the product ˜Lds . . . ˜L
d
t+1 = 1 holds if s = t . q.e.d.
Infinite Lifetime If the firm exists infinitely long and if the dynamic leverage ratio
remains constant, the following theorem can be shown.
Theorem 3.27 (Debt-Cash Flow Ratio in Infinite Lifetime) The assumptions of
Theorem 3.26 are valid. If the firm has an infinite lifetime and if the debt-cash flow









1 + rf (1 − τ˜Ld)
˜Dt .
Example (Finite Case Continued) The debt-cash flow ratio will be constant
˜Ld = 1 .
Debt at time t = 0 is
D0 = 100 .
49See Sect. 6.6.
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From the above theorems we have
V l0 = V u0 + D0
(
τrf




































(1 + kE,u)2 .
This gives
V l0 = 229.75 + 100
(
0.5 · 0.1




























for the value of the levered firm.
Example (Infinite Case Continued) If the firm exists infinitely long and maintains
a debt-cash flow ratio of
˜Ld = 1,













1 + 0.5 · 0.1 · 1
1 + 0.1(1 − 0.5 · 1)
)
500 + 0.5 · 0.1
1 + 0.1(1 − 0.5 · 1) 100
≈ 528.571 .
3.6.4 Comparing Alternative Forms of Financing
In the previous sections, we discussed different forms of financing and their
influences on the value of firms. In the case of autonomous financing, the evaluator
knows the firm’s future amount of debt D0,D1, . . .. A valuation equation, which
is possible under this assumption and delivers the correct value of the firm is the
APV equation. If in contrast financing is based on market values, the evaluator
knows the firm’s future debt ratios l0,l1, . . . measured in market values. A valuation
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equation that results in the correct value of the firm under this condition is the
WACC formula. In the case of financing based on book values, the future debt ratios
l0,l1, . . . measured in book values are known to the evaluator. Which valuation
equation is applied under this condition is dependent upon whether the firm follows
a policy of full distribution, only takes on replacement investments or conditions
its investments upon attained cash flows. With financing based on cash flows, the
firm reduces its amount of debt—for a limited time—by a certain proportion of its
free cash flows. Special valuation equations can be given that bear just this sort of
financing calculation. Financing based on dividends are distinguished in that a firm
pays constant dividends over a longer period of time.
Extent of Differences in Value In order to illustrate the way the different valuation
equations work, we have used a standard example. Every reader, who has paid
attention to our calculations can determine that the respective values of firms are
not that dramatically different from each other. That brings up the question as to the
practical relevance of those valuation equations either given or developed by us. It is
after all conceivable that the differences in value of the forms of finance specified by
us are relatively small. In this case, using any valuation formula you like and simply
accepting the possible resultant valuation mistakes can be economically justified. It
is, however, not now clear to us at all how you would have to go about confirming
or refuting such an assertion if the firm lives longer than three periods or possesses
different cash flows.
APV and WACC Autonomous financing and financing based on market values are
particularly prominent forms of financing in the DCF literature, which is why we
still want to spend some time on them here. In the first case we recommend the APV
formula, and in the second case the WACC formula. “Mixed formulas” are derived
in the literature that look like WACC formulas and are nevertheless appropriate to
be applied for autonomous financing, or that look like APV formulas and still can
be used for value-based financing.50 From an academic viewpoint, such valuation
formulas may be interesting, but they are not practically relevant. An autonomous
evaluator supposes certain future amounts of debt. What sense is there then of the
fiction of not knowing the amounts of debt (otherwise only the APV formula would
be needed in order to value), but instead falling back upon the expected debt ratios
in order to enter them into a WACC formula? It is likewise so for the opposite
case. If an investor supposes future certain debt ratios, why should she fabricate not
knowing them, and then instead access the expected amount of debt in order to put
them into an APV formula? Whoever wants to get from A to B can either take the
direct path or take the long way round. Economists normally avoid such long ways.
We find it even more strange at the least to propagate such round about ways.
With autonomous financing the tax advantages determined by the terms of credit
are certain, but with financing based on market values they are uncertain. Even
50See Wallmeier (1999) or Grinblatt and Titman (2002, chapter 13.2).
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= 0 = 1 = 2
if the expectations are identical to the tax savings,51 certain payments are always
worth more than uncertain payments from the point of view of risk-averse investors.
It is thus completely plausible if one supposes that both assumptions do not
necessarily lead to identical values of firms. This is not always adequately stressed
in the literature. WACC and APV result in—at least with economic procedures—
thoroughly different values of firms.
3.6.5 Problems
1. It is not necessary the case that the assumptions of Theorem 3.25 must violate





0 = D0 +
Div
rf
which is very intuitive since the company will pay a given dividend to the
shareholders at any time in the future.
2. Assume an unlevered company has a lifetime T = 2 and its cash flows are given
by the Fig. 3.13. Ignore default. The unlevered cost of capital are kE,u = 20%,
any up- or down-movement has a probability 0.5. The riskless interest rate is
rf = 10%, the tax rate is τ = 34%. The levered company has debt D0 = 0 at
time t = 0.
(a) Write down a formula for the value of the levered firm if ˜D1(u) and ˜D1(d)
are given.
(b) Assume the firm has an expected debt E[˜D1] = 100. Which debt schedule
(i.e., what values of ˜D1(u) and ˜D1(d)) yields the highest value of the levered
firm?
51In our example that is not the case. This explains why the WACC value of the firm is greater than
the APV value, even though the tax advantages in the first case are uncertain.
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3.7 Further Literature
The first work on the valuation of tax advantages is already half a century old:
compare Modigliani and Miller (1958) as well as Modigliani and Miller (1963). In
their work both authors have also examined the case of the perpetual annuity. Sick
(1990) was first to extensively use certainty equivalents (i.e., a martingale technique)
to derive valuation formulas including taxes, although Ross (1987) examined the
question mainly in a one-period setup.
The well-known formula of a perpetual rent first appeared in a book by Williams
(1938, p. 72) but is still known as Gordon–Shapiro formula. Neither Williams nor
Gordon/Shapiro did consider uncertainty. In the preceding setup our result might
come close to the results from Feltham and Ohlson (1995).
The first two financing policies mentioned in this chapter are found in nearly
every textbook on financing. See, for instance, Brealey et al. (2020, p. 254 (APV)
and p. 508 (WACC)). We believe the designation “autonomous” goes back to Richter
(1998).
Autonomous financing with an nonconstant amount of debt is shown for the first
time in Myers (1974). Financing based on market values was examined for the first
time by Miles and Ezzell (1980) as well as Miles and Ezzell (1985). However, both
authors only succeeded in getting the proof which is named after them under the
assumption of a constant leverage structure. A generalization is found in Löffler
(2004). Arnold et al. (2015) have established results for a financing policy where
the refinancing dates are given by multiples of a number greater than 1 (delayed
financing). Dierkes and Schäfer (2016) looked at a policy where a firm combines
both capital structure targets and predetermined debt levels. Barbi (2012) also used
risk-neutral probabilities to derive general results for the tax shield.
Although a number of publications about financing based on market values later
appeared (Harris and Pringle (1985) and Clubb and Doran (1995) are mentioned
here as representative), they do not deal with any new financing. Financing based
on cash flows was considered in Arzac (1996) and Löffler (2000).
Auto-regressive processes are covered in any textbook on time series analysis.
Hamilton (1994) or Brockwell and Davis (2002) are a good source. Auto-regressive
cash flows were introduced in a more general form by Lintner (1956) and Rubinstein
(1976) and used by Ohlson (1979), Garman and Ohlson (1981), and Christensen
and Feltham (2003). In Barberis et al. (1998) a violation of auto-regression was
considered, although in a very different context. Our specific formulation of weak
auto-regressive cash flows was first systematically examined in Laitenberger and
Löffler (2006). That is also where theorems on the relation between cost of capital
and conditional expected returns are found. Löffler (2002) points out the problem
of the Modigliani–Miller adjustment. In an earlier discussion Fernández (2004),
Fieten et al. (2005), and Cooper and Nyborg (2006) clarify the relation between
Modigliani—Miller and Miles–Ezzell. The observations on financing based on book
values are new, even if individual elements, such as the operating assets relation, are
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already known in the literature. Compare, for instance, Feltham and Ohlson (1995,
S. 693f.) or Penman (2013, chapter 8).
The literature cited so far concentrated on discrete time models. There is a vast
literature on continuous time models for the firm which we will not mention here.
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4Personal Income Tax
We now shift gears. While in the last chapter we worked on the basis that the firm
was taxed, but that the financiers were free from taxes, we now suppose that the
financiers have to pay income tax, but that the firm is spared.
Certainly not all readers will think that it makes sense in the valuation of firms to
take taxes due at the financiers’ level into consideration. The appropriate textbooks
at any rate like to leave out income tax all too well.1 If, however, you keep in
mind that income tax influences the consumption flow of private investors in every
case, then there is hardly any reason why this tax is not taken into consideration in
valuation of firms. Somebody who has acquired a firm will have other numbers
to enter in on her income tax statements than someone who invests her money
on the capital market. Just this fact itself speaks for including the income tax in
the valuation of firms. The German profession of certified public accountants, for
instance, officially decided in 1997 to advocate the consideration of income tax in
valuation of firms.2
The reader can expect a timetable in this chapter very close in structure to
the plan of action in the previous chapter. We will shortly recognize that despite
clear differences, there exist enough similarities between corporate income tax and
personal income tax to justify treating them structurally in the same way. So, surely
to the surprise of some readers, we will again speak of levered and unlevered firms.
We will use the same symbol for the tax rate and also look into the different firm
policies again in order to value the resulting tax advantages of a levered firm versus
an unlevered firm.
1The income tax is typically not gone into in detail. In the first edition of our book we were at
least able to point to some textbooks that handled typically the case of an eternal annuity. While
preparing the second edition it turned out that even these cases have been abolished in the literature.
It seems that the inclusion of personal taxes fell out of favor.
2See Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer in Deutschland (2000).
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We will certainly not surprise our readers by the statement that considerable
new ground is being broken with the inclusion of personal income tax in theory of
valuation. The first work on WACC and APV appeared already half a century ago. In
contrast, international literature on valuation of firms has very often ignored income
tax on the level of the financiers up to present. We thus have considerably less
literature on which to build. So being, this chapter cannot deal with the systematic
presentation of available knowledge. We will, much rather, have to compile new
results. In doing so, we cannot check to see if we are moving in the right direction by
comparing our results with the outcomes of other papers. We thus see the following
chapter not as an attempt at presenting already existing knowledge, but much rather
as a contribution to the theoretical discussion of income tax and valuation of firms
within the DCF theory.
4.1 Unlevered and Levered Firms
DCF theory, in essence, continually deals with the question as to how tax shields
are appropriately valued. If talk of a tax advantage (or also of a tax disadvantage)
is to be economically substantial, a reference point is needed against which the
advantage (or disadvantage) can be measured. This reference point concerns a firm
which pursues a very definite policy, a firm which we will say is unlevered.
4.1.1 “Leverage” Interpreted Anew
Do you remember the beginning of the previous chapter? We had supposed there
that the firm has to pay taxes, but the financiers remained free from tax. We had
made it clear there that a levered firm is less heavily burdened with taxes than is
an unlevered. We had further yet considered that you can immediately understand
what an unlevered firm is supposed to be without any further details, but much more
detailed information is needed in order to exactly comprehend what a levered firm
is.3 We had agreed at the beginning of the previous chapter to refer to the non-debted
firm as unlevered and to characterize the indebted firm with the adjective levered.
Reference Firm We are now dealing with a completely different tax situation. The
firms remain free from tax, while the financiers will be enlisted to pay income tax. If
you bear in mind that from the basis of income tax, dividends, and interest payments
are the object of taxation, then a lot of income tax is due to a firm which has a policy
of full distribution. An income taxes savings, in contrast, is expected if the firm
only partially distributes the profits obtained to the financiers. Profit retention brings
about a tax shield for the investors. It is therefore recommended to use the firm
with full distribution as reference firm, since no other distribution activity makes
3See Sect. 3.1.
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what we are talking about immediately clear. Whoever, in contrast, has to value a
firm with partial distribution, must very precisely describe which share of the cash
flows is to be withheld in which periods. It is completely clear, in contrast, what is
designated by full distribution. Since more income tax has to be paid in the case of
full distribution than in the case of reduced distribution, we will speak in the first
case of an unlevered firm, and in the second of a levered firm.
Please observe that we use the terms levered differently in the current chapter
than in the preceding chapter. Levered now no longer means indebted, but rather
partial distribution. The capital structure of the firm does not play any role in this
chapter. Leverage in the ongoing chapter relates solely to the question if and how
much is retained in the firm. Although this may possibly be somewhat irritating
for readers, we purposely chose the terminology in order to be able to make use of
structural similarities in the previous chapter.
In the previous chapter a full retention policy was assigned to the unlevered and
the levered firm as well. Any other possible retention policies were not object of our
discussion. In this chapter we argue similarly. Now both companies, the unlevered
(or full distributing) firm as well as the levered (or partially distributing) firm, are
self-financed and therefore without debt. The financing policy is not object of our
discussion. How financing and retention policy can be linked together will be the
topic of the last chapter. Seen in this light, the unlevered firm of the previous and
this chapter is identical: both are without debt and both fully distribute their cash
flow to the owners.
If we interpret the notation anew in the sense explained here, then it should also
apply that a firm with full distribution has the same value as a firm with partial
distribution, as long as no taxes are imposed. That agrees with the theorem of Miller
and Modigliani (1961) on the irrelevance of dividend policy. This theorem says that
it does not matter when a firm distributes its earnings so long as taxes do not play a
role.
Notation We will note the market value of the unlevered firm with ˜V ut and the
market value of the levered firm with ˜V lt , respectively. Please note that both firms
are not indebted, hence both values coincide with the market value of the equity,
respectively. And we will completely analogously use the symbol FCF
u
t for the
post-tax free cash flows of the firm with full distribution, while the post-tax free cash





t has to do with the shareholders’ taxes of a firm with full distribution, but ˜Tax
l
t
with the shareholders’ income tax of a firm with partial distribution.
Notice another important difference between the previous and present chapters.
Previously FCF
l
t described the free cash flow that accrued to all investors (to
shareholders as well as to debt holders). Now, there are no debt holders. In contrast
with the previous chapter, here the free cash flow exists only as payment flow, which
accrues to the shareholders.
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Positive Dividends If we work on the grounds that a firm’s cash flows are dealing
with payments from which the dividends to the owners are defrayed, then a
further limitation results. If in the last chapter cash flows turned negative, it meant
nothing more than that the financiers infused the firm with further equity. If this
was no longer possible, we then spoke of default and in more than one section
we specifically expanded upon the implications of such a situation. But negative
payments do not make any sense in the case of dividends. Thus in the following
we will presuppose that the (levered as well as the unlevered) firm’s cash flows are
always large enough so that the dividends cannot turn negative.
4.1.2 The Unlevered Firm
In this chapter firms with full distribution play the same role as firms without debt
in the chapter on corporate taxes. We assume that firms with full distribution are
just as seldom the case in economic reality as self-financed firms. Nonetheless, it
is important to be able to value them. Just as we maintained in the last chapter that
you can only value an indebted firm if you are also capable of valuing a firm that
is self-financed, we can now maintain that you can only value a firm with partial
distribution if you can find a way of valuing a firm with full distribution.
If the cost of equity and the free cash flows of a firm with full distribution are
known, it is very simple to write down a correct valuation equation. To do this we
first define the cost of equity.













Since these cost of equity are formally not different from the cost of equity of an
unlevered firm according to Definition 3.1, the valuation equation for a firm with full
distribution naturally results very easily. If we again assume that the cost of equity
are deterministic, then the valuation equation looks exactly like the corresponding
valuation equation for a fully self-financed firm according to Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 4.1 (Market Value of the Unlevered Firm) If the cost of equity of
the unlevered firm kE,ut are deterministic, then the value of the firm, which fully
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We do, however, find it important to point out a fact that may take some time
getting used to for one or more readers. The cost of equity kE,u are dealing with
the cost of equity post- taxes, and not say pre-taxes ! It is just as important for us
to ascertain that we avoid every statement about the connection between the pre-tax
and the post-tax cost of equity. We much rather see the cost of equity post-taxes as
simply given. We will later come back to a likely relation between both quantities
in still more detail.4
In the chapter on corporate income tax, it was necessary to be able to fall back
upon a premise that we had designated as the assumption of weak auto-regressive
cash flows.5 In order to develop valuation equations and also, above all, adjustment
equations, we used the Theorem 3.3 many times in the chapter on corporate tax.
We then need a commensurate theorem when dealing with personal income tax.
But in order to get the theorem, we first have to introduce the assumption on weak
auto-regressive cash flows. Thus:








= (1 + gt )FCFut
is valid for the unlevered firm’s cash flows. q.e.d.
Since we have already discussed the economic significance of this assumption
above, we do not need to go into it again. Before we can begin with proving
specific valuation equations, we have to complete a series of preparatory steps.
We must first describe the tax which is at the center of this chapter’s discussion
in more detail. We must furthermore go into the question as to what happens to the
fundamental theorem of asset pricing when we have to take personal income tax
into consideration.
4.1.3 Income and Taxes
Economists usually describe a tax type by saying who pays the tax, how the tax base
is established, and which tariff is to be applied. Individuals are always subject to tax.
Categories of Income In most countries of the world, income tax is measured
according to an amount, that as a rule is not so easy to calculate since very detailed
legal provisions must be observed. The core of this amount is comprised of the sum
of the so-called income. For the present we will differentiate between the incomes
of the owners and the creditors, although no creditors are present in our model yet.
4See Sect. 4.2.
5In regards see Assumption 3.1.
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Table 4.1 From pre-tax gross cash flow to income
Pre-tax gross cash flow GCFt
− Investment expenses ˜Invt
= Shareholder’s unlevered taxable income GCFt − ˜Invt
− Retained earnings ˜At
+ Reflux from retained earnings (1 + r˜t−1)˜At−1
= Shareholder’s levered taxable income GCFt − ˜Invt
−˜At + (1 + r˜t−1)˜At−1
1. Owners’ incomes can mean the firm’s achieved earnings or the firm’s dividends.
If the firm’s achieved earnings are taxed, and in fact taxed regardless of whether
these earnings are distributed or withheld, then it is “accrued income” that forms
the tax base. If, in contrast, the cash which the shareholders receive is the object
of taxation, then “realized income” is spoken of. Income from shares, which are
traded on capital markets, is always included in the second group.
2. When we speak of the creditors’ incomes, we must think of interest. In many
countries interest income and income from dividends are taxed differently.
Redemption of Capital Owners sometimes receive payments that do not have
the character of dividends. Think of the repayment of capital in relation to capital
reductions or the liquidation of firms. It is important not to mix such payments up
with dividends since they are, as a rule, spared from the burden of income tax.
Earnings Retention It is possible to retain parts of the distributable cash flows in
the firm. We write ˜At for these earnings retention amounts. The earnings retention
amounts are always non-negative. We proceed on the basis that these amounts are
invested by the firm for one period at the (later more precisely described) interest
rate of r˜t , to then be distributed to the financiers.
Table 4.1 describes how to get from the pre-tax gross cash flows of a firm to
the levered taxable income. With that we get the term given in the last line of
Table 4.1 for the financiers’ taxable income. The owners must, however, still pay
their taxes from this: the unlevered as well as the levered free cash flows result from
the respective taxable income minus the tax payments.
In this figure the gross cash flows and the investment expenses are identical for
the levered and the unlevered firm. The unlevered firm, however, does not have
retained earnings.
Yield of the Retained Earnings Amounts Under what conditions does the firm
invest the amount ˜At? To answer this question we want to recall that managers—
independent of distribution policy—should institute every investment project with
positive net present value. Investing the amount ˜At in operating assets is as
impossible as that of the principle repayment of debts or the mark-down of equity.
The only remaining possibility is that of investing on the capital market.
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Investing on the capital market can now turn out to be riskless, but it can also be
risky. And one may suppose that it makes a difference as to which variants we abide
by here. If personal income taxes are not (yet) taken into account we will, however,
soon recognize that due to the fundamental theorem we do not have to take this
into consideration. rf shall denote the risk free interest rate before income tax is
deducted. If the amount ˜At is invested in riskless assets, then the following simply
applies:
r˜t = rf . (4.1)
In case of a risky investment by the firm, the following happens: The firm invests
the amount ˜At and receives back the amount (1 + r˜t )˜At one period later. If the
capital market is arbitrage free, then the reflux at time t + 1 must be just as great as
the cash value on the money investment at time t . We use the fundamental theorem
to determine this cash value. But since the investment is carried out by the firm
and according to our conditions the firm does not pay taxes, we must apply the
fundamental theorem here according to Theorem 2.2, which is valid in a world




(1 + r˜t )˜At |Ft
]
1 + rf .




] = rf . (4.2)
That is a generalization of Eq. (4.1). In the following we will proceed from this
relation.
Tax Rates for Interest and Dividends Just as with the firm tax, the tax rate is
again linear. There are therefore neither exemptions nor exemption thresholds. As
in the preceding section, the tax rate is certain as well as constant. We already clearly
said in the previous chapter that this presents a heavy, but unfortunately necessary
assumption. Furthermore, tax rates on dividends and interest differ: the tax rate on
dividends will be denoted by τD , the tax rate on interest is τ I . Although our firms
are self-financed, this difference is of relevance in proving our fundamental theorem
which will become clear in a moment.
We need to take the following into consideration: Let us assume that an investor
has an amount of G at her disposal. There are two different possibilities to invest this
sum securely. Either she could now keep G in his private means in order to acquire
an asset of G+ (1 − τ I ) rf G for the course of one time period or she pays this into
her company and invests it there. In this case her assets will at first increase to G +
rf G during the next time period. Once distributed to the entrepreneur it is crucial as
to how this additional cash flow is taxed. If the interest share of the additional cash
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flow is treated like a dividend, the investor will get G+ (1 − τD) rf G from the safe
investment after income tax. Obviously this amount differs from G+ (1 − τ I ) rf G
which we ascertained beforehand, unless, of course, the tax rate for interest and
dividends happens to be identical. It is now quite easy to formulate a possibility
for arbitrage from the disparity of the two values (even when considering only self-
financed firms). This would make our model superfluous. To avoid this, we only
have two possibilities.
1. We could assume that
τ I = τD
applies.6 Unfortunately it can easily empirically be verified that many industrial
nations of the world do not currently match up to the identity we presumed. So
we will not consider this particular option.
2. The second possibility consists in defining the assessment basis of the income
tax in a different way than in our arbitrage example. For this purpose we need
to define a capital market, which takes into account our considerations more
precisely. We are assuming a fixed quantity of convertible assets to which we
shall refer as basic assets.7 One of these basic assets is risk free, all the others
are risky. Additionally, every company and every investor can only dispose of a
portfolio of these basic assets.
The formulation of such an assessment basis is thus crucial to the elimination
of the arbitrage opportunities. Any investment in the capital market is geared to
the portfolio of basic assets. Furthermore, payments from the risk free asset will
always be taxed by τ I , while payments from the risky asset will be taxed by τD .
Such a definition has far reaching consequences. Let us assume an investor chooses
to invest risk free not privately but rather into a company. Once the returns of this
investment are distributed then the return will not be taxed as a dividend but will
be treated like interest. Ultimately it can be traced back to the risk free basic assets.
With such a definition of the assessment basis we avoid the arbitrage opportunity
mentioned above.
Tax Equation Our model’s income tax equation for shareholders can now be







for the unlevered firm.
6This assumption is found in Miller (1977) for instance.
7The use of basic assets is in keeping with common procedure in the financial mathematical
literature, see Shreve (2004, section 1.2).
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As far as the levered company is concerned, it is not quite as easy to deal with
this issue. Much depends on how the amount ˜At has been invested: because a risk
free financial investment will be taxed differently as opposed to an investment of
risky securities. In this chapter we shall assume that the retention investment will be





GCFt − ˜Invt − ˜At + (1 + r˜t−1)˜At−1
)
.
The two firms tax payments differ by one amount, which we, analogously to the
chapter on firm tax, want to designate as tax shield.
Tax Shield If we want to determine the cash flows of the levered firm in t , we
do not only have to observe the earnings retention at time t , but also the earnings







−˜At + (1 + r˜t−1)˜At−1
)
.
In order to calculate the difference between the free cash flows of the two firms,
we take into consideration that gross cash flows and capital repayments as well as
investments all result in identical amounts in both firms. The one and only difference
between the two firms is the single fact that one renounces all earnings retention
measures, while the other institutes such measures, resulting in a different amount
of income tax. We can then entirely concentrate on the retained earnings amounts
and tax payments in calculating the difference between the free cash flows of the

















(1 + r˜t−1)˜At−1 − ˜At
)
.
8Whereas if the retention is invested without risk, as you might expect, the equation will be
formulated slightly differently. “Retention for a risk free investment” will only indicate that we
are dealing with a portfolio with more risk free securities. As a result, the assessment basis for the
income, which is taxed at a rate of τ I , will correspondingly decrease. In the period that follows,
it increases again by virtue of the repayment of the retention and the returns on interest. Thus we
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A tax shield then comes about if the firm does away with fully distributing the free
cash flows.
4.1.4 Fundamental Theorem
In the last chapter we made thorough use of the fundamental theorem of asset
pricing. We had already introduced this theorem in the first chapter of this book,
since it is of such central importance for the derivation of valuation equations.
The fundamental theorem says that under the condition of an arbitrage free
capital market, risk-neutral probabilities Q exist. Risk-neutral expectations can
thus be discounted in a world without taxes with the riskless interest rate rf . The
correctness of this statement does not change if a corporate income tax is entered
into the model. This is because in taxation, which is only affective at the level of the
firm, the riskless interest is identical pre- and post-tax. But now we are dealing with
taxation at the financiers’ level. And whoever invests riskless money as a financier
and is at the same time liable to pay taxes, no longer attains net returns in the
amount of rf , but rather a return in the amount of rf
(
1 − τ I ). What comes of the
fundamental theorem under these conditions? Do risk-neutral probabilities Q still
exist? And if so, how are risk-neutral expectations to be discounted?
For the value of any discretionary portfolio from risky and riskless assets as well
the following theorem now applies.
Theorem 4.2 (Fundamental Theorem with Different Taxation of Dividends and
Interest) If the capital market with a personal income tax is free of arbitrage, the











1 − τ I ) .
The tax rate for returns on interest is found in the denominator even if it includes
assets with risky returns. This result is neither trivial nor is it immediately evident.
Due to the fact that proofs like this cannot be found in the relevant literature, we
nevertheless felt that we had no other option than to publish it here. For further
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information please refer to the appendix.9 Now we shall continue to develop results
analogous to the ones we have proved in the previous two chapters.
Theorem 4.3 (Williams/Gordon-Shapiro Formula) If the cost of equity are
deterministic and the assumption on weak auto-regressive cash flows holds, then






holds for deterministic dut . q.e.d.
Theorem 4.4 (Equivalence of the Valuation Concepts) If the cost of equity are
deterministic and the assumption on weak auto-regressive cash flows holds, then the
























In terms of the value of equity of the unlevered firm, cost of equity and discount
rates are the same. But the taxed interest rate rf
(
1 − τ I ) now appears in place of
the riskless interest rate rf . The cost of equity kE,u we are now dealing with is also
a post-tax variable. We do, however, avoid establishing an explicit relation to the
levered firm’s pre-tax cost of equity here.
We do not really need to prove the two theorems here for a second time. Instead,
we refer our readers to the applicable pages in the chapter on the corporate tax.10
4.1.5 Tax Shield and Distribution Policy
In this section we want to characterize the difference in value between an unlevered
and a levered firm.
Let us begin with the firm with full distribution. From Theorem 4.1 in relation to
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1 − τ I ))T−t
.
Yet, we still have to think about how the free cash flows from the firm with partial
distribution differ from those of the unlevered firm. We thereby regard the following
principle: The first earnings retention takes place in t . It is economically unsuitable
to forgo with distributions at the last time t = T . From that results ˜AT = 0. If we
compare the value of the levered and unlevered firm, we then get by applying the
rules 4 as well as 5







































(1 + rf (1 − τI ))T−t
.
After some minimal reshuffling, the following results:
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1 − τI ))T−t
.
This brings us to the conclusion













1 − τ I ) +
. . . +
τ I
(







1 − τ I ))T−t
. (4.4)
This equation shows itself to be the personal income tax pendant to Eq. (3.11). In
place of debt ˜Dt ,
(
1 − τD) ˜At simply enters in, that being the amount by which the
maximum distribution to the financiers is reduced.
Alternative Retained Earnings Policies If we think the tax shields through to
a consequential end, then we would have to advise every firm to hold off the
distribution only so long as possible for tax reasons. There is nothing to object
to this recommendation within the framework of our model. We could have also
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argued accordingly in the last chapter. It was the debt which brought a tax shield
there. And it would have then made sense to recommend that the firm allow for
the maximum debt ratio permissible. As we did there, we here refrain from such
recommendations since we very well know that suitable advice is unreasonable if
it is solely based on tax considerations. That is also why we want to master the
situation differently here. We take the firm’s distribution policy—just as we did the
debt policy in the last chapter—as a given and question how it affects the value of
the firm.
In the following we will more clearly analyze five distribution policies. Since
distribution and retention are always complementary measures, we can naturally
speak of alternative retention policies as well. This involves a phraseology in
relation to the subsequent characterizations which can more easily be remembered.
1. With the autonomous retention, a certain amount is retained each period.
2. With the cash flow based earnings retention, a certain amount of the free cash
flows is deducted each period.
3. With the dividend based earnings retention, the amounts to be deducted are so
chosen that in the first n periods it comes to a distribution of a fixed dividend.
4. With the market value based earnings retention, the deducted amounts are
so chosen that the relation of earnings retention and equity value remains
deterministic.
Another potential dividend policy of relevance can be of consequence if we
consider disbursement stoppages. In many countries statutory provisions allow that,
at the very most, the earnings are distributed and nothing more. This applies as
well even if the free cash flow should exceed this amount. Unfortunately, these
disbursement stoppages are very difficult to manage. Therefore we will refrain from
discussing them.
4.1.6 Example (Continued)
We also want to use the data from the two examples in the previous chapter in
terms of the personal tax. We assume that the tax rates on dividend and interest
will coincide and be denoted by τ . Since the expositions in this chapter almost
completely formally correspond to those of the last, we could simply repeat the
previous chapter’s calculations here once again. we would just have to interpret the
respective variables differently: with FCF
u
t as cash flows post income tax, k
E,u as
taxed cost of equity and τ as income tax rate, the calculations take shape for the
finite as well as infinite example, but formally just as in the Sects. 2.2.3 and 3.1.3.
In the infinite case, we would—despite the formal agreement with the previous
chapter’s concept—indeed fumble into a trap. Analogously to Sect. 3.1.3, we could
determine the risk-neutral probabilities Q1(d) and Q1(u) for a certain time period.
Now the outcomes no longer agree with the values calculated for the infinite case in
Sect. 3.1.3, because the fundamental theorems for the case of the corporate income
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tax and the personal income tax differ from each other. In the first case, the riskless
interest rf is to be calculated with, and in the other case it is the riskless tax interest
rf (1 − τ ). It now appears that with the data constellation we have chosen, the
probabilities would be negative and that correlates to an arbitrage opportunity!11
We will therefore suppose a cost of equity rate of kE,u = 15 % in the following.
It can be seen that with such a cost of equity rate the arbitrage opportunity vanishes.
With cost of equity in the amount of kE,u = 15 %, the value of the unlevered firm






























The values of ˜V u1 and ˜V
u
2 have to be determined anew.
We can take the other original numerical values for the infinite example without
restriction.
4.1.7 Problems
1. In Sect. 3.1.3 we were able to evaluate the risk-neutral probabilities Q1(d) and
Q1(u) for the finite example.12 Show that
Q1(u) ≈ −0.125, Q1(d) ≈ 1.125
if a personal income tax with τ = 50 % is present.
Verify that for kE,u = 15 % this arbitrage opportunity vanishes and determine
Q1(u) and Q1(d). Determine Q2(dd),Q2(du),Q2(ud), and Q2(uu).
2. Prove that the tax shield ˜V lt − ˜V ut in the case of the personal income tax satisfies
˜V lt − ˜V ut =
EQ
[
˜V lt+1 − ˜V ut+1|Ft
]




(1 + rf )˜At − ˜At+1|Ft
]
1 + rf (1 − τ I ) .
3. Similar to problem 4 show that the main valuation Eq. (4.4) can be written as
˜V lt = ˜V ut +
1 − τD















1 − τ I ))s−t .
11For details see problem 1.
12See Sect. 3.1.3.
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4.2 Excursus: Cost of Equity and Tax Rate
Statement of the Problem In this section we will go into the question which until
now has been left out. The question goes: How do a firm’s cost of equity change
when the income tax rate changes? And further: What can we say about the value of
a fully self-financed firm as function of the income tax rate? In all our expositions
up to now, we kept the tax rates constant. We did not want to clarify how a firm’s
market value behaved with a different tax rate. In this section it will be seen why we
constantly avoided this question.
Whoever wants to investigate the relation between tax rate and value of the firm
has to grapple with two problems. On the one hand, she has to analyze the influence
of the tax rate on the cash flow, and on the other hand, the influence of the tax rate
on the cost of equity. The first problem mentioned is not considered particularly
difficult in the literature, which is why it generally does not get much attention. The
question as to how the cost of equity react to changes in the tax rate, in contrast,
deserves much more consideration. We will limit ourselves to the case of the eternal
return in our subsequent analysis. The reasons for doing so will soon be clear. To
simplify matters, we are operating in this section on the basis that both income types
are burdened by income tax in the same way. The tax rate will be denoted by τ .
Influence on Cash Flows We presuppose expected cash flows remain equal. We
further assume that no changes of the drawn capital and no investments result during
the entire duration. Thus the free cash flow is dealing with an amount that can be
easily calculated as product of the gross cash flow and the term 1 − τ ,
FCF
u
t = GCFt (1 − τ ). (4.5)
Influence on Cost of Equity In connection to a work by Johansson (1969), a
declaration on the functional relation between the cost of equity (post-tax) and the
tax rate is often made in the literature,13 which can be formulated as follows: the
post-tax cost of equity kE,u is dependent linearly on tax rate τ ; there is then a number
kE , so that
kE,u = kE(1 − τ ) (4.6)
13Johansson addressed the question, indeed in more scope, as to if the formula notated below is
in fact applicable. He clearly pointed out in response that a series of conditions must be satisfied
here. One typically finds this relation in examples and not in a chapter on theory, as, for example,
in Hillier et al. (2008, Example 14.5, page 520) or in texts dealing with practical issues as Institut
der Wirtschaftsprüfer in Deutschland (2008, section 4.4.2.5) (in German).
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is valid. kE is also referred to as “pre-tax cost of equity,” although this interpretation
is not necessary for our argument. We ourselves have always very wisely forgone
asserting such a relation.
Equation (4.5) now leads in connection to Eq. (4.6) to the familiar outcome of
the income tax being completely redundant under the conditions assumed here. It






= GCFt (1 − τ )




But our discussion concerns a deeper matter. We want to critically analyze the linear
relation (4.6).
Stochastic Structure of the Cash Flows There is a strong relation between the
cost of equity and the risk-neutral probability measure Q.
We always stressed that earlier as well. The relation which we want to call
attention to here once again is particularly well expressed in Theorems 3.3 and 4.4.
If, as now in Eq. (4.6), a statement on the dependence of the cost of equity on the
tax rate is made, then that also implies a relation between risk-neutral probabilities
and the tax rate.
We want to show with help from an example that this relation can lead to a
dramatic problem. In order to more exactly characterize the stochastic structure of
the future gross cash flows, we use our example of an infinitely long living firm. We
now assume that the gross cash flows GCFt of the firm evolve according to Fig. 2.3.
In order to show that the free cash flows as modelled are in fact weak auto-
regressive, we have to make it clear how the conditioned expectation E [·|Ft ] is
calculated. At time t the cash flow GCFt is already known, and that is why the
uncertainty can only relate the subsequent movement u or d . We thus have in
14There was a heated discussion in the German literature about this relation, which has found
a way to enter into the documents of the Institute of Certified Public Accountants, the German
association of CPAs (“Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer” or IdW). You read, for instance, in Institut der
Wirtschaftsprüfer in Deutschland (2013, II. Band, Teil A, Rz. 195): “. . . 1983 it was still assumed
that a number of cases could forgo the (explicit) inclusion of the investor’s tax burden, since it
has no affect upon the firm’s value.” The Institute of Certified Public Accountants, however, gave
up this position in 1997. Since then an income tax rate of 35% has been used, if no other income
tax rate can be identified, see here Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer in Deutschland (2000) as well as
Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer in Deutschland (2013, II.Band, Teil A, Rz. 117).
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connection to rule 2
E
[
(1 − τ )GCFt+1|Ft
]











(1 − τ )GCFt . (4.8)
Because of (4.5) that is exactly the assumption of weak auto-regressive cash flows.
An Arbitrage Opportunity Now we do not only suppose the existence of one,
but also of two firms. Both should be without debt and pursue a policy of full
distribution. For the parameters u,d in the first firm
P(u)u + P(d)d = 1 ⇒ g = 0
should be valid. The value of the firm at time t is denoted by ˜Vt . For the sake of
simplicity, we designate the cost of equity when taxes are neglected with k; they
should remain constant in time.
The second firm should also possess gross cash flows with the stochastic structure
as in Fig. 2.3. If the cash flows grow in the first firm (that is, move up), then they
also grow in the second firm. If they fall in the first firm, then they also sink in the
second. It can thus be determined that the cash flows of the two firms are perfectly
correlated. We will denote the cash flows of the second firm with GCF
′
t . The factors
u′,d ′ are different from those of the first firm, but
P(u)u′ + P(d)d ′ = 1 ⇒ g′ = 0
should again be valid. Because of this connection, the gross cash flows do not point
to any expected growth in either case. The second firm’s cost of equity rate when
taxes are neglected is k′ and the firm’s value in t is denoted with ˜V ′t .
The investor can continue selling or acquiring riskless bonds, which at time t
have the value Bt . When taxes are left out, the bonds promise a return in the amount
of rf , the riskless interest rate.
We use an idea reasonably well known in the literature, that of the so-called
pricing by duplication. This way we will be able to uncover a relationship between
the value of the two firms, ˜Vt and ˜V ′t , and so too between the cost of equity k and
k′. This relationship is based on the idea that a portfolio can be put together from
shares from the first company and the riskless bond, the cash flows of which do not
differ from the payments with which an owner from the second firm can plan.
For that purpose we make up a portfolio which at time t includes exactly nB
riskless bonds and nV shares of the first firm. We choose the numbers nB and nV
in such a way that, independently from the state which manifests at time t + 1, the




1 + rf (1 − τ )
) + nV
(
GCFt+1(1 − τ ) + ˜Vt+1
)
= GCF′t+1(1 − τ ) + ˜V ′t+1




1 + rf (1 − τ )
) + nV (1 + kt+1(1 − τ )) ˜Vt+1 =
(
1 + k′t+1(1 − τ )
)
˜V ′t+1.
In the period following from the end of time t , there are exactly two possible
directions (up or down) along the cash flow path in the binomial model. That is
why the above condition can be resolved in a system of two equations, which must
be simultaneously satisfied: in the case of an up movement
(
1 + rf (1 − τ )
)
nBBt + u (1 + k(1 − τ )) nV ˜Vt = u′
(
1 + k′(1 − τ )) ˜V ′t
must be valid, while in the case of a down movement
(
1 + rf (1 − τ )
)
nBBt + d (1 + k(1 − τ )) nV ˜Vt = d ′
(
1 + k′(1 − τ )) ˜V ′t
must be satisfied. Both equations make up a linear system, which can be unequivo-




(u − u′)(1 + k′(1 − τ ))




u′(1 + k′(1 − τ ))
u(1 + k(1 − τ )) .
All variables are uncertain. They depend upon the firm value in t .
Since the portfolio ex constructione at time t + 1 generates the same payments
as the second firm, it has to have the same price under the arbitrage free conditions
as this has,
nBBt + nV ˜Vt = ˜V ′t . (4.9)
If we employ the solutions for nB and nV in the solution at hand, then we get a
valuation equation for the second firm. In so doing ˜V ′t cancels out and we get a
functional relation between the cost of equity k of the first firm and k′ of the second.
It reads as follows:
u − u′
1 + rf (1 − τ ) +
u′
1 + k(1 − τ ) =
u
1 + k′(1 − τ ) . (4.10)
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A possible economic interpretation of this equation could consist of the cost of
equity 1 + k′(1 − τ ) being established as harmonic mean of the cost of equity
1 + rf (1 − τ ) and 1 + k(1 − τ ), whereby this harmonic mean is weighted with the
parameters of the up and down movement.
The following is decisive for this equation: it must be valid for all conceivable
tax rates τ . But that does not work. In addition to the trivial solution τ = 1 the
value τ = 0 will yield a relation between k and k′. Hence, τ = 0 and τ = 1
solve the above equation already. But, a simple rearrangement shows that (4.10) is
a quadratic equation in τ that cannot have more than two solutions! The equation
cannot be satisfied for a single further τ .
That is a violation of the no arbitrage principle, a principle we always uphold.
If namely, the cost of equity do not fulfill the given relation (4.10), then that means
nothing more than that the relation of the firm values (4.9) is also not valid—and a
free lunch can easily be construed from there. Depending upon whether
nBBt + nV ˜Vt > ˜V ′t or nBBt + nV ˜Vt < ˜V ′t
is valid, you must either go short or long with the shares of the second firm and
cover this transaction with the bond and the shares of the first firm.
We had posed the question as to what connection existed between cost of equity
and the tax rate. Until now, this question was always left out of our considerations.
In order to answer the question, we fall back upon a concept which is very popular
in applied work. This concept produces a simple linear relation between the cost
of equity and the tax rate. We could show that the unlimited application of the
appropriate equation results in an arbitrage opportunity. We are thus left with the
following realization: whoever wants to know how cost of equity react to the
changes in the tax rate, may not rely on Eq. (4.6). The DCF theory simply does
not give any answer here. And that is exactly why we have until now deliberately
avoided the question.
4.2.1 Problems
The following problems are devoted to the understanding of the arbitrage opportu-
nity revealed in this section.
1. One particular feature of our tax system in that section was that only dividends
were taxed. Assume now that also capital gains are taxed. In particular, we
assume that the capital gains (even if they are not realized!) also add to the tax
base, i.e., instead of (4.5) we assume
FCF
u
t = GCFt − τ
(
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Such a tax system is also called neutral tax system or taxation of economic rent.
Show that if the value of the assets remain unchanged by the tax rate the cost of
equity have to satisfy
kpost-tax = kpre-tax(1 − τ ).
Remark It can be shown that if this system is free of arbitrage pre-tax it will
remain free of arbitrage post-tax.
2. This problem derives a possible relation between company value and tax rate
without violating the arbitrage principle.
Assume that the risk-neutral probability measure Q does not change with
the tax rate τ and that the cash flows form a perpetual rent (no growth). We
further assume that the company has constant pre-tax cost of equity kpre-tax.
Using Theorem 4.2, derive an equation for post-tax value of the unlevered firm
that explicitly contains kpre-tax.














is a good choice.
3. The (pre-tax) gross cash flows from two companies follow the binomial tree as
in Fig. 2.3 and let FCF0 = 100, g = 0, rf = 5 %, k = 15 %, u = 10 %, and
u′ = 20 %.
a. Consider the first company having cost of equity k. Determine the risk-neutral
probabilities Q1(u) and Q1(d).
b. Use the arbitrage argument above to determine k′.
c. Assume that for the first company the post-tax cost of equity are given as
(1 − τ )k. Determine the risk-neutral probabilities depending on τ .
d. Now assume that for the second company the post-tax cost of equity are given
as (1 − τ )k′. Calculate again the risk-neutral probabilities depending on τ .
Does the result coincide with c)?
Hint: You might consult the finite example from Sect. 3.1.3 on how to calculate
Q1(u) and Q1(d).
4.3 Retention Policies
In the following we will analyze alternative forms of the earnings retention policies.
With one exception, it essentially deals with such strategies in which the scale of the
earnings withholding is uncertain.
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4.3.1 Autonomous Retention
The free cash flow of the unlevered firm can be either fully or partially distributed.
We will now examine the most simple form of a retention policy. It is distinguishable
in that the firm, on principle, annually holds back a certain amount of the maximally
distributable cash flows.
Definition 4.2 (Autonomous Retention) A firm is following autonomous
retention policy if the retention is deterministic. q.e.d.
The value of a firm which follows this policy is easy to calculate. We employ
Definition 4.2 in Eq. (4.4) and get
Theorem 4.5 (Autonomous Retention) In the case of an autonomous retention,
the following is valid:







1 − τD) rf At
1 + rf
(
1 − τ I ) + . . . +
τ I
(




1 − τ I ))T−t
.
Eternally Living Firm with Autonomous Retention If the firm pursues the
autonomous retention in such a way so that At does not change in time, the last
statement is simplified. We furthermore suppose at the same time that the firm lives
infinitely. Notice that the value of the tax shield in Theorem 4.6 does not depend
from the tax rate if τD = τ I .
Theorem 4.6 (Constant Retention) The firm lives on forever. For constant A, the
following applies:
˜V lt = ˜V ut +
1 − τD
1 − τ I A.
The proof of this statement is straightforward.
Example Let us turn to our finite example. The amounts of retention with the
levered firm are exactly
A0 = 10, A1 = 20, A2 = 0 .
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With that we get
V l0 = V u0 + (1 − τ)A0 +
τ(1 − τ)rf A0
1 + rf (1 − τ) +
τ(1 − τ)rf A1
(1 + rf (1 − τ))2
= 249.692 + (1 − 0.5) · 10 + 0.5 · (1 − 0.5) · 0.1 · 10
1 + 0.1 · (1 − 0.5) +
0.5 · (1 − 0.5) · 0.1 · 20
(1 + 0.1 · (1 − 0.5))2
≈ 255.383
for the value of the levered firm.
In order to establish the value of the levered firm in the infinite example,
assuming A = 10 and using the statement from Theorem 4.6 we get
V l0 = V u0 + A = 510 ,
which is independent from the tax rate as mentioned earlier.
4.3.2 Retention Based on Cash Flow
The next policy concerns the case where a fraction of the distributable cash flow is
retained.
Definition 4.3 (Retention Based on Cash Flows) A firm is following an
earnings retention policy based on cash flows if the retention is a determinate
multiple of the free cash flow of the unlevered firm,
˜At = αt FCFut .
αt is a number greater than zero. q.e.d.
The value of a firm which follows this policy is easy to calculate. We employ
Definition 4.3 in Eq. (4.4) and get























1 − τ I ))T−t








































1 − τ I ))T−t−1
⎞
⎠ .
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All we need to do now is to use Theorem 4.4, and the following statement is
already proven.
Theorem 4.7 (Cash Flow-Retention) In the case of a retention based on cash
flows, the following is valid:

































Eternally Living Firm with Constant Retention If the firm pursues the retention
based on cash flow in such a way so that the share percentage α > 0 does not change
in time, the last statement is simplified. True, we only arrive at this simplification
if we suppose at the same time that the firm lives infinitely. Otherwise it is so that
αT = 0 is necessarily valid, and then a constant retention rate can no longer be
spoken of. The subsequent statement applies under these conditions.
Theorem 4.8 (Constant Retention Rate) The firm lives on forever. For constant















1 − τD) α
1 + rf
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The proof of this statement is simple. We only need to employ the constant retention
rate,







1 − τ I ) +
τ I rf
(
1 − τD) α
1 + rf
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1 − τ I ) +
τ I rf
(
1 − τD) α
1 + rf
(
1 − τ I )
˜V ut .
And that was it.
Example Let us turn again to our finite example. The retention coefficients with
the levered firm are exactly
α0 = 0 %, α1 = 10 % , α2 = 20 % .
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With that we get




(1 − τ )α0FCFu0
1 + rf (1 − τ ) +
τrf (1 − τ )




















= 249.692 + 0 + 0.5 · 0.1 · (1 − 0.5)
1 + 0.1 · (1 − 0.5) ·
(
0.1 · 100





for the value of the levered firm.
In order to establish the value of the levered firm in the infinite example, we use
the statement from Theorem 4.8 and get
V l0 =
(
1 + τrf (1 − τ )






(1 − τ )α





1 + 0.5 · 0.1 · (1 − 0.5)
1 + 0.1 · (1 − 0.5) · 0.5
)
· 500 + (1 + 0.1) · (1 − 0.5) · 0.5
1 + 0.1 · (1 − 0.5) · 100
≈ 558.333 .
4.3.3 Retention Based on Dividends
Valuation Equation We now want to look at a retention policy in which a
prescribed dividend (pre-tax) is distributed for a period of n years. At the end of
this period, the firm should change over to a policy of full distribution. We will
expect in the following that all decisions about the firm’s investment policy have
already been made. But then the firm cannot pay out any dividends if the free cash
flow is not large enough. It is thus recommended requiring that the free cash flow is
higher or at worst the same as the planned dividend. If the two amounts do not agree,
then the difference is withheld. The reflux from this difference is then available as
additional distribution potential at time t + 1.
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Definition 4.4 (Retention Based on Dividends) A firm is following a reten-
tion policy based on dividends if a prescribed certain pre-tax dividend should







t + (1 + rt−1)˜At−1 − Divt
)+
for all t = 1, . . . ,n. q.e.d.
Readers who still remember details from Sects. 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 of the previous
chapter will hardly be surprised by the assertion that a general valuation equation is
only possible through the inclusion of derivatives which we believe are not always
traded in the market. Such complications can only be avoided if we introduce an
additional assumption.
Assumption 4.2 (Non-negative Retention) At no time does the prescribed divi-





t ≥ Divt ∀t ≤ n.
The maximum function in Definition 4.4 is superfluous under this simplified
assumption, and we can prove that the following statement is valid.
Theorem 4.9 (Retention Based on Dividends) The following applies in the case
of a retention based on dividends, if the dividend is not greater than the free cash
flow of the unlevered firm for all times before T ,
































1+rf (1−τ I )
)n+1−v)
.
The proof is found in the appendix. In our opinion it does not make sense to
generalize the above statement to the case of an infinitely long living firm with an
eternally constant dividend (n → ∞), since we otherwise fall into conflict with
the assumption of transversality. We already pointed this out in a similar context in
Sect. 3.6.2.
Example Let us work on the basis that the firm will pay the following pre-tax
dividend:
A0 = 0, Div1 = Div2 = 40.
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If the tax rate amounts to 50% , Assumption 4.2 is satisfied. Under these conditions
we get the following for the value of the levered firm:









1 + kE,u −
(1 − τ )Div1






















− (1 − τ )Div2




1 + 1 + rf
1 + (1 − τ )rf
)
and from that
V l0 = 249.692+
+ 0.1 · 0.5 ·
(
100
1 + 0.15 −
(1 − 0.5) · 40











+ 0.1 · 0.5 ·
(
110
(1 + 0.15)2 −
(1 − 0.5) · 40




1 + 1 + 0.1




V l0 ≈ 263.472
for the levered firm.
4.3.4 Retention Based on Market Value
Valuation Equation A retention policy could take on the following form: the
managers withhold a certain share of the value of the levered firm every year.
However, much more value that firm has, that much more is retained. Hiding
behind that could be the strategy of internally financing the growth of the firm with
invariable intensity.
Definition 4.5 (Retention-Value Ratio) The firm is following a retention
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We again use the symbol for leverage here, since, as we shall soon see, an
equation equivalent to the WACC approach can be proven with the help of this
quotient. This justifies the designation of this retention policy.
Theorem 4.10 (Retention Based on Market Values) In the case of a retention


















h=t (1 + kh)
,
whereby









1 − τ I ) lh
)
.
The last equation looks a bit like the Miles–Ezzell formula.15 In order to prove
Theorem 4.10, we notate Eq. (4.4) for ˜V lt+1,
























1 − τ I ))T−t−1
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out of which with the rule for the iterated expectation
EQ
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1+rf (1−τ I ) +
(
1 − τD) ˜At
to both sides, then we can again under application of (4.4) bring the above equation
15See Theorem 3.14.




˜V lt+1 − ˜V ut+1 +
(








1 − τ I ) =
˜V lt − ˜V ut .
With the help of the fundamental Theorem 4.2, we can eliminate ˜V ut and ˜V
u
t+1
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1 − τ I ) .
Since the retention-value ratio is deterministic, we have
˜V lt −
(







1 − τ I ) =
EQ
[








1 − τ I ) .
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(1 + kE,uh )(1 − (1+rf )(1−τ
D)
1+rf (1−τ I ) lh)
) .
That is the assertion of the statement.
Example We assume a retention-value ratio constant in time of
l0 = l1 = l2 = 10% .
16By definition,
∏t
s=t+1 xs = 1.
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The following then results for the cost of equity:






(1 − τ )
1 + rf (1 − τ ) lh
)
− 1
= (1 + 0.15) ·
(
1 − (1 + 0.1) · (1 − 0.5)
1 + 0.1 · (1 − 0.5) · 0.1
)
− 1 ≈ 8.976% .








1 + k +






(1 + k)2 +








1 + 0.08976 +
(1 − (1 − 0.5) · 0.1)110
(1 + 0.08976)2 +
(1 − (1 − 0.5) · 0.1)2 · 121
(1 + 0.08976)3
≈ 264.137 .
In the infinite example, we again use
ls = 10 %
resulting in






(1 − τ )
1 + rf (1 − τ ) ls
)
− 1
= (1 + 0.2)
(
1 − (1 + 0.1) · (1 − 0.5)
1 + 0.1 · (1 − 0.5) 0.1
)




























k + (1 − τ )l
= 100
0.13714 + (1 − 0.5) · 0.1 = 534.351 .
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4.3.5 Problems
1. Look at the example of the unlevered firm in this section. Assume that funds in
the firm are invested risky. Let A0 = 0. What are the highest possible retentions
at times t = 1,2? What value does the firm have if it institutes these retentions?
2. Consider the case where retention is invested in riskless assets. Write down
the valuation equation similar to (4.4). Determine the value of the levered
and eternally living company if the firm follows an autonomous retention with
constant At .
4.4 Further Literature
The literature on personal income tax is few and far between. Miller and Modigliani
(1961) dividends story is a predecessor of our handling of tax shield and distribution
policy. Miller (1977) investigated an equilibrium model where a corporate and a
personal income tax are present. The papers by Sick (1990), Taggart Jr. (1991), and
Rashid and Amoaku-Adu (1995) considered personal income taxes in a valuation
setup. The relation between tax and arbitrage (and in particular a fundamental
theorem with income taxes) is also developed in a paper by Jensen (2009). Lally
(2000) develops the DCF valuation implications with personal and corporate income
tax where an imputation system is applicable. Fernández (2004) discusses the effect
of different retention policies on the firm value.
The so-called “lock-in-effect” designates a situation where the owner of a
company retains parts of the distributable cash flows due to personal income tax
savings. If the tax rate differs across individuals people with high tax brackets hold
assets with low dividends and people with low tax brackets hold assets with high
dividend yields. This “clientele effect” is widely discussed in the literature.
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5Corporate and Personal Income Tax
In the last chapter of this book we would like to look into the question of how to
evaluate a firm if taxes are raised both at the investor and at the company level.
Attentive readers of Chaps. 2 and 3 might expect a discussion on different strategies
of financing policy (Chap. 2) and of dividend policy (Chap. 3). But, we are not going
to do this. We will also, however, not dwell on the innumerable variations of possible
combinations in this context, rather we will restrict ourselves to a manageable
example. At the end, we will only discuss how to proceed in the cases of further
possible financing and dividend policies.
5.1 Assumptions
In this chapter we will define an unlevered company as a company, which fulfills the
following two conditions. First, it has to be entirely self-financed, and second, it has
to distribute all free cash flow to the shareholders. If even one of the attributes does
not apply, then we will switch to discussing a levered company. Like in Chaps. 2
and 3 we will refer to the symbols u and l to distinguish either one case or the other.
In what follows we will begin by characterizing a tax system, which will be used
in our example.
Corporate Income Tax The corporate income tax will possess the attributes we
mentioned in Chap. 2: The tax is measured by the company’s profit. The tax scale
will be linear and the tax rate, which we will designate with τC is independent on
time. Furthermore, taking out loans at time t − 1 provides a tax advantage. This
advantage will be equal to the product of tax scale and interest, τC ˜I t .
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Personal Income Tax The personal income tax will follow the same model as in
Chap. 3. On an assessment basis we are dealing with dividends and interest. Both
will be taxed differently, the dividends with a tax rate of τD and the interest with a
rate of τ I . Such a strongly diverging treatment of income categories exists in several
industrial nations. Both of the tax scales are linear and the tax rate is independent on
time. In case the company does not pay out its entire free cash flow a tax advantage
in the amount of ˜At will result due to the retention.
Interaction of Both Taxes As we excluded one of the two tax types in Chaps. 2
and 3 we did not have to deal with the question of how to pattern an interaction of
both types. It is obvious that here is a problem we have to discuss. For this purpose
we shall put ourselves into the position of a shareholder whose earnings consist only
of dividends. However, in order to be able to distribute dividends, the company in
which the shareholder is involved, has to first yield profits. These profits are liable
to corporate taxes. Consequently, the distribution to the shareholder will therefore
already have been subject to initial taxes. Naturally the company can only distribute
that amount of money that remains after corporate taxes. If the shareholder now has
to pay personal income tax as well, the tax authorities will essentially have access
to the dividend once again.
The legislator will have two ways to deal with the situation. Either he accepts
that the income tax, which the company has already paid (entirely or in part), is
considered just as a first installment, in which case we can talk about indirect relief,1
or the legislator does not provide for such an allowance. This last option would
imply a double taxation of dividends.2 Occasionally political entities try to combine
both concepts. As a general rule this is achieved with a milder dose of taxation of
the dividends, especially when compared to the taxation applied to interest.3
In our examples we will assume the classical system with a two-tier rate of
taxation for dividends and interest. Further comments as to the question of how
to proceed in the case of different indirect relief policies or financial systems are
discussed in Cooper and Nyborg (2004), Husmann et al. (2006), and Lally (2000).
5.2 Identification and Evaluation of Tax Advantages
Gross and Free Cash Flows Our intention consists in evaluating the tax advan-
tages of the levered company, especially compared with those of the unlevered
company. Again this can be achieved in two steps as in the preceding chapters.
In the first step we will identify the tax advantages in t . In a second step we will
1In Italy, Japan, and New Zealand, for example, a form of indirect relief has been in use as of 2004.
2In 2004, the “classical system” was adopted in Belgium, Denmark, and the USA.
3In 2004, adequate solutions to this problem were in existence in Germany, the Netherlands, and
Greece.
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Fig. 5.1 From pre-tax gross
cash flows to post-tax free
cash flow
Gross cash flow before taxes GCF
− Corporate income taxes Tax
− Investment expenses Inv
− Interest (Creditor’s taxable income)
− Debt repayments − + −1
− Retained earnings
+ Reflux from retained earnings (1 + −1) −1
− Shareholder’s personal income tax Tax
= Shareholder’s levered post-tax cash flow FCF
evaluate these future tax advantages at the point in time of evaluation. To identify
the amount of the tax advantages accurately it is advisable to examine Fig. 5.1.
It specifies how to get from the gross cash flow to the free cash flow of the levered
company. According to our assumption, the gross cash flow of the levered company
involves the same amount as the gross cash flow of the unlevered company. The
same applies to the investment expenses. Notice that (as in Chap. 3) FCF
l
t in Fig. 5.1
does not represent the entire payments of the investors but rather only the payments
to the shareholders.
Tax Shields Let us now have a look at the distributions of the levered company.
We intend to compare these payments with those of an unlevered company. The
unlevered company is able to pay the following amount to the shareholders:
FCF
u
t = GCFt − ˜Tax
C,u
t − ˜Invt − ˜Tax
P,u
t . (5.1)
Due to the indebtedness of the levered company the payments to the shareholders
will diminish. In addition, a part of the cash flow is withheld. The following equation






t − ˜I t + ˜Dt − ˜Dt−1 − ˜At + (1 + r˜t−1)˜At−1







Here we can find two tax shields, a corporate income tax shield and a personal
income tax shield. In our example we want to focus on a case in which both the
indebtedness and the retention are constant over a specified period of time. Hence
the following always applies:
˜Dt = D, ˜At = A . (5.3)
Now, let us address the tax shields.
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The earnings before taxes determine the corporate income tax. Consequently,
analogously to Chap. 2, the following applies:
˜Tax
C,l







t − rf D + r˜t−1A
)
= ˜TaxC,ut − τCrf D + τCr˜t−1A.
The personal income tax follows the classical system and is geared to distribution. If
we take a closer look at the basic assets, we can see that the shareholder’s tax base of
the levered company decreases by the amount of the interest payments and increases
by the amount of the proceeds from the retention. Looking at the creditors, however,
the tax advantages based on borrowing need to be added. But these are partly with





t − τ I rf D + τDr˜t−1A + τ I τCrf D − τDτCr˜t−1A









Finally, both equations add up to the entire tax shield of the levered company.4 For
this purpose we will concentrate on Eq. (5.2) and will take advantage of the fact that













































The difference of both equations is now easy to determine. All we need to do is
to make use of the fundamental theorem (4.2), which applies to the levered as well
as to the unlevered companies.
Again we have to take into account an important detail that we have already
mentioned in the previous chapter. We designated the cash flow of the unlevered
company, thus this company that conducts a full dividend policy, with FCF
u
t . We
already pointed out that this merely concerns the cash flow, which accrues to the
owners. Hence, the payments (interest and/or amortization) for the creditors have
not been included up to now. In order to determine not only the value of equity but
4The argumentation is equivalent to the Eq. (4.2) on page 147.
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moreover the value of the entire company, we need to take into consideration the
payments to all investors. It would not be correct to focus just on FCF
u
t .
Here we technically have two possibilities: On the one hand we could concentrate
on the income of the owner and subsequently add ˜Dt . On the other hand we could
calculate the payments to all financiers. This can be obtained by adding the interest
payments to those accrued from amortization and to the FCF
u
t . And then we subtract
the personal income tax, which the creditors have to pay. Both methods lead to the
same result. This is due to the fundamental theory of asset pricing. Correspondingly
this applies to the levered company as well.
According to this, the difference between the values of the companies concerned
is equal to the sum of the discounted tax shields plus the market value of the debt,






1 − τD) (1 − τC) rf A −
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(5.4)


















1 − τI ))s−t rf D
= ˜V ut + D +
(
1 − τD) (1 − τC)
rf
(
1 − τI ) rf A −
(
1 − τI ) (1 − τC)
rf
(
1 − τI ) rf D
= ˜V ut +
(
1 − τD) (1 − τC)
1 − τI A + τ
CD .
This describes a more general view of the findings of the precedent chapters
(Modigliani–Miller-Theorem 3.7 and Theorem 4.6).
5.3 Conclusion
In the previous paragraph we evaluated a company assuming that taxes are raised
at the company’s level as well as at the investor’s level. We could formulate a
simple valuation equation under the special conditions concerning the lifespan of
the company as well as its debt and dividend policies. The question remains how
to proceed if the debt and dividend policies seriously deviate from the conditions
which we had originally assumed.
For this purpose we will analyze the Eq. (5.4). It permits us (according to the
special assumptions which we have made) to make a statement of appraisal on the
difference in value between the levered and unlevered company. Given different
assumptions concerning the debt and dividend policies, one can also easily modify
the equation. One only has to identify the tax advantages, which are associated with
specific debt and dividend policies to determine the corresponding equation. The
expected values in such an equation would be valid for the future amounts of debt
˜Dt and the future amounts of retention ˜At . But in any case they have to be calculated
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with the risk neutral probability measure Q. And since the person who, in practice,
has to evaluate a company is usually unaware of this measure we would have an
elegant but, nevertheless, useless valuation equation.
In a first step in acquiring a valuation equation (while taking into account the
subjective probability measure) it is important to formulate a linear correlation
between the future amounts of debt ˜Dt and the future amounts of retention ˜At as
well as the cash flow of the unlevered company FCF
u
t .
5 If we cope with this task
fairly successfully the valuation equation can be expressed by the following formula:
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1 − τ I ))T
.
In this case we need to assume that current amount of debt and current amount of
retention are given as known factors. The parameter xt are the expressions of any
deterministic variables, which describe the linear correlation between the amounts
of debt and the amounts of retention on the one hand, and the cash flow of the
unlevered firm on the other hand. Unfortunately we cannot characterize them more
precisely in our final general view. With this we will have retraced the evaluation of
the tax shield to an ascertainment of expected values of future cash flow under Q.
Finally, we need to eliminate the risk neutral probability measure. For this we
avail ourselves in a second step of the assumption that the free cash flow of the
unlevered company is going to be weak auto-regressive. Under these conditions
the cost of capital of the unlevered company imply suitable discount rates. Finally,
we can ascertain realistic valuation equations, which rely just on known variables
(subjectively expected cash flow, cost of capital of the unlevered company, tax rates,
and interest rates).
Consequently, if we proceed in the described manner, we will be able to evaluate
companies operating with other financing and dividend policies. Initially we always
have to identify the ensuing tax advantages. Subsequently the future amounts of debt
˜Dt and the future amounts of retention ˜At need to be linked to the future cash flow
of the unlevered company with a linear correlation. Afterwards we can evaluate the
expected values of this cash flow in that the cost of capital of the unlevered company
can also be used as discount rates.
But the limits of our approach are quite in evidence. Every time we fail to
construct a linear correlation the concept collapses. Such situations are easy to
imagine. One just has to think of cases in which the future investments of a company
follow a stochastic process which is independent of the cash flow and in which the
manager commit themselves to trade the investments exclusively on the equity. In
such a case it would not be possible to depict the future amounts of debt with the
cash flows in a linear correlation. And our approach would not reap the desired
5For a similar approach in continuous time see Grinblatt and Liu (2008), chapter 1.C.
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result in which the tax shield is determined solely by the cost of capital and the
subjectively expected values of future cash flows.
5.4 Problem(s)
1. Evaluate the value of the levered company in the infinite example using all our
assumptions (from autonomous debt and retention) so far.
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6Proofs
6.1 Williams/Gordon–Shapiro Formula (Theorem 3.2) and
Equivalence of Valuation Concepts (Theorem 3.3)
We start with the proof of Theorem 3.2. From the valuation equation (Theorem 3.1)














































But the last equation says exactly that the firm value is a deterministic multiple
of the cash flow. The relation between dividends and price dut is deterministic and
positive if gt > −1. Using transversality this also applies for T → ∞. Thus the
Theorem 3.2 is proven.
© The Author(s) 2020
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Now we prove Theorem 3.3. The following results from the definition of the cost






t+1 + ˜V ut+1|Ft
]
1 + kE,ut






























t+1 + ˜V ut+1|Ft
]











1 + rf . by Theorem 3.2
















and this also holds for t + 1 = T from transversality. And that is already the
proposition of the theorem for s = t + 1.
We go back to Eqs. (6.1) and (6.2) and remove the terms already shown to be




































1 + rf .
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, that is the claim of the theorem for s = t + 2.
The propositions for s = t + 3, . . . can now be proven analogously.
6.2 Valuation Formula with Investment Policy Based on Cash
Flows (Theorem 3.21)
With the following proof you have to make an effort to keep an overview. We
begin with showing the difference between investments and accruals. Because of
Definition 3.10 and because there are only non-discretionary accruals, for the time
being we could write
˜Invt − Accrt = ˜Invt − 1
n
(
˜Invt−1 + . . . + ˜Invt−n
)
.
Now it makes sense to use Definition 3.13 and replace ˜Invs with αsFCF
u
s . That,
however, fails in that for investment amounts that are not in the future, we have to






s , if s > 0
Invs, else
we get for all t ≥ 1 equation
˜Invt − Accrt = ˜Ht − 1
n
(
˜Ht−1 + . . . + ˜Ht−n
)
. (6.3)
Taking advantage of this relation, we get the following for the firm’s book value
using Theorem 3.17 (operating assets relation) and Assumption 3.9 (subscribed
capital) as well as Eq. (3.28)
˜V
l























































We will now rearrange the double sum. To this end we determine the number of
possibilities to represent a given number a as a sum a = r + s such that the first
summand r is between 0 and n − 1 and the second summand s is between 1 and t .













a if 0 < a < min(t,n),
min(t,n) if min(t,n) ≤ a ≤ max(t,n),
n + t − a if max(t,n) < a < n + t,
0 else.




1 1 1 1 |
s
︷ ︸︸ ︷




The separating line cannot lie left from the first one (because r ≥ 0) and cannot
lie right from the last one (because s > 0). Hence, there are exactly A(a) = a
possibilities; this explains the first row of our definition. If a increases by one, the
quantity A(a) increases by one as well.
If a gets above min(n,t), then A(a) remains at its current level. This is so because
the vertical line cannot occupy all available positions. If, for example n ≤ t and
therefore n < a, the vertical line cannot be right from the n-th one since we must
have r < n. The argument is analog for n > t . This explains the second line of the
definition.
The third line of the definition can be understood as follows. Look at a
representation r+s where the vertical line is farthest to the left. Because a is greater
than n and t by adding an additional one to the right this representation violates our
rules since s gets too large. Hence, increasing a by one decreases the number A(a)
by one. This finishes our proof of A(a).
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Now (6.4) can be simplified to








































This equation can be simplified even further. To this end we will look at the distinct
cases.
First let n < t . Then from the definition of A(s + n)








s + n if 0 < s + n < n
n if n ≤ s + n ≤ t









s + n if − n < s < 0
n if 0 ≤ s ≤ t − n
t − s if t − n < s < t
.
We will treat the second and the third summand separately. Because the index s in
the first summand runs from 1 − n to 0 and the index in the second summand runs
from 1 to t − 1 (6.5) simplifies to






























































Let now n ≥ t . Then from the definition of A(s + n)








s + n if 0 < s + n < t
t if t ≤ s + n ≤ n









s + n if − n < s < t − n
t if t − n ≤ s ≤ 0
t − s if 0 < s < t
.
Again we will treat the second and the third summand separately. The index s in the
first summand runs from 1 − n to 0 and in the second summand from 1 to t − 1.
Hence, (6.5) simplifies to





















































n − t + s
n
αsFCFs . (6.7)
Now we are able to rejoin both cases n < t and n ≥ t . The Eqs. (6.6) and (6.7)
yield in compact notation













n − t + s
n
αsFCFs .
The first three summands will be designated as V ∗l0 . Economically, this term
concerns the amount which the firm’s book value would be if up to time t , there are
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If we use the agreement αs = 0 for s ≤ 0 (α was up to now only defined for future
times), this equation becomes
˜V
l

















and we will from now on use this form.
The valuation with a policy based on book values is now finally successful by
means of this representation. For that purpose we use everything that we have. Look
at the valuation Eq. (3.11) which is valid for every conceivable financing policy and
onto which we want to fall back now. With means of financing based on book values,




which with (6.8) and using Assumption 3.7 leads us to










































































(1 + rf )n
⎞
⎠ .
We are now using the Assumption 3.1 and the Theorem 3.3 based on it. That
allows for the representation














































(1 + rf )n
⎞
⎠







































(1 + rf )2











(1 + rf )n
⎞
⎠ .
Lastly, we only have the terms in the last two lines to concentrate on. We
are obviously looking at a double sum. To simplify its representation, we have
to consider, how often an expected cash flow comes up. It is recognized that the



















(1 + rf )n .
Again, this requires that coefficients ls with an index greater than T − 1 are set to
zero. We get


































(1 + rf )n
)
,
where ls = 0 for s ≥ T . With that Theorem 3.21 is finally proven.
6.3 AdjustedModigliani–Miller Formula (Theorem 3.22)
Many factors remain constant in the theorem. More than anything, it affects the
debt ratio l, the investment parameter α, and the subscribed capital. Beyond that, it
is assumed that the firm to be valued exists without end. By disregarding the time
indices with the investment parameter and the debt ratio, we get the following using
the sum of a geometric sequence:
V l0 = V u0 + τrf
lV l0




























(1 + rf )n
)
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0 + V ∗l0
)
















1 + rf +
n − 1
(1 + rf )2 +
+ . . . + 1
(1 + rf )n
)
. (6.9)
We make the effort now to get a compact representation of the expression
n
1 + rf +
n − 1
(1 + rf )2 + . . . +
1
(1 + rf )n .
To do so we look at the identity
(1 + rf )n + (1 + rf )n−1 + . . . + (1 + rf ) = (1 + rf )((1 + rf )
n − 1)
rf
and derive it according to rf ,




Multiplying by (1 + rf )−n results in




Entering this into Eq. (6.9), results in





0 + V ∗l0
)
1 + rf +
τrf αl
n











(1 + kE,u)t .
We recognize that the sum on the right-hand side exactly corresponds to the market
value of the unlevered firm. This leads us to





0 + V ∗l0
)
1 + rf +
nrf − 1 + (1 + rf )−n
nrf
ταlV u0 .









and consider that at time t = 0 the identity







applies, so long as the influence of depreciation on those assets raised before time
t = 0 is not excluded. But if we disregard this influence according to the gotten





0 + V ∗l0
)





0 + V l0
)
1 + rf
= τ lV l0.
We recognize that the product of debt ratio and book value of the firm corresponds to
the book value of the debt, and can close up the proof considering Assumption 3.7.
6.4 Valuation Formula with Financing Based on Cash Flows
(Theorems 3.23 and 3.24)
From the definition of financing based on cash flows, the following first results for
the amount of debt using the fact that debt is riskless:
˜Dt =
(
(1 + αrf (1 − τ ))D0 − αFCFu1
)+ ∀t ≥ 1 .
We enter this into Eq. (3.11) and get
V l0 = V u0 +
τ EQ[Z1]







(1 + αrf (1 − τ ))D0 − αFCFu1
)+]
(1 + rf )t+1
= V u0 +
τ rf D0




(1 + αrf (1 − τ ))D0 − αFCFu1
)+]
(1 + rf )rf
(
1 − 1
(1 + rf )T −1
)
.
With help of Theorem 3.2, the third summand can be further simplified
V l0 = V u0 +
τrf D0













(1 + rf )T−1
)
.
Let us now look at a put on the value of the unlevered firm at time t = 1 with
a strike of 1+αrf (1−τ )
αdu1
D0. The bearer of this option receives the difference of the
exercise price and the firm value, if this difference is positive. In the opposite case,
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the payment comes to zero. To determine the value of this put Π , we have to evaluate
the expectation EQ[·] of the payments of the put and discount them with the riskless







D0 − ˜V u1
)+]
1 + rf .
But with that applies
V l0 = V u0 +
τrf D0





(1 + rf )T−1
)
,
and that was what we wanted to show.
We come to the proof of Theorem 3.24. Since the amount of debt of the first
period is positive, expression (1 + αrf (1 − τ ))D0 − αFCFu1 will not be negative in
any case. Therefore we can write
˜Dt = (1 + αrf (1 − τ ))D0 − αFCFu1
for all t ≥ 1. From that we get the simpler valuation equation
V l0 = V u0 +
τrf D0
1 + rf +
τrf EQ
[
(1 + αrf (1 − τ ))D0 − αFCFu1
]
(1 + rf )rf
(
1 − 1
(1 + rf )T−1
)
= V u0 +
τrf D0
1 + rf +
⎛
⎝
τ (1 + αrf (1 − τ ))D0












(1 + rf )T −1
)
.
Due to the equivalence of the valuation concepts (Theorem 3.3), there results from
that
V l0 = V u0 +
τrf D0
1 + rf +
⎛
⎝
τ(1 + αrf (1 − τ))D0












(1 + rf )T−1
)
.
Lastly we make use of the fact that expected cash flows are constant. With that we
end up with
V l0 = V u0 +
τrfD0
1 + rf +

















That agrees with the claim.
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6.5 Valuation with Financing Based on Dividends (Theorem
3.25)
Here we apply a different method to establish the value of the firm. For that we
concentrate on the payments, which go to the debt and equity financiers. From the









t + τ ˜I t
]









t − ˜Dt−1 − (1 − τ )˜I t + ˜Dt
]






˜I t + ˜Dt−1 − ˜Dt
]
(1 + rf )t .
The second summand agrees with the sum of the discounted payments to the debt






˜I t + ˜Dt−1 − ˜Dt
]






˜I t + ˜Dt−1
]

























(1 + rf )t
= D0.









t − ˜Dt−1 − (1 − τ )˜I t + ˜Dt
]
(1 + rf )t + D0.
During the first n periods, the shareholders get exactly the amount Div. Afterwards,
the amount of debt remains constant. Using (3.19) that leads to













t+1 − (1 − τ )˜I n+1
]























(1 + rf )t+1 −
−




rf (1 + rf )n
(
1 − 1







(1 + rf )T .
6.5 Valuation with Financing Based on Dividends (Theorem 3.25) 193
If we make use of the equivalence of the valuation concepts from (Theorem 3.3)
and further consider that the rate of growth of the expected cash flows is constant
(g = const.), there then results
V l0 = D0 +
(
1 − 1
































































(1 + rf )T −n
))
. (6.11)
We now turn to the amount of debt at time n. Since according to the condition
that the credit always remains positive, we can simplify the formation law of the







Div − FCFut |Ft−1
]
+ (1 + rf ∗)Dt−1 ∀t ≤ n.













+ . . .+




+ (1 + rf ∗)nD0.





= (1 + rf
∗)n − 1
rf ∗

























(1 + rf )n =
(1 + rf ∗)n − 1
rf ∗(1 + rf )n Div +
(











(1 + rf )n −








(1 + rf )n−1 − . . . −
(1 + rf ∗)n−1









or due to Theorem 3.3 as well as the constant rate of growth g and with γ = 1+rf ∗1+rf






(1 + rf )n =
(1 + rf ∗)n − 1
























1 + g .





(1 + rf )n =
(1 + rf ∗)n − 1






















(1 + rf )n =
(1 + rf ∗)n − 1












1 + g .
We put this into (6.11) and get
V l0 =
(




















(1 + rf )T
))
Div
rf (1 − τ )+
+
(


















kE,u − g .
(6.12)
We now take advantage of the expected cash flow of the unlevered firm showing
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Plugging this into equation (6.12) gives
V l0 =
(




















(1 + rf )T
))
Div
rf (1 − τ )+
+
(











(1 + rf )T−n
)))
V u0
1 − δT .
If we sort the terms around a bit, then we get our desired result.
6.6 Valuation with Debt-Cash Flow Ratio (Theorems 3.26
and 3.27)

















s−1 + τrf ˜Ds−2
))
.
Using induction this gives for s > t










Plugging this into the general valuation formula (3.11) we get
˜V lt = ˜V ut +
τrf ˜Dt




τrf (τ rf )
s−t
˜Lds . . .
˜Ldt+1 ˜Dt





















(1 + rf )s−t+1 .
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This simplifies to (let ˜Lds . . . ˜L
d
t+1 = 1 if s = t)






(1 + rf )s−t+1









˜Lds . . .
˜Ldu(τrf )
s+1−u







(1 + rf )u−t .
Changing summation it yields






(1 + rf )s−t+1
















˜Lds . . .
˜Ldu(τrf )
s+1−u
(1 + rf )s+1−u
or after using Theorem 3.2






(1 + rf )s−t+1










˜Lds . . .
˜Ldu(τrf )
s+1−u








(1 + kE,u)u−t .
Changing indices gives Theorem 3.26.
Now let us turn to the case of infinite lifetime (Theorem 3.27) and constant
dynamic leverage ratio. In this case
























(1 + kE,u)s−t .
The sum of geometric series gives
˜V lt = ˜V ut + ˜Dt
τrf
1 + rf (1 − τ˜Ld)
+
˜Ldτrf










(1 + kE,u)s−t .
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The sum on the right-hand side is just ˜V ut and hence
˜V lt = ˜Dt
τrf





1 + rf (1 − τ˜Ld)
)
.
6.7 Fundamental Theorem with Income Tax (Theorem 4.2)
We closely follow Löffler and Schneider (2003). Consider a model in discrete time
t = 0,1, . . . ,T with uncertainty. The probability space is denoted by (Ω,F , P ).
The filtration F need not be finitely generated, it consists of the σ -algebras F0 ⊆
F1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ FT that describe the information set of every investor.1 There are N
tradeable risky financial assets that pay dividends (adapted random variables)
FCF
1




The prices—also called values—of the risky assets at time t are adapted random
variables
˜V 1t , . . . ,
˜V Nt .
There is one riskless asset, labeled n = 0. The prices of this asset are given by
V 0t = 1 (6.13)
and the cash flows of the risk free asset are given by
FCF 0t = rf (6.14)
where rf is the riskless interest rate.2
At time t = 0 the investor selects a portfolio consisting of the available
financial assets. This portfolio will be changed at every trading date t = 1, . . . , T .
Immediately after time t the investors form a portfolio ˜Ht =
(




available assets, see Fig. 6.1. ˜Ht is Ft -adapted. Note that H−1 = ˜HT = 0. At time
t + 1 her portfolio has a value of






1These are standard assumptions in an uncertain economy, see Duffie (1988).
2All our findings are also valid in an economy with a time-dependent interest rate. Therefore,
interest is assumed to be constant in time without loss of generality.
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=0 =1 =2 = −1 =
    
0 1 2 −1 = 0
Fig. 6.1 The time structure of the model
We now introduce the tax system. We have to distinguish between the market
value of a risky financial asset and the value that will be the underlying for the tax
base. The underlying tax base will not be determined by the market alone but by
the tax law. We denominate it the book value of a financial asset. The book value
of a financial asset n at time t will be denoted by ˜V
n
t and is a random variable. We
assume that the book value is an adapted random variable that will be zero at time
t = T . It is not necessary for our model to incorporate other details from any actual
tax law. At time t + 1 the portfolio ˜Ht has the book value








The tax base of the portfolio ˜Ht at time t + 1 now consists of two parts. The first
part (“riskless or interest income”) is given by the payments of the riskless asset
rf ˜H
0
t . The second part of the tax base (“risky or commercial income”) is given by






















t . If the tax base is negative, there is an immediate and full
loss offset. In t = 0 no tax is paid. We assume a proportional tax on both income
which is time-independent and deterministic: the tax rate on riskless income (“tax on
interest”) is τ I and the tax rate on risky income (“tax on dividend”) is τD . Therefore,
the tax payments in t + 1 are given by















We now turn to the characterization of the book value of financial assets. Our
assumption concerning these book values is motivated by considering a riskless
bank account with a closing balance equal to the book value. In every period the
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interest payment is added to and the cash flow (withdrawal) is subtracted from the
opening balance. The evolution of the bank account from t to t + 1 is as follows:
book value at the beginning of period t + 1 V 0t
+ interest at t + 1 rf V 0t
− withdrawal at t + 1 FCF 0
t+1
= book value at the end of period t + 1 V 0t+1.
We get
(1 + rf )V 0t = FCF 0t+1 + V 0t+1, (6.17)
which resembles to the fundamental Theorem 4.2. Since at t = T book and market
value will be equal to zero we conclude that this equation implies by induction that
book value and market value are the same at every time t . Although other rules for
the determination of book value could be incorporated, we make the assumption that
the tax law requires investors to mark their financial assets to market in each period
and the tax law is applied to that measure of value3:
Assumption 6.1 The book value ˜V
n
t of a financial asset is equal to its value ˜V
n
t
˜V nt = ˜V
n
t . (6.18)
We now show that if our tax system has no arbitrage opportunities an equivalent
martingale measure exists. To this end let us define when a market is free of
arbitrage.








FCFt+1 + ˜Vt+1 − Taxt+1
)
− ˜Ht+1 · ˜Vt+1 ≥ 0 (6.19)










for at least one t . q.e.d.
Then the following holds.
3The existing American tax law states under the Statements of Financial Accounting Standards
(SFAS) 115 that “unrealized holding gains and losses for trading securities shall be included in
earnings.” Hence, the American tax system contains elements similar to our assumption.
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Theorem 6.1 Under Assumptions 6.1 and 6.2 the following holds: There is an




FCFt+1 + ˜Vt+1 − Taxt+1|Ft
]
1 + rf (1 − τ I ) .
The proof of the fundamental theorem uses a result of Kabanov and Kramkov
(1994). To this end we first notice that there is no one-period arbitrage in the market,
i.e., there is no trading strategy ˜X such that for one t
˜Xt · ˜Vt ≤ 0 and ˜Xt ·
(
FCFt+1 + ˜Vt+1 − Taxt+1
)
≥ 0
with at least on inequality strict with probability greater than zero and ˜Xs = 0 for
all s = t . But then there is also no random variable ˜Yt such that
˜Yt ·
(
˜Vt+1 + FCFt+1 − Taxt+1




where the inequality is strict with probability greater than zero. This can be shown
as follows: define



















Using this strategy we get




















showing that ˜X would be a one-period arbitrage.
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Now apply the theorem 3 of Kabanov and Kramkov (1994), see also Irle (2012,





˜Vt+1 + FCFt+1 − Taxt+1
1 + rf (1 − τ I ) |Ft
]
= ˜Vt .
The existence of Q follows now from standard arguments, see Kabanov and
Kramkov (1994, p. 524) or Irle (2012, section 5.2).
6.8 Valuation Formula with Retention Based on Dividends
(Theorem 4.9)
The free cash flows are never lower than the dividend (see Assumption 4.2). From











s − Divs |Fs−1
]
+ (1 + rf )˜As−1.


















1 − τD − Divv
⎞
⎠ .
We plug this term into (4.4). It yields

















1 − τ I ))s−t+1




































1 − τ I ))s−t+1































1 − τ I ))s−t+1
,
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the last row by changing summands. Using geometric sums we get
































1 − τ I )
)n+1−v⎞
⎠ .
Lastly, we use Theorem 4.4 and get






































1 − τ I )
)n+1−v⎞
⎠ .
This was to be shown.
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1.10 · 1.05 ≈ 177.49 .








− 1 ≈ 100
177.49 − 100
1.052
≈ 15.2257 % .
2. Assume we have
(1 + κt,t+1)(1 + κt+1,t+2) < (1 + κt,t+2)2 .
© The Author(s) 2020
L. Kruschwitz, A. Löffler, Stochastic Discounted Cash Flow,
Springer Texts in Business and Economics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37081-7_7
203
204 7 Sketch of Solutions
Then the investor should do the following. At time t she invests 1
(1+κt,t+2)2 in the
firm to get one dollar of cash flow at time t + 2.
The amount needed is borrowed in the market: At time t + 1 (tomorrow) she
borrows 11+κt+1,t+2 and has to pay back one dollar at time t + 2. At time t she
again borrows 1
(1+κt,t+1)(1+κt+1,t+2) to pay back
1
1+κt+1,t+2 at time t + 1. Mind that
both borrowing strategies do not require any net cash flows at time t+1 and t+2.
The first strategy requires an investment of 1
(1+κt,t+2)2 and the second one gives
a payment of 1
(1+κt,t+1)(1+κt+1,t+2) which is, by assumption, more. By investing
again and again the investor will get infinitely rich.
If
(1 + κt,t+1)(1 + κt+1,t+2) > (1 + κt,t+2)2,
a reverse strategy yields the arbitrage opportunity.
7.1.2 Conditional Expectation
1. This is straightforward, see Fig. 7.1.











(0.1 · 145.2 + 0.9 · 121)
+ 1
2
(0.1 · 121 + 0.9 · 100.6) = 113.03












= 0 = 1 = 2 = 3






































(0.1 · 145.2 + 0.9 · 120)
+ 1
2
(0.1 · 122 + 0.9 · 100.6) = 112.63


























In general, it can be shown that both expectations may be changed if down–
up and up–down yield the same cash flows. Otherwise not. The rule is: If the
outcome is independent of the actual path, i.e., if ud yields the same as du and
uud yields the same as udu and duu, then expectations may be changed.
3. For the conditional expectation of FCF3 given F2 we have four possible






(uu) = (u3 + u2d)FCF0
= u2FCF0
= FCF2(uu).





















FCF1(u) if FCF1 is up,
u+m+d
3
FCF1(m) if FCF1 is middle,
u+m+d
3
FCF1(d) if FCF1 is down.






Fig. 7.2 Plot of (u,m, d)
The required relation holds if
u + m + d = 3 .





3 − m +
√
3(3 − 2m − m2)
)




Figure 7.2 shows (u,m, d) for m from [0,1].
7.1.3 A First Glance at Business Values




























Now using Definition 2.1 and because ks1 is a real number (by assumption) it
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= E [r˜s1 |Ft
]
which gives the desired result.
















= 1 + g




u ˜Vt if up,
d ˜Vt if down
is an immediate consequence of the fact that FCFt follows this pattern. The
second part of the solution follows from u2 + d2 = 0.
3. We have to show that the firm’s value amounts to
V0 = C
k − g .


























k − g .
If g ≥ k, then the sum does not converge and the value of the firm is infinite.
1We have not used g = 0 in our proof.
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4. We know that
˜Vt = EQ[
˜Vt+1 + FCFt+1|Ft ]
1 + rf
holds. Now adding C(1 + rf )t to both sides
˜Vt + C(1 + rf )t = EQ[
˜Vt+1 + C(1 + rf )t+1 + FCFt+1|Ft ]
1 + rf
and replacing ˜V ∗t := ˜Vt + C(1 + rf )t gives the desired result
˜V ∗t =
EQ[˜V ∗t+1 + FCFt+1|Ft ]
1 + rf .
Both ˜V as well as ˜V ∗ satisfy the fundamental theorem.
Note that ˜V ∗ does not satisfy the transversality condition. We have
lim
T→∞
EQ[˜VT + C(1 + rf )T |Ft ]
(1 + rf )T−t = limT→∞
EQ[˜VT |Ft ]
(1 + rf )T−t + C(1 + rf )
t
and this cannot be zero for all C.
5. By plugging in the assumption into the expectation under Q we get
EQ[˜Vt+1 + FCFt+1|Ft ]
1 + rf =





+ FCF0 + g
1 + rf
= 1
rf (1 + rf )
(
FCF0 + g + (FCF0 + g)rf
)
= FCF0 + g
rf
= ˜Vt
which is the fundamental theorem.
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rf (1 + rf )T−t = 0 ,
because rf > 0.
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7.2.1 Unlevered Firms
1. (a) First, if a random variable εt can have two values we speak of a binomial
structure. In order to get a typical binomial tree from
FCF
u
t = 1 + ε1 + ε2 + . . . + εt
we have to verify that for any cash flow not the actual movement but only
the number of up’s and down’s is decisive. In other words, “uudd” as well
as “uddu,” etc. must lead to the same cash flow. But this is evident from the
fact that the increments are added.
(b) For the logarithmized cash flows
log(FCF
u
t ) = log(1 + ε1) + log(1 + ε2) · · · log(1 + εt ) .
Any log(1 + εt ) is binomial as in 1a. Hence, the proposition holds.
2. (a) This follows immediately from the fact that the sum of two standard
normally distributed variables is normally distributed again, the variance
being the sum of the individual variances.
(b) Following the above solution we have
log(FCF
u
t ) = log(1 + ε1) + log(1 + ε2) · · · log(1 + εt ) .
Any summand on the right-hand side is normally distributed with
expectation 0 and variance 1. The sum is therefore normally distributed with










(1 + gt )FCFut + εt+1|Ft
]
= (1 + gt )FCFut
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by Rule 5. Furthermore, for s > t
Cov [εs,εt ] = E [εs εt ]
= E [E [εs εt |Ft ]] by Rule 4


























ε(uu) if development is uu ,
ε(ud) if development is ud ,
ε(du) if development is du ,
ε(dd) if development is dd .
The first equation of the problem requires
0 = E [ε2] = E [ε2|F1]
or





2 if u ,
ε(du)+ε(dd)




= ε(du) + ε(dd)
2
= 0 .














x if uu ,
−x if ud ,
y if du ,
−y if dd ,
for arbitrary x,y.
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(b) The second equation of the problem
E [f (ε2)] = E [f (ε2)|F1]
is equivalent to







2 if u ,
f (ε(du))+f (ε(dd))
2 if d .
Since f is an arbitrary function, it is straightforward to see that a sufficient
and necessary condition is given by the following cases2:
Case 1: The following equations have to be satisfied:
ε(uu) = ε(du), and ε(ud) = ε(dd) .
Case 2: The following equations have to be satisfied:
ε(uu) = ε(dd), and ε(ud) = ε(du) .
We will from now on only consider case 1.
Since the increments must have expectation zero, we furthermore have
to add the requirement
ε(uu) + ε(ud) = 0, and ε(du) + ε(dd) = 0 .













x if uu ,
−x if ud ,
x if du ,
−x if dd ,
2The formal argument is: if
f (w) + f (x) + f (y) + f (z)
4
= f (w) + f (x)
2
= f (y) + f (z)
2
has to hold regardless of what f is, we must have w = y and x = z or w = z and x = y.
Otherwise, we could change the value f (w) without changing the function f outside w and get a
violation of the above assumption.
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x if uu ,
−x if ud ,
−x if du ,
x if dd ,
This is far more restrictive than the linear relation from 4a.







1 to be chosen properly: The two conditions imply
FCF
u
1(u) + ε(ud) = FCF
u
1(d) + ε(du)
and with independent increments and FCF
u
1(u) = 133.1 as well as
FCF
u
1(d) = 110.8 this cannot hold.
5. The solution of this problem runs absolutely parallel to the solution of prob-
lem 4. Noise terms are zero if and only if
ε(uu) + ε(ud)
2
= ε(du) + ε(dd)
2
= 0 .













x if uu ,
−x if ud ,
y if du ,
−y if dd ,
for arbitrary x,y.













x if uu ,
−x if ud ,
x if du ,
−x if dd ,














x if uu ,
−x if ud ,
−x if du ,
x if dd ,
for arbitrary x.
This solution for ε is different from problem 4. In problem 4 the (noise)























































































kE,u − g ,
if g < kE,u.
The dividend-price ratio is k
E,u−g
1+g .

















= kE,u − g
























(b) In this case the firm value is infinite.
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= FCFut + Xt







= FCFut + Xt.





























t and Xt are uncorrelated the variance of the firm is greater





































































and the expected capital gains rate is zero.





t+1 + ˜V ut+1|Ft
]





t+1 + ˜V ut+1|Ft
]


























































which is the first part of the claim.





t+1 + ˜V ut+1|Ft
]





t+1 + ˜V ut+1|Ft
]






































t+2 + ˜V ut+2|Ft
]
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which is almost the claim.







= (s − t)C + FCFut









































using an algebraic formula.3 In particular, the price-dividend ratio is not















(1 + x)s+1 = −
1
x2


































= ˜V ut +
C
kE,u






t+1 + ˜V ut+1|Ft
]





t+1 + ˜V ut+1|Ft
]
1 + rf =
˜V ut .



















































1 + rf . (7.1)







= 1 + rf






















= 1 + rf
1 + kE,u (
FCF
u





1 + kE,u − 1
)
.
Summarizing the terms with C gives the required result.
Now consider Theorem 3.3. Since C does not cancel in (7.1) this
intermediate result shows that our weak auto-regressive assumption will
violate Theorem 3.3. We have
C



















1 + rf .
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Hence, using this assumption about cash flows we can still use cost of
capital as discount rates but we have to add a correction term due to the
fact that C = 0.

















(1 + κt )(1 + κt+1) .
























(1 + κt )(1 + κt+1) .


















1 + κt+1 .



















implying rf = κt . This argument will apply to all κt .
































There is no other conclusion to be drawn from this problem than that
in this case the definition of discount rate κr→st cannot be simplified by
omitting r and s from κt . It is necessary to specify the time s when the cash
flow is paid and the time r when the cash flow is valued as well.
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7.2.1.1 Basics About Levered Firms








˜I s+1 + ˜Ds+1 + ˜Rs+1|Ft
]
1 + rf .








˜I s+2 + ˜Ds+2 + ˜Rs+2|Ft
]
1 + rf .



















˜I s+1 + ˜Rs+1|Ft
]
1 + rf +
EQ
[
˜I s+2 + ˜Rs+2|Ft
]





(1 + rf )2











˜I s + ˜Rs |Ft
]





(1 + rf )T−t .






2. The tax shield satisfies
















EQ [D0] = 100,





= 120 · 0.25 + 110 · 0.75 = 112.5.





= 150 · 0.252 + 145 · 2 · 0.25 · 0.75 + 100 · 0.752 = 120.
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Using both equations gives us
˜V l0 − ˜V u0 =
0.1 · 0.5 · 100
1 + 0.1 +
0.1 · 0.5 · 112.5
(1 + 0.1)2 +
0.1 · 0.5 · 120
(1 + 0.1)3
≈ 13.702.
3. Equation (3.11) implies


































˜V lt+1 − ˜V ut+1|Ft
]

















1+rf and taking into account that ˜Dt is known at time t (Rule 5) gives
EQ
[
˜V lt+1 − ˜V ut+1|Ft
]
1 + rf +
τ rf ˜Dt
1 + rf =
EQ
[
τ rf ˜Dt |Ft
]
1 + rf + . . . +
EQ
[





= ˜V lt − ˜V ut
and this is the claim.
We have shown that the value of the tax shield in t +1 and the value of the tax
shield in t are related by the above equation. Such a relation is sometimes called
recursive. If Q is unknown still an evaluation of the tax shield is possible if all
˜Dt are known using this recursive equation.
4. From (3.11) we have








(1 + rf )s+1−t
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and from this
















(1 + rf )s+1−t
















(1 + rf )s+1−t
















(1 + rf )s+1−t






















= (1 + gt )FCFut + τrf ˜Dt









For weak auto-regressive levered cash flows debt ˜Dt−1 must increase with the
growth rate
˜Dt = (1 + gt )˜Dt−1 = . . . = (1 + gt ) . . . (1 + g1)D0
and is therefore deterministic.
2. In the infinite example the value of the firm can be rearranged as follows:
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t + τrf Dt−1
˜V ut + τDt
= kE,u
˜V ut + rfkE,u τDt−1
˜V ut + τDt−1
.




the cash flows are uncertain. Then, the function





is strictly monotone and hence f (˜V ut ) will again be a random variable, i.e., if for
two different states ˜V ut (ω) is different from ˜V
u
t (ω
′), it will be true that dlt (ω) =
dlt (ω
′) and hence the dividend-price ratio is stochastic.
4. The conditional Q-probabilities are as in Fig. 3.1. From this, the unconditional
probabilities can easily be evaluated: see Table 7.1.















































as was to be shown.
Table 7.1 Unconditional Q-probabilities
Time Q(·)
t = 1 Q1(u) = 0.0833, Q1(d) = 0.9167
t = 2 Q2(uu) = 0.00347, Q2(ud) = 0.07986, Q2(du) = 0.11458, Q2(dd) = 0.80208
t = 3 Q3(uuu) = 0.00130, Q3(uud) = 0.00217, Q2(udu) = 0.05657, Q2(duu) = 0.08116,
Q3(udd) = 0.02329, Q3(dud) = 0.08116, Q3(ddu) = 0.33420, Q3(ddd) = 0.46788
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1 − τ Q3(d|dd)




· D2 · (1 − 0.5833) + 48.4 − 0.5 · D21 − 0.5 0.5833
˜k
D,nom




From this equation it is clear that there will be default if D2 ≥ 46.09, otherwise
˜k
D,nom
2 (dd) = 10 %.

















1 + 3.04024 − 135.531
D2
)
· D2 · (1 − 0.5) + 11−0.5 (48.4 − 0.5D2) · 0.5
D2
− 1
≈ 0.52012 − 19.3654
D2
for D2 ≥ 46.09, otherwise ˜kD2 (dd) = 10 %.
Remark For very large D2 there will be a default at state ω = duu (and probably
uud, udu as well) which requires a more complicated evaluation that we will not
present here.
7.2.3 Financing Based on Market Values
























1 + 0.18 +
110
(1 + 0.18)2 +
121
(1 + 0.18)3 ≈ 237.39.





















1+0.18 + 133.1(1+0.18)2 ≈ 198.13 if up,
99
1+0.18 + 108.9(1+0.18)2 ≈ 162.11 if down.
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198.13 ≈ 30.28 % if up,
40
162.11 ≈ 24.67 % if down.
The Miles–Ezzell formula must not be applied.
(c) The WACC textbook formula will give us the cost of equity of the levered
firm since




+ rf (1 − τ )˜l1(u)








1 (d) ≈ 22.26 %.






















1 (d) ≈ 0.2226 · (1 − 0.2467)+ 0.1 · 0.2467 ≈ 19.24 %.
Note that we did all calculations using EXCEL and rounded the numbers
only after all calculations were done.
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2. We have
WACC − kE,u(1 − τ l0) = (1 + WACC) −
(
1 + kE,u(1 − τ l)
)
= (1 + kE,u)
(
1 − τrf




1 + kE,u(1 − τ l)
)
= (k
E,u − rf )τ l
1 + rf > 0
which was to be shown.








































1 − τrf1+rf l
)
− 1
which gives the result after some rearranging.
4. We have






1 + rf lt
)






1 + rf + (E
[
r˜M
] − rf )βE,ut
)
(
1 − τ rf
1 + rf lt
)
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] − rf lt .
7.2.4 Financing Based on Book Values
1. (a) First, since
FCF
u
t+1 = FCFu0 + ε1 + . . . + εt
and using the hint we know that the cash flows are normally distributed. They
have expectation FCFu0 and variance t .







































t . Hence, the whole sum is again





n − (t − s)
n




When evaluating the variance we have to take into account that the FCF
u
s are





























































+ . . . + n
n
}













εs + (n + 2)(n + 1 − 2)
2n
εt−n+2
+ (n + 3)(n + 1 − 3)
2n














+ (n + 2)
2(n + 1 − 2)2
4n2
Var[εt−n+2]+
+ (n + 3)
2(n + 1 − 3)2
4n2
Var[εt−n+3] + . . . + (n + n)





Since the variance of all noise terms is 1, this can be simplified to
α2
[
n2(n + 1)2(t − n)
4n2
+ (n + 1)
2(n + 1 − 1)2
4n2
+ (n + 2)
2(n + 1 − 2)2
4n2
+ (n + 3)
2(n + 1 − 3)2
4n2
+ . . . + (n + n)




Although this is a complicated sum it can nevertheless be evaluated (for
example, using Mathematica) and we get
α2
[
n2(n + 1)2(t − n)
4n2
+ (n + 1)(1 + 2n)
(





(1 + n)(2 + 15tn(n + 1) + 8n − 3n2 − 7n3)
60n
.
This is the variance of the book value of the firm.
These evaluations show two interesting things:
– The expectation of the future book value does not depend on time. It stays
constant at a level above the book value today.
– The variance does depend on time. With higher t the variance increases,
the increase is linear with slope α (n+1)
2
4 .
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2. The value of the firm that is financed by book value is given by
V l0(finan. book value) = V u0 + τD0 +








+ 0.34 · 500
+ 4 · 0.05 − 1 + (1 + 0.05)
−4




The Miles–Ezzell formula for infinite lifetime (see problem 3 in Sect. 3.4.7)
can be applied, but l0 is not known (if l0 were equal to l, then book and market
value would coincide). Hence,























This can be rearranged to





















Obviously, the difference is very big.
7.2.5 Other Financing Policies
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since δ < 1. The same holds for γ and 11+rf . Now Theorem 3.25 reduces to
limT ,n→∞ V l0 = (1 − 0 (1 − τ (1 − 0)))D0
+ (1 − 0 (1 − τ (1 − 0)) − τ (1 − 0)) Div
rf (1 − τ )
+
(






which was to be shown.
2. In a binomial model, the individual probabilities Q can be determined (see
Fig. 3.1).
(a) Using (3.11) this gives
V l0 = V u0 + (˜D1(u)Q1(u) + ˜D1(d)Q1(d))
τ rf
(1 + rf )2











and since debt cannot be negative, the highest value of V l0 is achieved for
˜D1(d) = 200, ˜D1(u) = 0 .
This yields a firm value of 164.87.
7.3 Personal Income Tax
7.3.1 Unlevered and Levered Firms
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and from this
Q1(u) ≈ −0.125, Q1(d) ≈ 1.125 .
Any claim that pays one dollar after tax if up and nothing after tax if down must
have a price of
V u0 =
Q1(u)
1 + rf (1 − τ ) < 0
and this is an arbitrage opportunity. If kE,u = 15% we get
Q1(u) ≈ 0.0652, Q1(d) ≈ 0.9348 . (7.2)
To evaluate Q2(dd), . . . we concentrate on t = 1. Analogously, we must have






Q2(u|u) ≈ 0.0217, Q2(d|u) ≈ 0.9783 .
Now
Q2(uu) = Q1(u)Q2(u|u) ≈ 0.0014
Q2(ud) = Q1(u)Q2(u|d) ≈ 0.0638
and analogously
Q2(du) ≈ 0.1016, Q2(dd) ≈ 0.8332 .
2. Equation (4.4) implies
˜V lt+1 = ˜V ut+1 + (1 − τD)˜At+1 +
EQ
[
τ I rf (1 − τD)˜At+1|Ft+1
]




τ I rf (1 − τD)˜AT−1|Ft+1
]














τ I rf (1 − τD)˜At+1|Ft
]
1 + rf (1 − τ I ) + . . . +
EQ
[
τ I rf (1 − τD)˜AT−1|Ft
]
(1 + rf (1 − τ I ))T−t−1




˜V lt+1 − ˜V ut+1 − (1 − τD)˜At+1|Ft
]
1 + rf (1 − τ I ) =
EQ
[
τ I rf (1 − τD)˜At+1|Ft
]




τ I rf (1 − τD)˜AT−1|Ft
]




τ I rf (1−τD)˜At |Ft
]
1+rf (1−τ I ) results in
EQ
[
˜V lt+1 − ˜V ut+1|Ft
]
1 + rf (1 − τ I ) +
EQ
[
τ I rf (1 − τD)˜At − (1 − τD)˜At+1|Ft
]
1 + rf (1 − τ I ) =
EQ
[
τ I rf (1 − τD)˜At |Ft
]
1 + rf (1 − τ I ) +
EQ
[
τ I rf (1 − τD)˜At+1|Ft
]




τ I rf (1 − τD)˜AT−1|Ft
]
(1 + rf (1 − τ I ))T−t =
˜V lt − ˜V ut − (1 − τD)˜At .
Reshuffling gives
˜V lt − ˜V ut =
EQ
[
˜V lt+1 − ˜V ut+1|Ft
]
1 + rf (1 − τ I ) +
(1 + rf )(1 − τD)







1 + rf (1 − τ I ) .
3. We have
















1 − τ I ))s−t+1







1 − τD) rf ˜At
1 + rf
(












1 − τ I ))s−t+1
= ˜V ut +
(1 + rf )(1 − τD)













1 − τ I ))s−t+1
= ˜V ut +
(1 + rf )(1 − τD)















1 − τ I ))s−t
(1 − τ I )rf
1 + rf (1 − τ I )
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= ˜V ut +
(1 + rf )(1 − τD)



















1 + rf (1 − τ I )
)
= ˜V ut +
(1 + rf )(1 − τD)






























1 − τ I ))s−t+1
= ˜V ut +
(1 + rf )(1 − τD)






























1 − τ I ))s−t
using ˜AT = 0. Rearranging gives
˜V lt = ˜V ut +
(1 + rf )(1 − τD)




































1 + rf (1 − τI )
and this is equivalent to
˜V lt = ˜V ut +
1 − τD















1 − τ I ))s−t .
7.3.2 Excursus: Cost of Equity and Tax Rate




GCFt+1 + ˜V ut+1 − τ (GCFt+1 + ˜V ut+1 − ˜V ut )|Ft
]
˜V ut
= (1 − τ )
E
[
GCFt+1 + ˜V ut+1|Ft
]
˜V ut
= (1 − τ )kpre-tax.








GCFs (1 − τ )|Ft
]












(1 − τ ) (1 + rf
)s−t










(1 − τ ) (1 + rf
)s−t







(1 − τ ) (1 + rf
)s−t
(1 + rf (1 − τ ))s−t
= (1 − τ )GCFt
(1+kpre-tax)(1+rf (1−τ ))
1+rf − 1
and this is obviously different from
(1 − τ )GCFt
kpre-tax(1 − τ ) .
























Q1(u) ≈ 0.0652, Q1(d) ≈ 0.93478 .
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0.0652 · 120 + 0.93478 · 80
1.05
≈ 100
1 + k′ ,
and hence
k′ ≈ 27.105 % .
(c) This is the same calculation except that we have to add taxes:
EQ
[
(1 − τ )GCF1
]
1 + rf (1 − τ ) =
E
[
(1 − τ )GCF1
]
1 + k(1 − τ )
Q1(u)(1 − τ )GCF1(u) + Q1(d)(1 − τ )GCF1(d)
1 + rf (1 − τ ) =
E
[
(1 − τ )GCF1
]
1 + k(1 − τ )
Q1(u)(1 − τ )110 + Q1(d)(1 − τ )90
1 + 0.05(1 − τ ) =
100(1 − τ )
1 + 0.15(1 − τ ) ,
and hence
Q1(u) ≈ 2.8333 (0.176471 + τ )
7.6667 − τ , Q1(d) = 1 − Q1(u) .
(d) The calculation is as above,
EQ
[
(1 − τ )GCF1
]
1 + rf (1 − τ ) =
E
[
(1 − τ )GCF1
]
1 + k′(1 − τ )
Q1(u)(1 − τ )GCF1(u) + Q1(d)(1 − τ )GCF1(d)
1 + rf (1 − τ ) =
E
[
(1 − τ )GCF1
]
1 + k′(1 − τ )
Q1(u)(1 − τ )120 + Q1(d)(1 − τ )80
1 + 0.05(1 − τ ) =
100(1 − τ )
1 + 15.5 %(1 − τ ) ,
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and hence
Q1(u) ≈ 1.1667 (1.85714 + τ )
7.6667 − τ , Q1(d) = 1 − Q1(u) .
This is different from the result in 3c.
7.3.3 Retention Policies
1. From (4.4) it follows that the market value is maximized if the retentions are as
large as possible. Since necessarily
˜A3 = 0,
we only look at ˜A1 and ˜A2. We will determine the highest possible retention and
evaluate the corresponding market value of the firm.
If the company maintains its highest possible retention, the cash flows to the















We put this into (4.4) and get, using Theorem 4.4,
V l0 = V u0 +




(1 + rf (1 − τ I ))2 +




(1 + rf (1 − τ I ))3
= V u0 +







(1 + rf (1 − τ I ))2 +







(1 + rf (1 − τ I ))3
= V u0 +






(1 + rf (1 − τ I ))2 +






(1 + rf (1 − τ I ))3 +






(1 + rf (1 − τ I ))3
= V u0 +






(1 + kE,u)(1 + rf (1 − τ I )) +






(1 + kE,u)(1 + rf (1 − τ I ))2
+






(1 + kE,u)2(1 + rf (1 − τ I ))
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≈ 249.692 + 0.5 · 0.1 · 100
(1 + 0.15) · (1 + 0.1 · (1 − 0.5))
+ 0.5 · 0.1 · (1 + 0.1) · 100
(1 + 0.15) · (1 + 0.1 · (1 − 0.5))2
+ 0.5 · 0.1 · 110
(1 + 0.15)2 · (1 + 0.1 · (1 − 0.5))
≈ 260.061 .

























Following Eq. (4.4) we get
˜V lt = ˜V ut +
(









1 − τ I ) + . . .
+
(









1 − τ I )T−t−1
+
(










1 − τ I ))T−t
.
After some minimal reshuffling the following results:
˜V lt = ˜V ut +
(












1+rf (1−τ I )
˜At+1 −
(











1+rf (1−τ I )
˜AT−1 −
(





1 − τ I ))T−t
.
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This brings us to the conclusion,
˜V lt = ˜V ut +
(






















1 − τ I ))T−t
.
In case of autonomous retention, with an eternally living firm this simply
yields
˜V lt = ˜V ut + A.
7.4 Corporate and Personal Income Tax
1. We get
˜V lt = ˜V ut +
(
1 − τD) (1 − τC)
1 − τ I A + τ
CD
= 500 + (1 − 0.5) · (1 − 0.5)
1 − 0.5 10 + 0.5 · 100
= 555.
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book value of, 115
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